COMPLEXITY IN DISASTERS: A CASE STUDY OF THE HAITIAN EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE by Connor, David J.
ABSTRACT
Title of thesis: COMPLEXITY IN DISASTERS: A CASE STUDY OF THE HAITIAN 
EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE
David Connor, Master of Arts, 2011
Thesis directed by: Professor Elizabeth Toth
Department of Communication
This case study explores the development of an international crisis response from 
the perspective of the United States Coast Guard (USCG). Crisis managers, responders, 
and communicators from the USCG and from partner agencies were interviewed, as well 
as representatives from the Haitian publics of the response. The resulting narrative was 
used to test the previously untested Situational Theory of Problem Solving (STPS) and 
complexity theory, which had not previously been applied to international disaster 
response. Findings validated both theories and demonstrated the importance of cultural 
translators in effecting international disaster response. This study served as a 
preliminary test of STPS, and a first international application of complexity theory. 
Practical implications include guidance for crisis managers on how to respond to crises 
in a complex world, as well as how to harness cultural awareness when responding 
internationally.




Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Elizabeth L. Toth, Chair
Professor Linda Aldoory






To the people who had nothing to give but their perspectives.
 iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank...
Dr. Elizabeth Toth for patience and grace in the face of eager ambition.
Dr. Brooke Liu for introducing me to the world of crisis communication and teaching 
me to navigate it.
Dr. Linda Aldoory for letting me go barefoot, but keeping me shod when it mattered.
Folks for being the first qualitative scholars I knew.
Angelina for support, teamwork, friendship, and love.
The USCG Public Affairs Office for generous funding and the autonomy to put it to 
use.
The US Embassy in Haiti for not asking too many questions while answering all of 
mine.
Will Brown and Melanie Coull for my introduction to Haiti, from the airport to the 
seashore.
Alexis and Ben Erkert-Depp for enlightening perspectives, honest criticism, and love 
for the Haitian people.
My colleagues for fostering a perfect balance of unfettered academic curiosity and free 
spirited humanity.
Melissa Plummer for being my foot in the door.








Chapter 2: Literature Review..........................................................................................5
Conceptual Definitions......................................................................5
Theories............................................................................................11













A Narrative Timeline of the Response................................57
Emergent Themes................................................................71
RQ2..................................................................................................79
Publics of the USCG Response...........................................82
RQ3..................................................................................................97
Awareness of Haitian Culture.............................................97
Perceptions of Violence.....................................................100
Considerations of Culture in Communication..................105
Consequences of Cultural Considerations.........................117
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion........................................................................121
Theoretical Implications...............................................................123
Complexity Theory............................................................123
Situational Theory of Problem Solving.............................135
Practical Implication.....................................................................143
Limitations....................................................................................148
Directions for Future Research.....................................................149
Conclusion.....................................................................................150
Appendix A: Interview Schedule.......................................................................................153
Appendix B: Consent Form for Interviews.......................................................................156
Appendix C: Table 1: List of Publics..................................................................................158
Appendix D: Table 2: Complex Systems of the Response................................................159
Appendix E: Figures 1-3: STPS Models of USCG Problems.............................................160
Appendix F: Sample Prompt-list for Crisis Managers......................................................163





On January 12th, 2010, an earthquake leveled Port-au-Prince and 
surrounding cities, decimating an already weak infrastructure, and killing more 
than 200,000 Haitians (USGS, 2011). Haitians responded first, pulling one 
another out from under rubble for days before a massive international response 
provided relief. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) Cutter FORWARD was 
one of the first international relief agencies on-scene, arriving in Port au Prince 
harbor early the next morning. Both the USCG and the Haitian people are 
familiar with disaster - the USCG has a history of both domestic and international 
disaster response and Haiti shares the fate of most Caribbean countries, directly 
in the path of westbound hurricanes swollen from warm equatorial waters. Both 
groups faced grave dangers, high levels of uncertainty, and low control over the 
environment, especially as aftershocks continued to rattle an already shaken 
public. 
The USCG, at 42,000 active duty members (USCG, 2010), is only slightly 
larger than the New York City Police Department (NYPD, 2011). Covering 11 
major mission areas ranging from port security to drug interdiction to search and 
rescue to marine environmental protection, the USCG lives by the motto Semper 
Paratus, Latin for “always ready.” The Coast Guard maintains a permanent 
liaison officer to Haiti. Migrant interdiction is one of the USCG’s primary mission 
areas, which requires frequent interaction between USCG sailors and Haitians 
attempting to enter the United States by sea. Disaster response, another primary 
mission, has also been a routine intersection between the USCG and Haitian 
nationals. In responding to the chaos, destruction, and uncertainty of the 
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earthquake’s aftermath, the USCG faced a complex array of challenges - health 
and safety risks, logistical concerns, a language barrier, and a 200 year history of  
conflict, both overt and subtle, between Haiti and the government of the United 
States. The challenges were not limited to international interaction. The USCG 
was a component of a “whole of government” US response comprising 
Department of Defense assets, civilian US Government (USG) agencies, and Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), all descending on Haiti without a 
formalized framework to cooperate within.
The field of crisis management and communication has grown to 
incorporate numerous other disciplines and theoretical backgrounds in pursuit of 
image repair, crisis abatement and organizational survival (Gilpin & Murphy, 
2008). Today, there are still knowledge gaps addressing crisis response factors 
including race, gender and culture (Tierney, 2002). Two recent theories - 
complexity theory and the Situational Theory of Problem Solving (STPS) - 
present more complete considerations of context and of the nature of interactions 
with and among the affected populations in crisis situations. Haiti, a country that 
has suffered the push and pull of international tensions for its two-hundred years 
as an independent state, seems uniquely, even tragically qualified as an exemplar 
to provide insight into how subtle, complex historical and cultural factors affect 
the preparation, execution and reception of a crisis response.
Purpose of Study
More than a year has passed since the earthquake, and at the time of 
writing, Haiti remains in crisis. Probable causes of the continued crisis abound, 
ranging from economics to infrastructure to politics to circumstance. In my study 
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I focused on the immediate, short-term response to the earthquake, comprising 
the first month of the aftermath. My goal throughout was to determine the overall 
progression of the USCG’s communicative response effort as well as the external 
and internal formative forces. I was particularly interested in exploring whether 
historical or cultural context affected the planning or reception of response 
efforts.
Significance of Study
The existence of organizations such as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and the USCG are testament to the inevitability of 
disasters. In an increasingly globalized world, the consequences of and 
obligations to respond to international disasters will increase pressures on 
American response agencies to bridge cultural and national borders while 
delivering relief services in unfamiliar and uncertain environments. 
This study contributes to both the academic field and real-world practice 
of crisis communications and management. The STPS and complexity theory 
offer theoretical frameworks from which to approach crisis situations. Lessons 
learned from this study support and expand on both theories, adding to the 
limited body of research applying complexity theory and the situational theory of 
problem solving to crisis situations. 
Organization of Thesis
I begin by clarifying the terms I plan to use, because considerable variation 
exists in the fields of crisis communication and disaster communication. 
Following that, I discuss the situational theory of problem solving, and then 
compare and contrast the tenets of complexity theory and chaos theory to one 
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another and to this study. Finally, I touch on Haitian history as it may apply to 
complexity theory, which sets the context through which we should view the 
events and response. Following that, I pose the research questions, present the 
methodology, sampling techniques, and data analysis procedures. I present my 
findings, and a discussion of the results. I conclude with the theoretical and 
practical implications, limitations of the study and directions for future research.
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Chapter  2 Literature Review 
Dedicated case studies of crisis communication through the lens of 
complexity theory remain rare. The situational theory of publics (STP) has been 
applied more frequently, but never in a side-by-side comparison to complexity 
theory. I found no applications of Kim and Grunig’s (2011) STPS. Both 
complexity theory and the STPS would suggest that pre-determined crisis plans 
would be insufficient even to a partially anticipated response, much less the 
unprecedented situation that the earthquake presented to Haiti. For this reason 
my study will aim to understand the formation and execution of the USCG’s crisis 
responses to the earthquake in Haiti of 12 January, 2010. I hoped to examine how 
the response was shaped and executed and to determine if the reality of the 
response fit or deviated from the two theories. Case study tests of these nascent 
theories contribute to a body of knowledge applicable to crisis response 
practitioners in a globalized world. 
Conceptual Definitions
Crisis is variously defined by scholars based on theoretical grounding, 
scope of interest, and, seemingly, personal preference. Fearn-Banks (2011) 
defined crisis as: “A major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome 
affecting the organization,” (p. 2), which I argue could be expanded to encompass 
groups, communities, or societies. Coombs (2012) definition emphasized 
stakeholders, labeling crisis: “The perception of an unpredictable event that 
threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an 
organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes” (p. 2). Hagan 
(2007) enumerated synonymous terms including predicament, emergency, 
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calamity, disaster, or catastrophe (p. 414). Botan (2006) listed two important 
characteristics of crisis: a demand for a resolution in a time frame too short for 
the organization to engage in its normal decision making process, and an 
improbability that the organization will be able to return, for better or worse, to  
its pre-crisis state (p. 244). This concept is inherent to complexity theory, where 
a pre-crisis state can never be regained due to the situated, historically contextual 
nature of a crisis (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008).
Crisis management and crisis communication, while closely related, are 
not interchangeable terms describing the crisis response process. Fearn-Banks 
(2011), writing on crisis management, described a process of strategic planning 
for a crisis or negative turning point, a process that removes some of the risk and 
uncertainty from the negative occurrence and thereby allows the organization to 
be in greater control of its own destiny. Fearn-Banks defined crisis  
communication as the dialogue between the organization and its public(s) prior 
to, during, and after the negative occurrence. The dialogue details strategies and 
tactics designed to minimize damage to the image of the organization.
Gilpin and Murphy (2008) favored crisis management over crisis  
communication in their discussion of complexity theory, stating a desire to 
“emphasize the comprehensive mind-set involved in crisis” (p. 7), seemingly 
sensible in a disaster context because of the additional duties of the 
communicator to ensure that messages can actually be disseminated. Seeger 
(2002), presented a chaos-based theory of crisis communication, labeling crisis 
communication as a boon to self-organization. Because I will be examining 
multiple levels of communications hierarchy, and the ongoing process of making 
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broad communications decisions, I will classify the phenomenon I am studying as 
crisis management and acknowledge that communication comprises a critical 
portion of its execution.
Strategic communication management mandates the communication or 
public relations function to operate at a social or macro level of the organization 
(Steyn, 2007). Grunig, Grunig and Dozier (2002) presented this symmetric 
communication as a normative standard in their writing on the excellence study, 
though others maintain that the ultimate purpose is simpler: facilitating 
persuasion on the organization’s behalf (Pfau & Wan, 2006). In strategic 
communication management, the PR or Public Affairs department provides the 
societal view of an organization and its potential actions to aid in the decision 
making process, a reflective trait that Vercic, Van Ruler, Bütschi and Flodin 
(2001) addressed in their discussion of European perspectives on public 
relations. Strategic communication management played a key role in the Coast 
Guard’s response to the earthquake. 
Disasters and crises, while often equated by mass media, are not mutually 
inclusive. Disasters are events on a community or larger social group scale that 
“disrupt or threaten to disrupt social context, cause deaths or casualties, destroy 
property and infrastructure, and disrupt communications” (Killian, 2002, p. 50). 
The International Telecommunications Union (1998) provided a more detailed 
description, labeling disasters a:
Serious  disruption  of  the  functioning  of  society, posing a specific, 
widespread threat to human life, health, property, or the environment, 
whether  caused  by  accident,  nature  or  human  activity,  and whether 
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developing  suddenly  or  as  the  result  of  complex,  long  term processes. 
(p. 5).
Early disaster studies in the United States aimed to extrapolate the 
structural impacts of a war on American soil, comparing earthquakes to air raids 
or industrial accidents to chemical attacks (Quarantelli, 1987). Gilbert (1995)  
described the conceptual transition of disaster as originating in an action, which 
manifests a result and incurs a social consequence: “Disaster is tightly linked to 
uncertainty that occurs when a danger, whether real or not, threatens a 
community, and this danger cannot be defined through causes or effects (p. 237)”
Communication is as broadly and variably defined as crisis. Early 
definitions assigned the label to a source transmitting a message of shared 
symbols, understandings, and identifications to a receiver, with conscious intent 
to affect the latter’s behavior (Miller, 1966;  Nilsen, 1957). Later revisions 
removed the necessity for affective intent, focusing more on the co-creation of 
meaning (Barnlund, 1978), while modern discussions of communication, 
specifically in a crisis context, have noted that messages can be decoded 
differently than they were encoded (Wester, 2009). For the purpose of my 
research, I will view ideal communication as a two-way, reflexive, self-correcting 
process, though I do not believe that all instances of communication that I study 
will necessarily adapt to this ideal. Communication is an emergent process of 
meaning-making between two or more individuals, and as such, is present in the 
formation and action of publics.
A public is a network of individuals self-organized around a problem 
(Grunig, 1978, 1997, 2003). Publics can be classified as active, aware, latent, or  
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inactive based on their level of involvement, tendency to seek information, and 
recognition of constraints on behavior (Van Leuven, 1991).  Grunig (2003) also 
classified publics by scope of concern. An all-issue public is universally active, 
while apathetic publics are universally inactive. Single-issue publics focus on a 
concern affecting only a small portion of the population and hot-issue publics are 
active on a single, widely covered, broadly impacting problem. I anticipate that I 
will be able to identify various types of these publics in my study, specifically the 
hot issue public, though I do not aim to predict the specific issues around which 
the publics will organize. 
There are many definitions of public relations, and they generally suggest 
the strategic management of relationships and information flow across selected 
channels with chosen publics internal and external to an organization (Coombs, 
2001; Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 1985; Lattimore, Baskin, Heiman, Toth, 2006; 
PRSA, 2011). For my study I preferredHeath's (2001) definition of promoting 
ideas favorable to the organization while scanning the publics for potential issues 
and prompting appropriate action most appropriate because it was similar to the 
Coast Guard's definition of public affairs.
Public affairs, while often used interchangeably with public relations,  
“combines government relations, communications, issues management and 
corporate citizenship strategies to influence public policy, build a strong 
reputation and find common ground with stakeholders.” (PAC, 2011). The US 
Coast Guard definition of public affairs, which is the logical definition to use in 
an exploration of USCG response, emphasizes engagement with media, 
legislative, and intergovernmental publics (USCG, 2011). Toth (2006) listed five 
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criteria of the public affairs domain: non-commercial environment, public policy, 
the public policy process, community and communal relationships, and the 
opinions of publics. The USCG response function, a non-commercial 
manifestations of public policy and the public policy process directed at building 
communal relationships and influencing public opinion, fits the definition of a 
public affairs function.
Culture is a broadly defined and controversial concept, but one that I must 
attempt to address and define as applicable to my study. Aldoory (2009) offered a 
relevant definition: “A system of values and norms, ideology, subjective states, 
ritual and discourse that influence attitudes, perceptions, communication, and 
actions, within a historical context” (p. 229). This definition shares the 
underlying concepts I have explored, specifically communication and historical 
context. Durkheim (1995) argued that culture influences cognition, and that 
social context is critical to understanding beliefs and attitudes, which is  
important in an international response context. Though Aldoory approached 
culture from a perspective of risk communication, other research has applied it to 
crisis management. 
From a complexity perspective, culture becomes the shared characteristics 
of a complex system “present at the level of individual elements, such as the 
experience and personal opinions of organizational members, as well as at the 
macroscopic level in the rituals and other features of a shared culture” (Gilpin & 
Murphy, 2008, P. 30). Keselman, Slaughter, and Patel (2005) explored the 
effects of culture, which they described as differential knowledge backgrounds, 
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on public comprehension of disaster information, and suggested that it could 
cause disparities in the way lay publics interpreted health messages. 
Race and ethnicity are frequently equated to culture. Spence, Lachlan, and 
Griffin (2007) examined preparation and post-disaster response to Hurricane 
Katrina, finding differences in evacuation percentages, hurricane preparation, 
and post-hurricane information seeking between Caucasian, African-American, 
and other minority groups. The authors theorized that a portion of this difference 
was attributable to a historical distrust of authorities by African-Americans. River 
and Miller (2007) identified “the increasing complexity of natural disasters...the 
interplay of geospatial, social, cultural, and economic factors in a community’s 
environment” (p. 503) in their discussion of natural disasters framing the African 
American experience. 
Theories
Situational Theory of Problem Solving and Publics
The STP was expanded to a STPS by Kim and Grunig in 2011. In 
consideration of observations of individual behavior in problem environments, 
new research on the original STP, and new and reconsidered variables of the 
process, Kim and Grunig created a framework describing a broader relationship 
between the factors that create problem recognition and how they encourage or 
discourage publics to communicate towards problem solving. This theory 
included the three original situational perceptional antecedents of problem 
recognition, level of involvement, and constraint recognition, and reincorporated 
a redefined version of the previously discarded cognitive referential criterion 
(Kim & Grunig, 2011).  
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Kim and Grunig (2011) created a hybridized and expanded version of the 
previous dependent variables of information seeking and information 
processing and named it communicative action in problem solving. Grunig did 
not intend the STPS to replace his previous STP, so I will blend my discussion of 
the two in the areas on which they overlap. I will first discuss the antecedents and 
intervening criterion, and then the new dependent variable.
The antecedent variables included the STP variables of problem 
recognition, level of involvement, and constraint recognition. Problem 
recognition, defined as the “perception that something is missing and that there 
is no immediately applicable solution to it” (Kim & Grunig, 2011, p. 128) 
addresses the combination of perceptual and cognitive problems, the former 
labeling “the discrepancy between expected and experienced states,” and the 
latter labeling the lack of a solution to the discrepancy (p. 128). Level of 
involvement is defined as “involvement recognition—a perceived connection 
between the self and the problem situation,” (p. 130) and the authors note that 
level of involvement measures the perception of involvement, not the reality of 
involvement. Constraint recognition retains its definition from Grunig’s (1997) 
STP, and occurs when “people perceive that there are obstacles in a situation that 
limit their ability to do anything about the situation” (p. 130). Perceived 
constraints can be either internal or external - a recognized cognitive or 
experiential limitation or an environmental obstacle.
The referent criterion, though discarded in Grunig’s (1997, 2003) previous 
updates to his STP, is redefined in a cognitive versus perceptual frame: “Any 
knowledge or subjective judgmental system that influences the way in which one 
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approaches problem solving” (Kim & Grunig, 2011, p. 131). The referent criterion 
includes decision guidelines, decision rules, and any information that a problem 
solver can reference that decreases the need for new data, thus decreasing the 
necessity for communicative action to arrive at a solution to the problem. The 
authors also included a subjective aspect of the referent criterion, including 
wishful and willful thinking as strongly affective of communicative action.
The inclusion of the referent criterion is particularly important to my 
study of the earthquake response, because some of the USCG responders and 
communicators had previous experience with either the general population or the 
general situation but others were inexperienced. The two experience groups 
approached the problem of establishing post-disaster communications with 
different frames of reference. Antecedent factors are similar to the referent 
criterion in that they can influence involvement, motivation and cognition, and 
have been studied in relation to the STP (Aldoory & Sha, 2007).
Building on social psychology’s recognition of motivation as an important 
antecedent or consequence of informational needs and uses (Higgins & 
Kruglanski, 2000), Kim and Grunig (2011) introduced situational motivation in 
problem solving as a mediator of the previously defined perceptual variables on 
communicative action, more specifically as a “state of situation-specific cognitive 
and epistemic readiness to make problem-solving efforts” (p. 132). Referential 
criterion are not affected because they are cognitive instead of perceptual. 
Kim and Grunig (2011) expanded the two domains of information seeking 
and information processing to three domains covering six variables. The three 
domains of information acquisition, selection, and transmission address both 
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seeking and elements of processing, and incorporate the concept of information 
sharing, which addressed observed problem solving efforts showing that publics 
actively engage in information sharing and selection among their members. The 
three domains are further subdivided into passive (information attending, 
information permitting, and information sharing) and active variables 
(information seeking, information forefending, and information forwarding). 
The division is based on their general postulate: “The more one commits to 
problem resolution, the more one becomes acquisitive of information pertaining 
to the problem, selective in dealing with information, and transmissive in giving 
it to others” (p. 125). 
Information seeking and attending have roots in Grunig’s (1997, 2003) 
STP, and address the tendency of an individual to actively search for or passively 
attend to information relating to a problem. An active problem solver will engage 
in both behaviors, while a passive individual will only attend to information that 
the individual happens to come across (Kim & Grunig, 2011). In a disaster 
scenario, this could be manifested as the difference between waiting for aid or 
seeking it out.
Information forefending and permitting describe how selective a problem 
solver will be when working to optimize or economize the available information. 
Information forefending is defined as “the extent to which a communicator fends 
off certain information in advance by judging its value and relevance for a given 
problem-solving task,” (p. 126) and the authors’ application of it was influenced 
by persuasion scholar Chaiken’s (1980) observations of participants using 
forethought or heuristic information processing when evaluating arguments. 
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Problem solvers who practice information permitting accept any information 
available, regardless of whether it directly applies to the problem, which can 
overload the process.
Information sharing and forwarding both address information giving. 
Information sharing is passive, a reactive response to a request for opinions, 
ideas, or expertise about the problem. Information forwarding, in contrast, is a 
proactive ‘push’ of unsolicited information that the sender considers relevant. 
Information can include both problem perceptions to build consensus within a 
public and preferred solution to unify towards action (Kim & Grunig, 2011). 
Grunig (1997) described his STP as teleological instead of a deterministic. 
It can be used to predict when people will think about a problem, but not the 
content or nature of their thoughts. Though active publics will be more likely to 
engage in communication and exhibit attitudinal and cognitive effects of the 
communication than passive publics, a given communication program will not 
necessarily produce the intended change. Modifying this statement, and 
applicable both to the STP and the STPS, is Grunig’s reminder that “people 
cannot be affected by messages that they do not seek or even process” (p. 38).
The STP has been applied in numerous studies (Aldoory, 2001, Grunig, 
1993, 2003, 2011, Major, 1998), but there are few studies examining perceptions 
of an impact by one public on another. Grunig’s examination in 1983 of 
journalists and their perceptions of their audience and his 1989 study on the 
effects of an activist public on a non-activist public are the two examples I found. 
There is a gap in the literature regarding perceptions that disaster responders 
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hold of populations they are assisting, and vice versa. A deeper understanding of 
this relationship, and how each public regards one another, could contribute to 
future disaster responses. 
Chaos Theory and Complexity Theory
Chaos theory and complexity theory both originated outside of the field of 
communications theory, but both have been adapted and applied in crisis 
response scenarios (Gilpin and Murphy, 2006; Murphy, 1996; Seeger, 2002; 
Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002; van Uden, Richardson, Cilliers, 2001) and the 
terms have often been used interchangeably or with minimal differentiation. I 
relied on the perspective of complexity theory, which shares some concepts with 
chaos theory. In this section I describe the two theories and explain the 
differences between complex, chaotic, and complicated systems. Throughout my 
discussion, I relate the applicable concepts to my research  and indicate the gaps 
that I feel my research addressed.
Chaos Theory
Seeger (2002) proposed an approach to crisis communication based on 
chaos theory following Murphy’s (1996) initial suggestion that the theory be 
integrated into the field of crisis communications. Seeger labeled previous crisis 
response methods as reductionist, which Goldberg and Markóczy (2000) defined 
as explanations relying previously understood terms or simpler concepts and the 
interactions between them, often without recourse to intermediate levels. 
Complex systems are dynamic due to their non-linear nature, multidirectional 
causality, and instability over time. Both complex and chaotic systems are 
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considered irreducible, a concept often explained by the mathematical concept of 
fractals. 
Fractals are a mathematical concept first named by Mandelbrot (1982) 
that describe non-linear calculations whose graphical representations illustrate  
the effect of small consistent changes over time. Mandelbrot's classic example 
used the coastline of England, which would be measured very differently at scales 
of one, ten, 100, and 1000 meters, despite having a consistent pattern of bays, 
harbors, and peninsulas. Though Mandelbrot presented fractals as an equation, 
they were incorporated into the crisis communication literature as qualitative 
descriptive aids, not predictive tools (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). The concept of 
fractals serves to remind the communicator that an understanding of a situation 
is dependent on scale, and what holds true from one perspective may prove to be 
inaccurate at a different one. Sellnow, Seeger, and Ulmer (2002) applied this 
concept in their study of the Red River Valley floods to explain how the maximum 
crest height of the Red River exceeded the predictions made by the National 
Weather Service. Fractals serve as cautionary reminders in our quest for pattern 
recognition, but can also serve to remind us that patterns exist, even in 
apparently chaotic situations. Sellnow, et al.’s (2002) study assessing state and 
local responses to the Red River Valley floods was one of the first studies to adapt 
chaos theory to crisis communication. Their study highlighted the beneficial roles 
of improvised communications, self-organization, and external relief 
organizations. 
Self-organization occurs in both chaotic and complex systems (Seeger, 
2002, Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). While including a discussion of organization 
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emerging from disorder in a theory that presents chaos as a standard seems 
paradoxical, it serves as a balance, or a mirror image to the rejection of 
Newtonian, linear modeling that the theory also recommends. Comfort, Sungu, 
Johnson and Dunn (2001) described self-organization as “mutual adaptation” (p. 
147) in their study of complex systems in crisis, referring to the difficulties faced 
by emergency response agencies in coordinating their systems to work together. 
Comfort et al. studied intentional efforts at self-organization, but other scholars 
(Ashmos, Duchon, & McDaniel, 2000; Freimuth, 2006; Sellnow, et al., 2002) 
have studied emergent self-organization, which appears to be more consistent 
with the tenets of complexity theory. Freimuth described emergent self-
organization in response to the 2001 anthrax mail attacks, specifically from a 
chaos theory perspective. Freimuth demonstrated how the Centers for Disease 
Control press team faced a bifurcation point in being under-staffed and over-
taxed, but self-organized into a more cohesive, flexible unit with refined goals 
and procedures in response to the insufficient capabilities and gaps in response 
plans made evident by the attacks. Ashmos et al. stated it most succinctly, calling 
self-organization the “ability to reconfigure connections and activities” (p. 579). 
Self-organization holds particular salience in a disaster environment. 
Perry and Lindell (2003) studied citizen responses to disaster, dispelling the 
popular myth that populations resort to primal states of panic in the aftermath of 
disasters. Self-organization can be emergent, which is to say that it can be 
spontaneously generated, and can generally be influenced by attractors.
Attractors can pull systems towards attractor basins, consistent states 
expressing a certain behavior, attitude, or value (van Uden et al. 2001). In a crisis 
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management context, these states can be higher or lower levels of organization, 
for example: public outrage, mutual cooperation, or organizational confusion. 
Attractors of chaotic and complex systems fall into three categories: stable,  
unstable, and strange.
Stable attractors are behaviors, both unique and cyclical, that tend to 
increase the organization of a system over time (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). 
Examples of stable attractors include: press conferences, daily meetings, or an 
organizational ethos that informs the actions of its members. Unstable 
attractors, on the other hand, tend to destabilize the system that they are 
influencing. They are erratic and unpredictable, and can trigger crises in the 
system . Examples of unstable attractors include issues left to simmer, 
organizational blind spots, inequitable practices, and subversive organizational 
agents. Neither of these attractors deviate significantly from common sense, but 
the third type, strange attractors, is less intuitive.
Strange attractors are organizing principles, inherent shapes or states to 
which a phenomenon will repeatedly return as it evolves. They are considered 
strange because they don’t operate from a fixed point or in linear ways, instead 
“describing behaviors that look random in the short term but that, through 
multiple interactions, gradually acquire an organized pattern” (Gilpin & Murphy, 
2008, p. 38). Seeger (2002) reconsidered the traditional quantitative approach to 
crisis communication because of strange attractors, urging a more holistic search 
for understanding and awareness of emergent patterns that traditional 
quantitative methods might fail to document. In their study of the Red River 
Floods, Sellnow, et al. (2002) identified emergency response agencies like the 
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National Guard as strange attractors. Their presence reassured the stricken 
population, implementing order in the post-flood urban environment. Freimuth 
(2006), discussing CDC response to the 2001 anthrax attacks, credited the 
exigent communication requirements placed on the CDC communicators as a 
strange attractor leading to self-organization. The pro-social tendencies observed 
by Perry and Lindell (2003) could also be credited as a strange attractor - re-
unifying fragmented populations despite uncontrollable external stimuli. When 
changes in systemic organization occur abruptly, they are labeled bifurcations. 
Sellnow et al. (2002) addressed the bifurcation, a point of change, 
specifically systemic change emerging in a chaotic environment. Bifurcations are 
“abrupt, discontinuous, and divergent,” (Mathews, White, & Long, 1999, p. 445) 
causing a breakdown in system equilibrium, though they can result in both 
increased and decreased levels of order. An complex system moving from one 
attractor basin to another can be considered a bifurcation as well. An earthquake 
can act as a bifurcation, as can the associated destruction of infrastructure, and 
can lead to a cosmology episode.
Cosmology episodes, adopted from philosophy into the crisis 
communication field by Weick (1993) are bifurcations resulting in collapse of 
order. Cosmology episodes occur, “when people suddenly and deeply feel that the 
universe is no longer a rational, orderly system... the sense of what is occurring 
and the means to rebuild that sense collapse together” (p. 633). Sellnow, et al.  
(2002) found cosmology episodes in their study of the Red River Valley flood, 
demonstrating how affected publics lost their ability to make meaning of and 
respond to a disaster when the scale of the disaster exceeded both their previous 
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experience and their expectations. In the Red River Valley, firefighters watched 
fire spread through flooded streets, emergency planners were taken by surprise 
as the river rose beyond anticipated levels, and the affected general public 
watched as their preventative efforts were rendered ineffective. All involved 
parties were forced to reassess their perspectives, and order was eventually able 
to re-emerge from the chaotic environment. Weick (1993) also described the 
learning process that could follow a cosmology episode as a critical point in the 
recovery of the system.
Complex Systems
Complex systems are distinct from both complicated and chaotic systems. 
Complex and complicated sound similar, but in fact derive from slightly different 
etymological roots. The New Oxford American Dictionary (2009), attributed the 
origin of complicated to words meaning “folded together,” while complexity 
originated with words meaning “embraced” (n.p.). Non-linearity distinguishes 
complex systems from merely complicated ones by decreasing the observer’s 
ability to predict specific outcomes. This hinders a crisis manager’s role to apply 
pre-established plans or deliver unequivocal guidance, despite the constant 
pressures from the public or management for certainty (Gilpin & Murphy, 2006; 
Seeger, 2002; Sellnow, et al., 2002). Indeed, complexity theory posits that “no 
two situations are alike or even similar enough to permit direct comparison,” 
(Gilpin & Murphy, 2006, p. 381). The concept of irreducibility, also present in 
chaos theory, discourages a quantitative or analytical approach to crisis response 
because samples are not inherently indicative of the state of the whole. Also, a 
sample assumes that a momentary state (the time at which we take our sample) 
 22
can be linked directly to the moments preceding it and following it, thus violating 
the non-linearity of complexity (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). While these 
characteristics may seem to discourage scholarly research and professional 
action, the rule-based, self-organizing aspects of the theory give hope to the crisis 
management practitioner and scholar.
Joslyn and Rocha (2000) defined a complex system as: 
Any system consisting of a large number of interacting components 
(agents, processes, etc.) whose aggregate activity is non-linear (not 
derivable from the summations of the activity of individual components), 
and typically exhibits hierarchical self-organization under selective 
pressures (p. 72).
Gilpin and Murphy (2006) defined a complex system as one in which the 
interaction of its various parts create a product greater than their collective value.  
This definition is qualified by Fioretti’s (1998) assertion that complexity is an 
externally defined characteristic that describes the relationship between the 
observer and the system. A complex system is composed of individual 
elements/agents whose interactions produce adaptability in the system over time 
and are local, rule-based, recurrent, and non-linear, which makes the system 
both self-organizing and unstable. Complex systems are dynamic and are 
influenced by both their historical and current contexts because of permeable, ill-
defined boundaries. These interacting characteristics mean that the systems are 
irreducible, because to cut out any piece handicaps our ability to understand the 
whole (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008).
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To further distinguish between a complex and a chaotic system, Goldberg 
and Markóczy (2000) explained: 
The study of chaos generally involves the study of extremely simple 
nonlinear systems that lead to extremely complicated behavior, and 
complexity is generally about the (simple) interactions of many things 
(often repeated) leading to higher level patterns (p. 75).
In more basic terms, chaos theory posits that a simple set of rules applied 
to a system will result in very complicated output, while complexity theory 
describes “how the interaction of billions of individual entities can lead to 
something that appears designed or displaying an overall systems-level pattern” 
(Goldberg & Markóczy, 2000, p. 76). The key difference between the two theories 
lies in the concept of the discernible pattern, more concretely described as the 
emergence of organization. While chaos theory does describe elements that form 
patterns, it does not help explain the operation of a system.
Complexity Theory
Chaos theory and complexity theory both describe rules governing the 
development of systems, but differ in their consideration of the systems 
themselves. A critical difference between theories of chaos and complexity is the 
degrees of freedom they attribute to systems, and this is what informed my 
decision to focus on complexity theory. Anderson (1999) suggested that to study 
complex adaptive systems without losing meaning to abstraction or compression, 
one can focus on the localized, contextualized actions of a single agent in relation 
to its environment (p. 220). Alternately, as van Uden, et al. (2001) addressed 
when discussing the difficulties of applying complexity theory to the study of 
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organizations, examining the differences between multiple perspectives helps 
address the otherwise insurmountable reality that no one perspective is sufficient 
to understand an irreducibly complex system.
From an organizational perspective, two types of complexity approaches 
have been characterized. Boisot and Child (1999) presented the organization as a 
complex adaptive system, continuously self-organizing and evolving, and 
described the tendency of organizations to either reduce or absorb complexity. 
Boisot and Child initially described complexity reduction as finding the most 
appropriate single representation of environmental variety and acting on it, while 
complexity absorption is embracing a variety of potentially conflicting viewpoints 
about the environment. Ashmos, Duchon and McDaniel (2000) studied these two 
organizational approaches further, and refined both definitions. Complexity 
absorbing organizations orient themselves towards externally influenced self-
organization, altering organizational structures, processes, or priorities to fit the 
emergent needs of the scenario. These organizations co-evolve with their 
environments, aided by large numbers of relationship-based connections and 
maintain a level of requisite variety that imparts flexibility in an unpredictable 
environment. 
Complexity reducing organizations, on the other hand, view order and 
homeostasis as an ideal state. They focus on linear, cause-and-effect 
relationships, and desire simplicity in their operation and purpose. Organizations 
desiring reduced complexity often move towards a narrower world-view than 
organizations embracing complexity. Complexity reduction, though contrary to 
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the normative aspects of the theory, can be advantageous in some organizational 
settings, specifically when limited resources are available.
Ashmos et al. (2000) further segmented their conception of complexity. 
Goal complexity addresses the decision of an organization to pursue a single goal 
or to spread its efforts out over multiple goals. Strategic complexity addresses 
strategy in a similar way, clarifying whether organizations focus on a single 
strategy or adopt numerous different approaches to interacting with the complex 
environment. Interaction complexity describes the nature of relationships 
internal and external to an organization, resulting in a complex network of agents 
or a simpler, more regimented hierarchy of decision makers. Structural 
complexity, similar to interaction complexity, relates to the flow of information. 
Centralization is a low-complexity approach, and discourages spontaneous 
reorganization in response to emergent problems and stimuli. Given the various 
criteria, it should be apparent that organizational complexity is not a quality 
simply possessed or lacked by an organization. 
A final consideration of complexity theory is the importance of historical  
context (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008), or what chaos theory labeled sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions, known popularly as the butterfly effect. At an 
organizational level, Bechler (2004) explained “treating the crisis as an isolated 
event to be dealt with...fails to account for the systemic nature of organizational  
life” (p. 67). He portrayed crises as necessary correctives, a strategy which may 
seem less applicable in a disaster context, but which may be appropriate, because 
historical context is another way of looking at the previously mentioned sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions. The history of a system, represented in the 
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organizational, cultural, or individual memory of its components, will affect how 
it responds to new stimuli. The historical context of complex systems forced a 
revised definition of a successful crisis response.
Crisis Response Best Practices
Scholarly discussions of crisis communication best practices focus on crisis 
response organization and interaction with publics. At the organizational level, 
crisis communication is considered more effective when it is incorporated in the 
decision-making process. Pre-crisis planning and communication can reap 
rewards for an organization in crisis (Heath, 2006; Seeger, 2006). Collaboration 
is imperative when multiple agencies respond to a crisis, though crisis scholars 
have not yet reached consensus on the efficacy of coordinated messaging, 
commonly referred to as speaking with one voice (Heath, 2006; Sandman, 2006; 
Seeger, 2006)
Crisis communicators are advised to “accept the public as a legitimate and 
equal partner” (Seeger, 2006, p. 238). Understanding the public and identifying 
public concerns help an organization achieve credibility. Seeger equated 
perception and reality in dealing with the public. Acceptance is equated with 
respect, as are honesty, candor, and openness, which form a continuum of 
communication practices. Honesty is answering questions and providing accurate 
information. Candor is a willingness to share unfavorable information. Openness 
is the most transparent state, where an organization shares all information it has 
access to (Seeger, 2006). Crisis communicators should accept uncertainty and 
ambiguity, inescapable in many crises, though most of the literature I found only 
addressed this concept from a press agentry perspective (Heath, 2006; Sandman, 
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2006; Seeger, 2006). The media is viewed as an important public, but scholars 
have disputed its value. Seeger (2006) claimed that the media are “obligated to 
report accurately and completely” (p. 240) while Heath (2006) disparaged 
reporters that would  “fill air and print, even though some sources are virtually 
useless or counter-productive to the community’s understanding and the public 
interest” (p. 246). 
None of the best practices I found addressed international crisis response. 
The uncertainty associated with crises was only applied to interactions with the 
media or general population, not with the process of making communicative 
decisions. Crisis management plans, maligned and championed (Heath, 2006; 
Seeger, 2006), are promoted as a valuable tool that crisis communicators are 
encouraged to consider pre-crisis, but require a foreknowledge of potential crises. 
A complex consideration of crisis response may address these shortcomings.
Complex Crisis Response Best Practices
I was unable to find literature addressing best practices of complex crisis 
response, but scholars have addressed how to assess the success of a response, 
which is a useful starting point. Complexity theorists view complex systems in 
crisis as unbounded because crises are historically situated. Assigning a discrete 
beginning is difficult and because the system in crisis experiences irreversible 
transformations, assigning a definite end is similarly difficult (Gilpin and 
Murphy, 2008). This contrasts with the dominant paradigm, which emphasizes 
reliance on and analysis via a crisis management plan and crisis management 
team (Coombs, 2012). Instead, assessment of complexity responses focus on 
procedural actions. A successful response maintains permeable boundaries 
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between the organization and its environment through prioritized relationships. 
Doing so contributes to complexity absorption. Requisite variety, the diversity of 
viewpoints and experiences roughly matching an organization to its target 
publics, helps the system predict a range of possibilities and adapt accordingly 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Finally, a successful responding organization 
enacts desired outcomes, turning its goals into reality (Ashmos, et al., 2000; 
Falkheimer & Heide, 2010; Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). Success can also be 
measured by the presence of double-loop learning, the ability to see larger 
patterns of influence and causality that lead to the crisis as opposed to just fixing 
the immediate problems (Argyris, 1977; Gilpin & Murphy, 2008).
Haiti: The Country With a Last Name
Haiti, as reported on its U.N. member page (Permanent Mission of Haiti to 
the U.N., n.d.), is the poorest country in the western hemisphere. This surname is 
echoed throughout the U.S. news media, along with conflicting reports 
documenting the AIDS infection rate as either the highest in the Caribbean or 
lower than several other Caribbean nations (Katz, 2009; USAID, 2011). Haiti’s 
history has been fraught, beginning with the annihilation of the indigenous 
population in the years after first contact with Europeans, continuing through 35 
separate coup attempts since it won independence from France in 1804, and 
culminating in recent memory with the despotic rule and subsequent rebellion 
against the Duvaliers and the troubled growth, retardation, and recent disruption 
of Haiti’s modern democracy (Robinson, 2007). A U.N. stabilization force called 
MINUSTAH, from the French Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en 
 29
Haïti, entered Haiti upon Aristede’s departure, and they have maintained a 
continuous presence since (UN Security Council, 2004).
U.N. Security Council reports from 2005 confirmed that Haiti’s political 
actors “acknowledged that Haiti was in a deep political, social and economic 
crisis” (U.N. Security Council, 2005, p. 3). That same report noted frustrations 
expressed over the presence of foreign troops in Haiti, which was perceived as a 
violation of sovereignty. U.N. Security reports from 2005-2009 shared common 
themes of instability, distrust of Haitian authorities, resentment of international 
presence, and community administered vigilante justice. Throughout the same 
time period, Haiti was barraged by devastating hurricanes, tropical storms, and 
floods (Masters, 2011), which U.N. Security Council (2009) reports labeled as 
grave setbacks in the socioeconomic development of the country. Haiti had not 
yet recovered from these storms when the earthquake occurred on January 12th.
Rationale for Study
The ground shook in Haiti’s capitol city of Port-au-Prince at 4:53 PM on 
January 12th, 2010. The Haitian people named it “goudougoudougoudou,” the 
onomatopoeia of the sound (Accilien & Laguerre, 2011, p. 95). The earthquake’s 
epicenter lay 15 miles west of the capitol.  222,570 people died, 300,000 were 
injured, and 1.3 million were displaced (USGS, 2011). The response, which I seek 
to explore and describe, was international in scope, but consisted primarily of 
United States military forces. The first U.S. representatives on scene were 
members of the USCG. As the aftershocks continued to rattle the country, 
Haitians were the first responders, and Haitian-led organizations played a central  
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role in the emergency response process. In many ways, the crisis is still active, 
more than a year later.
The earthquake fit the criteria for a crisis: It was a major seismic event that 
profoundly affected multiple organizations both within the national borders of 
Haiti and the USCG. A quick search of American media outlets revealed each of 
Hagan’s (2007) listed terms of “predicament, emergency, calamity, disaster, or 
catastrophe” (p. 414). Botan’s (2006) characteristics were also present: the 
extreme poverty exacerbated the impact of the earthquake, creating a pressing 
demand for relief assistance in an environment not suited to its delivery, and the 
devastation to and because of Haiti’s infrastructure ensured that a return to 
normalcy would neither be possible nor desirable.
Very little academic research exists on intercultural disaster 
communication, though there is a large body of research in disaster sociology 
(Killian, 2002; Quarantelli, 1987). The physical impact of the disaster also 
manifested psychological and societal consequences, disrupting communications 
and crippling infrastructure in the process. In the aftermath of a disaster, affected 
populations are deluged with information from the surrounding environment, 
others affected by the events, and relief workers. Disasters frequently damage 
existing communication networks, so consequences of this flood of information 
may be discernible in a study of local connections. This leads to my first research 
question.
RQ1: How did the US Coast Guard shape and implement crisis 
management with its publics?
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Kim and Grunig’s (2011) expansion of the STP was motivated in part to 
broaden its application from solely public relations to arenas of decision making, 
problem solving, and information use. In doing so, they bridged public relations, 
crisis response, and disaster response. Their theory applies to both the affected 
publics and the response agencies as publics. We can expect problem solving to 
occur across the spectrum of the response, at the organizational, social, and 
individual level. 
Kim and Grunig’s (2011) explication of information forefending and 
permitting describing which information individuals choose to consider or ignore 
are particularly applicable in the chaos of the post-quake environment. 
Information sharing and forwarding could affect individual discussions about 
where to find assistance, the health or location of family members, or individual 
perceptions of the extent and severity of damage. Kim and Grunig’s theory is 
currently unillustrated. I seek to examine its utility as a framework for 
understanding this exemplar case.
Complexity theory has been applied to crisis and disaster scenarios 
(Ashmos, Duchon, & McDaniel, 2000, Comfort et al., 2001, Gilpin & Murphy, 
2008). The typologies of complexity described by Ashmos et al. should be helpful 
in my examination of the response. The unpredictability of complex systems 
leads to my second research question: 
RQ2: How did the publics of the US Coast Guard receive and respond 
to USCG communicative actions?
The confluence of numerous different cultures: military, civilian, Haitian, 
and non-governmental organization made unpredictable interactions inevitable. 
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The studies on the role of history and culture in disaster communication that I 
found were strictly limited to the context of American citizens living in the south, 
but the existence of racial disparities is sufficient motivation to prompt my 
inquiry into whether historical racial or cultural tensions could affect the 
response efforts to the Haitian earthquake. I was unable to find any studies 
examining these issues in the context of international disaster response, which 
led to my final research question:
RQ3:  How did culture/history influence communications 
between the USCG and its publics?
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Chapter  3 Methodology 
I conducted a qualitative case study of the responses by USCG and local 
actors to the 2010 Haitian earthquake. Yin (2009) identified case studies as the 
appropriate method for answering how and why questions about contemporary 
events if the researcher is unable to exercise behavioral control over participants. 
In this section, I discuss the strengths and limitations of the case study method, 
the sources of evidence I collected in my research, and the techniques I utilized to 
obtain, code, sort, and analyze my data. Additionally, I discuss validity and 
reliability as they applied to my research. I conclude with a discussion of 
potential sources of bias.
A case study drawing on qualitative methods is conducive to the research 
problem. Aldoory (2001) wrote that qualitative research is required to explore the 
dimensions and factors of the STP, specifically to gauge publics’ levels of problem 
recognition, involvement, and constraint recognition. Grunig’s (1997) suggestion 
for further research on “how publics think, feel about, and behave towards our 
client organizations so we can...communicate more effectively with them” (p. 39) 
also requires qualitative inquiry. The holistic, detailed nature of a case study is  
appropriate for complexity theory. A case study enables the complex systems 
being studied to be represented in full instead of being reduced to overly specific 
variables and abstractions.
I began my study with a review of available documents to develop a 
framework of the timeline of events. I was seeking any on-the-record information 
that guided the USCG's decision-making process. Following that, I conducted a 
series of in-depth interviews with nine USCG personnel, focusing on crisis 
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communication decisions made by members directly involved in the planning 
and execution of the Haitian earthquake response. To deepen my understanding 
of the cultural context of the response, I traveled to Haiti in the summer of 2011, 
where I spent a month working with a British relief organization. Traveling to 
Haiti also allowed me to conduct in-person interviews with four representatives 
of Haitian Governmental Organizations (HGOs), and six interviews with other 
responders and communicators involved in the response, including members of 
the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other US 
Government (USG) agencies. The relief work I contributed to was secondary to 
my interviews, but the participatory nature of the experience helped shape my 
understanding of the intercultural context. I received Institutional Review Board 
approval for this study and adhered to the policies and procedures set forth when 
using human subjects for research purposes.
Case Study Methodology
A person, a social setting, a group, or an event can be the subject of a case 
study. In the case study method, the researcher systematically gathers 
information to build an understanding of how the subject operates or functions 
(Berg, 2009). Case studies are useful for both simple and complex phenomenon, 
especially when the phenomenon is situated in a particular context. Though a 
case study is typically bounded by time, it can be completed when the borders 
between the subject and its context are vague (Yin, 2009). Case studies can 
provide both a deep understanding about the nature of a specific event, and also 
the tools we need to relate it to existing theory or create new theory if necessary. 
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Triangulation is a central aspect of the case study method and of 
qualitative research in general (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2009). Compiling different 
sources of information about the response helped me to develop a coherent, 
multifaceted account of what happened, as well as a fuller justification for the 
themes, concepts, and patterns that emerged. “Converging lines of inquiry” (Yin, 
2009, p. 115) and corroborating evidence lead me to more convincing and 
accurate conclusions. I worked towards triangulation by comparing interviews 
and perspectives, to document accounts. Triangulation can result in an unusually 
high amount of data, because each fact requires multiple sources of verification, 
but the result is a more complete product, and was justified in this case.
Case studies have been criticized as being less rigorous and less systematic 
than other forms of research. The perceived lack of rigor is not inherent in the 
nature of the case study, but rather has been observed in previous research 
applications (Yin, 2009). Case studies are often cited for a lack of generalizability,  
especially the single-case design, but because I was not seeking “grand theory” 
output, and because I focused on analytical generalizability, I believe that my 
research can contribute to a greater body of knowledge and contribute to the 
extant theory. Case studies present the risk of overwhelming the researcher with 
data, and can lead to lengthy reports, which I addressed by striving for parsimony 
while giving due consideration to all the data I collected.
The case study method offered unique advantages compared to other 
sources of inquiry. The study of a real world events provided a deeper, richer 
experience than I would have been able to obtain in a laboratory setting, and the 
focus on contemporary data sources provided more opportunity for descriptive 
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inquiry than historical or archival methods (Yin, 2009). The holistic focus of my 
case study uniquely situated it as a tool for analyzing and understanding the 
operations of the complex systems of the response (Berg, 2009). 
A final consideration of case studies is present in Berg's (2009) discussion 
of human ecology. The complexity of the systems I studied stems from their 
human components, shared by human ecology's concern with “the 
interrelationships among people in their spatial setting and physical 
environment” (p. 333). Though the area affected by the study was geographically 
broad, I was able to find points of intersection: points of entry, command centers, 
and official meeting sites. Berg suggested using maps to “indicate physical and 
social proximity of items and events occurring in the community” (p. 333), and 
my pilot investigation of the USCG earthquake response document revealed maps 
made by the response team. In conducting the interviews, I discovered the effects 
of geography on the response, often exacerbated by the crippled communication 
infrastructure within the country.
Case Study Evidence Source: Documentation
My position as an officer in the USCG provided me unique access to the 
official USCG archive documenting the earthquake response, though most of the 
material would likely have been available via a Freedom of Information Act 
request. Berg (2009) emphasized ethical concerns relating to archives, including 
personally identifiable information. The archives I received were not redacted as 
they would have been if obtained via a FOIA request. I took particular care to 
avoid disclosing any sensitive information when discussing the documents. 
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Documents provide a rich source of data, and document review can yield 
motivational themes, goal complexity, and organizational patterns (Kidder, 
1981). Documents that I considered for this study included situation reports, 
meeting minutes, previously recorded oral histories, photographs, maps, emails, 
and operational messages. I first sorted the documents by date of creation, and 
then used them to construct a version of the USCG response narrative. This 
timeline allowed me to triangulate the narratives of my participants, and also 
helped me to assign significance to the response problems identified in 
interviews. 
Documents, though easier to access than interview subjects, present 
several limitations that I accounted for when conducting my review. Documents, 
especially organizational documents, are typically written for a specific audience 
and for a specific purpose. It may be more difficult to identify the bias of the 
author than in an in-depth interview. Additionally, I doubt that the documents 
that I was granted access to were all the documentation available (Yin, 2009). 
The USCG historians cautioned me that the record was incomplete because the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred during their collection, so they had to shift 
focus. For these reasons, I used documents for triangulation instead of for 
independently establishing fact. Additionally, I tried to heed Yin’s advice to 
constantly try to identify the purposive intent of the document creators.
Case Study Evidence Source: In-Depth Interviews
The majority of my evidence came from in-depth interviews with USCG 
personnel, other responders, and HGO representatives. Berg (2009) defined in-
depth interviews as “conversations with a purpose” (p. 101). Rubin and Rubin 
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(2005) used the term “responsive interviewing,” and included a variety of styles 
united in “a dynamic and iterative process, not a set of tools to be applied 
mechanically” (p. 15). I moved between comfortable and familiar environments 
(the USCG) and unfamiliar, often hazardous environments, and so a fluid 
interview style was well suited to capture the important data as defined by both 
myself and the participants. Yin’s (2009) description of case study interviews as 
“guided conversations rather than structured queries” (p. 106) speaks to this 
approach. 
Rubin and Rubin (2005) proposed a typology of interviews based on 
breadth and subject of focus, and used their definition of an elaborated case study 
method. The purpose of interviewing is to “find out what happened, why, and 
what it means more broadly...to be able to generalize to broader processes, to 
discover causes, and to explain or understand a phenomenon” (p. 6). During my 
interviews, I used the theory elaboration method described by Rubin and Rubin 
to pull out themes. I presented the themes I perceived to participants for 
feedback and elaboration.
I used a semi-structured format to interview my participants. I felt that a 
formalized, regimented questionnaire and process would hinder rapport with the 
participants and fail to tap relevant but unanticipated data. On the other end of 
the continuum, an unstructured interview would be similarly unsuited to my 
study because I had already stated research questions and found a set direction 
for my inquiry. Because of my unfamiliarity with many of the issues, I sought to 
retain what Berg calls “the freedom to digress...to probe far beyond the answers 
 39
to [my] prepared standardized questions” (p. 107). Rubin and Rubin's 
characteristics of the responsive influenced my approach, highlighting that: 
 The interview is about obtaining the perspective of the interviewee and 
their understanding of the world;
 Interviewing is an exchange, and the personalities and circumstances of 
both parties matter; 
 The interview forms a relationship, I have an ethical burden to protect the 
interviewee; 
 Questions should be broad enough to allow the interviewee to answer as 
he or she sees fit, instead of how I may want them to; 
 Maintaining flexibility and adaptivity is critical, as is following up on 
insights and ideas.
Member checking ensured that I captured comments as the participants 
intended, hopefully unaffected by my biases or unfamiliarity with the topic 
matter. Yin (2009) similarly asserted that the interviewer remain unbiased when 
asking questions. Prior to beginning my interviews, I conducted reflexive writing 
to attempt to identify and isolate my internal sources of bias, at the very least 
documenting them for the awareness of the reader. I feel that the semi-structured 
nature of my interview approach limited the influence of any biases I may have 
retained by allowing the participants to shape and own their responses and the 
flow of the interview.
Rubin and Rubin (2005) highlighted the conflict between the need to stay 
on topic and the desire to build conversational rapport. Throughout my 
interviews I had to contend with what Berg (2009) labeled evasion tactics, a 
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“word, phrase, or gesture that expresses to another participant that no further 
discussion of a specific issue (or in a specific area) is desired” (p. 128). My 
immersion in an unfamiliar culture made this process significantly more difficult, 
but I anticipated and attempted to ameliorate my ignorance by working in Haiti 
for three weeks before starting my interviews. At times I felt that participants 
gave what they perceived to be socially or organizationally appropriate answers, 
especially given the bureaucratic nature of the USCG and the assistance-based 
relationship between the HGOs and the USCG. I attempted to address this in two 
steps. First, I shaped my questionnaire in accordance with Berg and Rubin and 
Rubin's suggestions, starting with easy, non-threatening questions, moving to 
more sensitive questions, and circling between validating questions and new 
topics, to keep the conversational flow. Second, I used probe questions, redirects, 
and rephrased questions to ensure that I captured the appropriate depth and 
subtly influence the direction of conversation without disturbing the participants.
The interpersonal connection developed by in-depth interviews carry the 
risk of biasing the interviewer as well as recording the biases of participants. Yin 
(2009) identified the increased chance of interpersonal affective bias when 
relying on in-depth interviews and reiterated the need to triangulate facts as a 
corrective. This risk is offset by the considerable strengths of the interview 
method - namely the ability to build a rich understanding of the created meaning 
of events, the human intentional and unintentional forces that shape 
organizational decisions, and the opinions and attitudes behind behavioral 
invents (Yin, 2009). Researcher bias can also taint the question building, data 
collection, and analytical processes. To address the interview schedule bias, I  
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thoroughly reviewed the questions prior to the interviews and conducted pilot 
tests of my questionnaire to ensure that it accessed the appropriate information. 
The semi-structured interview format allowed participants to share information 
that I had not known to ask about, which allowed me to rapidly redirect my focus 
as I came to understand the fragmented nature of the USCG response. 
Two significant barriers to my interview process were the geographic 
distribution of USCG participants and the incongruities of the USCG and NGO 
responses. To overcome the first barrier, I traveled to Haiti to meet several of my 
participants in their working environments, and conducted telephone interviews 
with others, which I recorded and transcribed. Berg highlighted that telephone 
interviews prevent the researcher from using full channels of communication, but 
I believe that the lack of visual cues was secondary to overall access to the 
participants and their experience.Regarding the incongruous response, I had to 
make a more drastic modification to my research.
My initial goal of a comparative case study of USCG and NGO responses 
were, in retrospect, grandiose. I misunderstood the scope of the USCG response, 
and did not realize that there were no NGOs completing directly similar missions 
to the USCG. As I was planning my trip to Haiti and conducting interviews with 
USCG responders and communicators in the US, I realized that I would not be 
able to compare two independent responses. Instead, I decided to use interviews 
with NGOs as a method of tapping cultural familiarity and triangulating concepts 
that emerged from my USCG interviews. Ultimately, I chose to include a small 
sampling of responders from NGOs, the UN, and other USG agencies to capture a 
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variety of perspectives all with the goal of more deeply understanding the USCG 
perspective.
Case Study Evidence Source: In-Depth Interviews: Participants
The focus of my research question required both purposive and snowball 
sampling (Berg, 2009). My initial list of participants was drawn from my review 
of USCG documents. I contacted those participants to select candidates for my 
research and then asked them to recommend other USCG members who they felt 
would contribute. Hundreds of USCG men and women took part in the response 
and dozens in the response and communication process, so I harnessed the 
experience of the members I initially contact to determine the best candidates to 
interview in accordance with Berg's description of a snowball sample. Though a 
snowball sample may be limited by the knowledge and experience of my 
participants, I believe that the USCG response was structured specifically enough 
that response leadership maintained full awareness of all responding parties 
within the organization. USCG members are spread throughout the country, and 
the high operational intensity of the Haitian earthquake response drew in 
supporting personnel from across the organization, so I did not limit my 
participant selection based on geographic proximity. 
My recruitment in Haiti began prior to my arrival in the country. I traveled 
on official diplomatic orders as a USCG officer, communicating with the US 
Embassy and the Military Liaison Office prior to my arrival. My first three weeks 
were spent volunteering with a British NGO in a project completely unrelated to 
any USCG missions, in a town approximately three hours by bus away from the 
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US Embassy. After the third week volunteering, I returned to the capital city and 
began my interviews. 
My USCG and HGO interviews were conducted with the support of USCG 
personnel working at the Embassy. Responders I spoke with referred me to other 
USG agency officials who had participated in the response. Additionally, I had 
networked with a variety of US-based NGOs with experience in Haiti that 
preceded the 2010 earthquake. I met with and interviewed several 
representatives from those NGOs. All of my interviews conducted in Haiti were 
face-to-face.
Overall, I spoke with 22 people in 19 interviews. 16 interviews were one-
on-one and three were dyads. My two interviews with HGOs were each dyads, but 
a USCG official was present because he was the one who had introduced me and 
to the participants and provided me transportation through Haiti. Each interview 
lasted between 45 minutes and two hours, and all were conducted in English. The 
majority of my participants were directly involved as either a responder, a 
communicator, or a partner in the USCG response. I felt that I was able to reach 
theoretical saturation in a number of areas concerning the USCG response, and 
was able to triangulate many of the concepts using my interviews with non-USCG 
responders (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Case Study: Evidence Gathering Procedure
I utilized an interview protocol for my data collection. Rubin and Rubin 
(2005) stated, “interviews are structured conversations,” and a protocol “[gave] 
guidance on what main questions to ask, and of whom” (p. 147). The protocol 
enabled me to branch out as needed, personalizing my approach to each 
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participant without fear of losing my central thrust of inquiry. My interview 
protocol covered four phases. Phase one gathered basic demographic information 
about the experiences and background of the participant. Phase two solicited a 
“grand tour” of the post-earthquake response to establish a rough timeline of 
what occurred when. Phase three explored specific decision points in the 
response process and the factors that informed those decisions. Phase four, 
returning to the overall tour, addressed successes and lessons learned in the 
response. I included a series of probes and potential follow-up questions in 
anticipation of any evasiveness, uncertainty, or reluctance to share information 
(Berg, 2009). The protocol consisted of open-ended questions that could be 
reworded or reorganized. I solicited explicit permission to use audio-recording 
prior to all interviews, and took notes during and after interviews to capture my 
own thoughts and have a back-up record of the conversation.
Case Study: Data Analysis
I pursued data analysis, “the process of moving from raw interviews to 
evidence-based interpretations” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 201), throughout my 
data collection phase. My preliminary analyses consisted of journaling and 
discussion with my colleagues, as Berg (2009) emphasized, analysis “cannot be 
completely straightforward or cut and dry” (p. 147). Rubin and Rubin identified 
the two phases of my formal analysis process: in the first phase, I prepared and 
coded transcripts with respect to concepts, themes, and events. In the second 
phase I compared concepts and themes across interviews to work towards the 
research question. In the second phase, I engaged in pattern matching, which 
involved comparing accepted and tested patterns with patterns that I believed to 
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exist in the data (Yin, 2009). This allowed me to determine if either of the 
theoretical frameworks I chose fit the data, or if a new explanatory theory 
emerged.
Phase One: Transcription, Timeline, and Coding
I fully transcribed each interview by hand, completing transcription of 
seven interviews before traveling to Haiti and conducting the remaining 12. 
Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggested that mid-collection transcription would help 
me prepare for subsequent interviews. Each transcript was supplemented by 
handwritten memos taken during and immediately after the interviews. These 
notes addressed any non-verbal communications I observed, strong emotions or 
ideas triggered during the interview, and thoughts on themes, concepts, or ways 
in which the interview related to others previously completed. Using a systematic 
sorting process and an interpretive approach similar to those outlined by Berg 
(2009), I sorted and indexed each transcript by major topics, subtopics, and 
emergent characteristics.
Once I completed transcription, I constructed a compiled narrative of the 
USCG response timeline. I combined information from the interviews and the 
documents provided by the USCG historian’s office, attempting to triangulate as 
many data points as I could. I also included data from my interviews with HGOs. 
This timeline was critical for my analysis of the USCG communication response 
as a complex system.
I developed codes through both manifest and latent content analysis 
(Berg, 2009). To do this, I conducted a close reading of the transcripts, going 
line-by-line to discover repeating themes, concepts, and words (Strauss, 1990), 
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noting deep structural meanings conveyed by the messages (Berg, 2009). I 
analyzed my transcripts through both induction and deduction. Induction, as 
labeled by Berg, is similar to the practice of open coding: immersing myself in the 
transcripts to identify dimensions or themes. Deduction, on the other hand, 
utilizes the theoretical perspectives described in my review of literature to create 
a scheme of categorization. While coding I was constantly on the lookout for new 
categories to add to the coding structure (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Coding required 
me to put aside my preconceived notions of what the data contained (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008).
I coded my documents digitally. I used my interview questionnaire as the 
first level of analysis, compiling all applicable responses from my interviews into 
a single document structured like an interview. Following that, I categorized each 
response by the themes, concepts, or phrases they contained. I used a grounded 
theory approach to discover emergent themes, and also used codes based on the 
theoretical frameworks I chose. A final document sorted responses into the 
appropriate categories. The themes subsection of my findings section highlights 
the most important and best-supported themes I found in the first phase.
Phase Two: Pattern Matching
In the second phase I compared the individual interviews across several 
axes to discover patterns, themes, and shared opinions. Following that, I 
performed a comparative analysis of the interviews across the sample groups 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The sorting process completed in phase one facilitated 
the comparative analysis, as did my reflective memo writing throughout the data 
collection and coding processes. 
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Analytic induction, as described by Berg (2009), combines the post-coding 
data analysis with theory integration, an advancement of the grounded theory 
approach first described by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Analytic induction allowed 
me to simultaneously scan for support of the established theories while also 
maintaining openness to the development of new theory by pattern matching, 
which “compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with 
several alternative predictions)” (Yin, 2009, p. 136). As I answered the research 
questions, I considered how complexity theory, the STPS, and any emergent 
theoretical explanations helped to explain the trajectory of the communicative 
response (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
The process of interrogative hypothesis testing utilizes the negative case 
test, where a hypothesis is created based on observation or theoretical prediction 
and then applied to the data until a case that does not fit the hypothesis is located 
(Berg, 2009). Upon finding such a case, I either reformulated or discarded the 
hypothesis in favor of a rival explanation (Yin, 2009), repeating the process until 
my hypotheses no longer produced negative cases. In deference to Berg's warning 
that this process may neglect contradictory evidence or distort the initial 
hypothesis, I attempted to triangulate my findings with multiple instances and 
discussion with colleagues. Integration was rigorous because I considered two 
established theoretical perspectives and also theoretical concepts that emerged in 
my review of the data. I had to fit a surfeit of data into the frameworks, recognize 
when organizational schemes are not working, and ensure the analytic story “felt 
right” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 274). The Themes to Theory section in my 
Discussion and Conclusion section discusses 
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Validity and Reliability
Validity justifies the efforts of a scholar, and reliability insures it. Kvale 
(1995) addressed pragmatic validity in the context of communication research, 
promoting rational argument and consensus while cautioning that 
overemphasizing validity would result in stagnation or excess uncertainty in 
representation of findings. Kidder (1981) highlighted the requirement of 
reliability in the planning and execution of research, identifying three criterion 
for establishing validity: construct, internal, and external validity. Kirk and Miller  
(1986), describing qualitative research validity, labeled these theoretical,  
instrumental, and apparent. Construct or theoretical validity is drawn from the 
operational measures identified for the concepts in the study. Construct validity 
is easily identified and measured in quantitative studies, but case studies do not 
provide p values. Berg's (2009) discussion of triangulation is salient, and his 
exhortation to “obtain a better, more substantive picture of reality”(p. 5) speaks 
to the intent of construct validity. I addressed Berg’s conception of triangulation 
by tapping the perspectives of both the USCG and some of its publics, and also by 
learning about parallel response processes that were occurring in the same post-
quake environment. Additionally, my inclusion of a document review provided 
additional lines of sight on the process, as did member-checking with 
participants as I developed concepts. Kirk and Miller posited that field research is 
a useful validity check – allowing participants an opportunity to help define 
terms and adopting the language they use when communicating with other 
participants can help ensure a uniformity of definition throughout the interviews.
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Internal and external validity address the research instrument and the 
generalizability of the study. A poorly calibrated instrument cannot be expected 
to provide worthwhile readings, and the same can be said of a poorly planned or 
written interview questionnaire (Wolcott, 1995). Kidder (1981) presented the 
ability to rule out rival explanations as a test of internal validity. While this goes 
against the reluctance of complexity theory to posit linear causal relationships, I  
believe that the more general process of matching observations to theory spoke to 
this topic. Kirk and Miller (1986) identified that “a measurement procedure is 
said to have instrumental validity...if it can be shown that observations match 
those generated by an alternative procedure that is itself accepted as valid” (p. 
22). The inclusion of previously accepted theories to match my research 
developments drew from this practice, which ties in with Yin's (2009) suggestion 
of pattern matching as a method to increase internal validity. Despite that, I  
acknowledge in advance that this study, similar to any post-hoc case study, was 
not able to assert with certainty that the linkages are valid.
External or apparent validity concerns the ability of a researcher to apply 
the results found in a specific case study to other cases (Kirk & Miller, 1986). Berg 
(2009) boldly dismissed the charge, asserting instead that there “is clearly a 
scientific value to gain from investigating some single category of individual, 
group, or event” (p. 330), with the qualification that if we assume that human 
behavior is to some degree predictable, then case studies have value ipso facto. I 
am approaching this study from the perspective of complexity theory, which is a 
post-modern theory that problematizes the idea of generalizability. The 
historically situated nature of the Haitian earthquake means that future disasters  
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will not progress in the same manner, and that identical actions taken by similar 
responders in a similar situation would not necessarily, or even could not 
possibly yield the same results. Though I contest the necessity for broad 
generalizability in a complex world, I do recognize the value of analytical 
generalizability. Analytical generalization is defined by Yin (2009) as the 
application of particular results to an extant, or just generally broader theory. The 
process of analytic generalization occurred first in my post-interview memo 
writing. I conducted an extensive review of the two theories prior to beginning 
my research, and applied each to my conversations to assess how new data 
matched or failed to match the frameworks laid out in theory.
Reliability is similarly problematized in a complex environment. 
Reliability calls for a study to be repeatable in similar circumstances but different  
contexts. A complex system, historically situated and non-linear, cannot be 
expected to follow the same path as a previous system, or even the same system, 
given similar starting conditions. The challenge of reliability is not new to the 
field of qualitative research; people and their experiences are unique, and when 
viewed in rich detail, phenomenon are rarely identical. Despite the stated reasons 
against reliability concerns, I am encouraged by Kidder's (1981) emphasis on 
repetition of ideas and concepts versus actual study designs and conditions 
because the ideas and concepts of complexity theory are more similar to the 
patterned strange attractors than the specific details of an event. I worked 
towards reliability through procedural consistency, heeding Yin's (2009) advice 
to conduct thoroughly operational and systematic research capable of standing 
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up to an external audit, or providing acceptable responses to an educated 
interlocutor.  
Reflexivity
Though I could trace influences earlier, for the purpose of this research I 
will share that, for the past eight years, the military has trained me as a leader, a  
manager, and a law enforcement officer. While each of these positions carries 
with them a lingering flavor of qualitative research, I do not believe that they are 
appropriate frameworks for academic study.
To begin briefly, I will describe aspects of my personality and life that I feel 
may affect my research, and steps I took to minimize, or at least account for, their 
influence. I am a 26-year-old Caucasian male born and raised in New York City in 
a middle-class household. I attended public school throughout my childhood, 
earned a bachelor degree of science from the USCG Academy in 2006, and spent 
the four following years working on USCG ships around the country, in South 
America, and in the Caribbean. I remain employed as an officer in the USCG, and 
my enrollment at the University of Maryland and research trip to Haiti were 
funded through the USCG's postgraduate program. My research topic was 
selected based both on personal interest and on its applicability to the USCG's 
mission and knowledge base, and following my graduation I will work as a Public 
Affairs Officer, where I may be tasked with a disaster response similar to the one 
I studied.
This study of my own organization fit Creswell's (2003) label of “backyard 
research.” Rubin and Rubin (2005) emphasized the importance of researchers 
understanding internal biases or strong personal feelings that could distort what 
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they hear or how they approach interviews. Throughout my research I relied on 
Berg's (2009) assertion that “the researcher understands that he or she is part of 
the social world(s) that he or she investigates” and, in addition to reporting on 
experiences in the field, “actively constructs interpretations...and then questions 
how those interpretations actually arose” (p. 198).
All of my participants knew that I was actively employed by the USCG. In 
my interviews with USCG personnel, this frequently resulted in assumptions of 
shared knowledge that I attempted to fill in when presenting the results, 
including acronyms, procedures, and the general organizational knowledge of the 
USCG. Several participants suggested that “I know how it is,” because of my 
history as a USCG officer and because I went through the USCG Academy. In the 
context of the interviews, I felt that they were right, and tried to integrate my 
knowledge into the data they provided for a more holistic presentation.
In my interviews with HGOs, I felt that my status as a USCG officer 
severely obstructed the data collection process. I feel that conducting the 
interviews in English instead of Haitian Creole further exacerbated this 
obstruction. I had been warned by almost every American that I spoke with prior 
to beginning my interviews that Haitians were very reluctant to offer criticism of 
foreigners in front of foreign audiences. To attempt to alleviate this reporting bias 
I aggressively pursued my interview protocol in our conversations, reframing and 
asking questions repeatedly throughout the course of the interaction and trying 
to find ways to solicit critical information without making the participants feel  
like the were being critical. For example: I wanted to ask participants what they 
felt the USCG personnel could have done better, but their initial response was 
 53
“nothing.” Instead, I asked them to offer advice to future USCG responders on 
how to respond in unfamiliar cultural situations, even requesting they role-play, 
positioning myself as the responder in question. This method solicited more 
responses.
My findings were also influenced by a USCG response official who 
accompanied me on all of my interviews with HGOs. The reason he accompanied 
was mostly one of convenience: he provided transportation, introductions, and 
cultural translation, and he out-ranked me so it was difficult for me to ask him to 
leave. There were many times during the interviews where I was grateful for his 
presence because he was able to form probe questions to dig towards the 
information I needed. Despite that, I often felt, based on the circumstances, body 
language, furtive glances made by participants, and the phrasing of their answers 
that his presence further limited their willingness to offer criticism of the 
response, constructive or otherwise. I am hopeful that the efforts I made to ask 
and re-ask questions to circumvent their reluctance overcame any limitations 
imposed by his presence.
My process of self-reflection began before I enrolled at University of 
Maryland, when I wrote journal entries questioning my role in the alien migrant 
interdiction operations conducted by the USCG cutter I worked on in the waters 
separating the U.S. and the Caribbean. It continues in a more formalized setting 
in the present. My memos and journal, written over the course of this study, trace 
the progress of my thoughts, serving as a barograph of my emotional state. I 
believe they nurtured critical inquiry and problematized and dispelled harmful, 
limiting assumptions about the research, the subjects, or the topic. While I do not 
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believe that objectivity is possible, I am hopeful that the differing perspectives I 
gathered, the contemplative data analysis I undertook, and the process of self-
reflection I carried through my research have treated my data fairly and allowed 
the embedded meanings to emerge.
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Chapter 4: Results
RQ1: How did the US Coast Guard shape and implement crisis management 
with its publics?
The goal of my first research question was to reconstruct the 
communicative response timeline from operational communication, 
informational communication, and HGO perspectives. I viewed the response as a 
complex organizational system, and so I wanted to chart its development and 
critical decision points so that I could identify influential forces. I drew data from 
a variety of sources: I asked USCG participants to narrate their experience of the 
USCG response, examined approximately 2000 emails, presentations, and 
documents from the USCG archive, and spoke with HGO personnel who 
partnered with the USCG. 
Over the course of my interviews, I noted two primary axes along which 
their answers fell. The Coast Guard communicative response developed in 
Florida and Haiti, and USCG participants identified important communication 
structures at an informational and operational level. I also observed that the 
driving forces influencing the communicative response shifted with the passage 
of time. In the early stages of the response, needs assessment, internal 
communication, and integration were the primary operational communication 
concerns, and image control and telling the CG story were the primary 
informational communication concerns. Awareness and deterrence campaigns 
related to mass migration were both operational and informational 
communication concerns. Later, communication centered on restoration of 
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infrastructure and local capability. My discussion of the crisis management 
response is divided along those axes. I also found a fascinating narrative of 
organizational response, but because my focus is communication, I have placed 
additional findings in Appendix G.
I asked participants to assess their observations of the communicative 
response, comment on how communication plans translated into execution, 
credit successes, and posit lessons learned. My goal was to see how participants 
reacted to an unpredictable event – neither Americans nor Haitians anticipated 
an earthquake striking Haiti.  Most participants initially replied that there was no 
plan or that existing plans were insufficient, but further discussion revealed the 
presence of response frameworks that were adaptable to the situation. They also 
reported specific characteristics of the response organization, adaptability, 
flexibility, and a tolerance for autonomy that enabled the vague or non-existent 
plan to develop into a meaningful response framework that both provided 
disaster relief and empowered the HGOs to resume control. Equally important 
were concerns that participants identified, lessons learned that could have 
delayed the goals of the response. 
A note on nomenclature: because my interviews included personnel in 
both the operational and informational response, I have selected the terms 
responder and communicator as descriptive labels. I also use participant more 
generally when the distinction of role is less important, and I use response to 
describe the overall action taken by the USCG in the aftermath. 
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I aim for this section to provide a geographic and organizational tour of 
the communicative response, beginning in Miami, FL on the night of the 
earthquake with a discussion of how the operational and informational responses 
took shape, and then heading south to Haiti. Communicators arriving in the 
country to establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) and integrate into a Joint 
Task Force (JTF) were confronted with horrific scenes, and then were tasked with 
building a joint response between military and civilian USG agencies, reaching 
out to devastated Haitian publics, and responding to the perceptions of an 
international audience. I conclude the section by highlighting four concepts that 
were present in the responses of both communicators and responders in Haiti 
and Florida: flexibility and adaptability, autonomy, and information sharing. 
Most responders highlighted these concepts as instrumental to the success of the 
communicative response. Cultural sensitivity and image control also emerged as 
closely linked themes, which I address in my third research question. 
Florida, Informational Communication Response
In Florida, the informational response began the day after the earthquake 
with the establishment of “basically what was a [JIC], but it wasn’t at the time,”  
because it was staffed exclusively by the existing local USCG communicators 
working in Florida with minimal input from other agencies. The primary focus of 
this center was media inquiries, which began almost immediately after the 
earthquake and required around-the-clock staffing. When the formal JIC was 
formed in Haiti, the two centers worked in unison, though the Haiti JIC was the 
primary source of strategic guidance.
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The geographic separation between the communicators and the scene of 
the response presented unique challenges, exacerbated by the crippled 
communication infrastructure. As a first step, USCG communicators coordinated 
with operational USCG forces to perform PA functions before more formally 
trained communications personnel were able to enter the country. 
Communication challenges persisted even after communicators arrived in Haiti. 
They had to manually transfer digital data via the continuously operating relief  
flights until internet access was restored.
US media crews were on the ground and broadcasting within days but 
response communicators in Florida ignored media reports, instead relying on 
direct questions and fact checking to collect information. The early USCG 
communication structure did not have the personnel capacity to simultaneously 
generate content and scan media. What they did observe, they judged as 
presenting a distinct media bias, as one senior official stated,“[media] were not 
helpful because they weren't truly telling a balanced story.”
A parallel communication response was also taking shape in Miami under 
the title of the Homeland Security Task Force, South East (HSTF-SE). The task 
force, initially only five members strong, was a joint effort between several 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies. Tasked to prepare for a rapid 
implementation of a potential mass migration plan, the HSTF-SE initially sought 
to keep a low profile, in the words of one USCG official, they “didn’t want to 
dilute the message of the humanitarian aid that we’re providing to the country.” 
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The ongoing humanitarian response influenced communicators to keep 
quiet about the preparations related to mass migration. Had the plan been 
activated by an actual mass migration, the communications function would have 
begun broadcasting as soon as possible. Since no mass migration was occurring, 
and since public sympathy was directed towards Haiti, communicators wanted to 
prepare the plan with minimal public attention, both to keep focus on the 
important work being done by the humanitarian responders. One communicators 
explained he, “would be sending mixed messages if I was also talking about, 
‘we’re going to repatriate you and...we’re going to interdict you at sea, and you’re 
migrants.’”
The Task Force was compelled to publicize their efforts in response to a 
photograph of a severely overloaded Haitian ferry. The photo prompted fears of 
mass migration in South Florida, in part because of past USCG efforts to raise 
public awareness:
South Florida knows all that stuff. Beat it in their head for the last couple 
of years. Through our exercise series Unified Support, through our talks 
about preparations for different exercises we had, working with the media 
- there’s even a mass migration media pool we established in Florida just 
before that, so once they saw that the media inquiries started to come in to 
the task force, there was a brief but very intense period of time where we 
were having to kinda walk everybody back from the ledge and reassure 
people that the next mass migration was not happening.
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Once the public was reassured that a response framework was in place, the 
HSTF-SE withdrew from the public eye in favor of the response effort overall. 
Haiti, Informational Communication Response
The Coast Guard public information response in Haiti occurred under the 
umbrella of the JIC, whose first point of organization was the JIC Forward, a 
media operations center set up in the airport. The JIC combined military, 
government, and US NGO communicators to deliver a “coordinated, integrated, 
and synchronized” story of the US response. A senior USCG leader served as one 
of the deputies in the response, starting at the Port au Prince airport to organize 
media relations. The USCG, in addition to communicating its own story, was 
tasked with focusing on all aspects of the USG maritime response, including the 
medical ship USNS COMFORT, the marine engineers known as the “SeaBees,” 
and all maritime rescue operations. Both the JIC and the parallel USCG 
information structure in Florida grew as the response did. Contrary to the 
bureaucracy of the organizational response, which was perceived as stifling, the 
hierarchy of the JIC was reported to be beneficial. A communicator from the JIC 
explained the process:
As news came up you'd draft something, gotta get an on-the-ground 
coordination between all those organizations, then you can push it to DC 
and say, 'alright, give us the national thumbs up on this and we'll start to 
use it,' and then push it back down and then daily, a set of JIC talking 
points were produced and were sent to all the participating USG entities to 
include us in the JTF.
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A senior JIC communicator highlighted several focal points of the JIC 
response: Visual storytelling was key, both directed at the Haitian people and at 
American media outlets. He used the phrase timely reporting to describe the 
controlled flow of the response narrative to keep media focused on 
accomplishments of the response as they occurred instead of shortcomings before 
they could be addressed. The USCG story and the USG story were considered the 
same: all individual agencies were tasked to report their progress nested in the 
overall narrative of the USG, and were to emphasize the humanitarian nature of 
all efforts. This coordination was a difficult task, in the words of one JIC 
communicator, “trying to gather up all the cats and dogs PAOs and PA assets that 
are out there that come in at the unit level who quickly want to do some good 
stuff but can quickly get misaligned message wise.”
Sensational reporting practices of US news media threatened to derail the 
USCG communications effort, as one communicator reported: 
Journalists that were in the area that seemed to find things that nobody 
else would be able to find, like the one riot in the city...and grab attention 
to those little things that maybe showed Haiti in a different light than what 
we were actually seeing it while we were there.
The majority of participants identified “politics” as a driving force of the 
response effort, but I interpreted their descriptions to be concern about the image 
of the response. Several participants described overtly political issues: outrage 
against Haitian President Rene Preval’s lack of public statements or suggestions 
of a US invasion from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. A senior USCG official 
described politics between responding countries as a barrier, also highlighting 
 62
concerns about whether the response organization had jurisdiction to operate in 
Haiti and echoing the sentiments of several participants:
It’s important to save lives and end suffering, but in many cases big level 
politics is what it’s all about...‘here’s the lines, everybody plays within their 
lines’ because we’re all responding and helping out Haiti, but we don’t 
want...negative interactions. It’s all about what’s the authority.
Members of the Haitian Coast Guard provided an additional perspective on this 
concept: 
If I have a neighbor, a neighbor who has some problem, I’m going to help, 
first of all, because this is a human being, but at the same time I’m going to 
help because I am a neighbor. I have a face to save. The same thing applies 
for people, and then for the country that help.
Jurisdictional questions affected the different components of the USCG response 
to varying degrees. Communicators from the informational response reported no 
uncertainty regarding the justification of their presence in the country, while 
responders from the operational response frequently reported that they had 
limited jurisdiction, authority, or mandate.
The USCG played an essential role in defining the story of the US 
response, directly connected to image control. As one senior USCG official stated: 
“This couldn’t become a bureaucratic ‘where’s the relief stuff’ like [Katrina]...this  
needed to be a relief effort, not a security effort.”
Not all US agencies contributed to this image, as observed by the same official: 
“The DOD message was ‘we provided thousands of troops to help secure the 
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nation of Haiti.’ That was the wrong message because all their troops were 
guarding rubble and there were tons and tons of supplies at the airport.”
Communicators also expressed a desire to tell the USCG ‘story’ to both US 
and international media, and to the Haitian people:
Making sure that the public knew that the Coast Guard was involved and 
knew what we were doing and knew that we were one of the first there and 
that we were doing things that were outside of what we were trained to do 
and we were overcoming those obstacles,” 
exemplifying “traits that are in the Coast Guard heritage,” such as “flexibility,  
adaptability, and humanitarian concern.”
Telling the USCG and USG story was important, but one military 
communicator from the JIC clarified a concern about speaker identity, also 
motivated by concerns of image and politics: 
There's always a desire never to just have a US Military person standing up 
there talking about what's going on, but to have a USAID or a Embassy 
Country Team member, even better, have a MINUSTAH partner there and 
somebody else from the UN, depending on what you want to talk about. 
But you're not just giving the US military aspect of what's going on 
because we were only going to be there for a short period of time.
None of the USCG and USG participants stated a desire for Haitian 
representation in the response communications structure, despite the majority of 
communicators and responders explicitly stating a partner relationship instead of 
a subservient relationship between the US and Haitian government agencies.
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 Communicators in the JIC reported several features that fostered 
flexibility and adaptability in the unpredictable post-quake environment. 
Coordination between agencies was reached via routine meetings at a frequency 
of one or more per day. Routine meetings helped communicators from partnering 
agencies reach consensus and respond to emergent needs. This was essential 
because the military and civilian agencies did not have histories of formal 
coordination. The response of the JIC was “literally [bringing] everyone together 
and [saying], 'here's how we're going to do this.’” As a senior JIC communicator 
remembered, “we all agreed that we would have a single product, daily product,  
of talking points, top-line messaging. We determined that we would use a single 
set of numbers.” Participants noted that the meetings did not guarantee accuracy,  
but rather that the unified messages would help focus media attention, “we gotta 
show progress, we gotta do things, but we all gotta be wrong together.”
Daily meetings also helped identify emergent problems for the 
communicators to address, making it more flexible to changing needs. 
Operational responders were included in these meetings, which helped 
communicators choose what topics to focus on, a senior communicator gave an 
example:
This was us working with our operational guys to say, 'what's going on? 
And at what point do we want to start talking about the docks and what 
we're doing to fix it?' Because you don't want to take people out there and 
go, 'yeah, these are pretty screwed up' before you're able to do something.
The daily meetings included a partner that most PAOs were not used to 
working with. Military Psychological Operations, synonymous with Information 
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Operations (InfoOps) is considered the modern iteration of propaganda. InfoOps 
capabilities were used in Haiti as a strategic tool for interacting directly with the  
Haitian people, despite reluctance from military communicators. A JIC 
communicator justified the decision: “When it's a disaster situation, it's not the 
same thing as psychological operations during wartime.” He saw this as necessary 
for the communicative objectives:
You can't just talk to the media and call yourselves strategic because...The 
media are not the only people talking to your audience...And oh, by the 
way, you're not the only person talking to that media. You got members of 
Congress, you got locals, you've got whatever. So if you're...just coming on 
through the media, you're not going to influence a damn thing because, 
because everyone else is going to walk right around you and they're going 
to touch all those other pieces and they're going to have a much stronger 
influence on that person that you're trying to reach
These capabilities were used to provide both helpful and cautionary information 
to the Haitian public. Participants described broadcasts of health, safety, and 
food distribution details and warnings to locals not to attempt to flee the country.
The JIC itself was credited as a success by both USCG and civilian 
communicators, contrasting with the difficulties of coordinating other aspects of 
the response. One responder noted frustration coordinating interagency 
“operations and logistics and finance administration, but when it comes to public 
affairs...I think we’ve got a model that’s working.” The USCG was able to 
integrate into the JIC, as one non-USCC JIC communicator noted, the Coast 
Guard was able to “[get] a lot of CG stories out and, but...understood that it 
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would start by saying, 'as part of the unified USG response to support the Haitian 
Government.'”
The PaP airport was an important central clearinghouse for information. 
In the first days of the response, thousands of personnel from dozens of countries 
arrived: professional responders, media, good samaritans, and UN forces. A 
responder contrasted the chaotic scene, “all these entities descending on one 
place... it doesn’t have on a good day here what? Six flights? Maybe.” But the 
convergence was beneficial, as a senior JIC official explained, “we had a lot of 
media that just literally came, camped out at the airport...We had a media 
operations hub out there.” The hub of the US response eventually shifted to the 
embassy, but initially the airport was the necessary home of all levels of the 
response structure, including the JIC Forward, which set the procedures for 
media interaction that the US news media and JIC communicators would follow 
for the remainder of the response, as noted by one of the communicators: “Once 
you get your capability a little stabilized you can say, 'send all queries into the JIC 
and then we can figure out the right partner to be answering.'”
Haiti, Operational Communication Response
Perhaps the most chaotic aspect of the USCG response occurred on the 
ground. Most of the lead USCG responders were in the country during the 
earthquake. Responders previously familiar with Haiti found their experience 
served as a communicative shortcut for needs assessment, as one related: 
“Having been in the middle of it and having known the country, I knew what they 
needed from my area of expertise: the ports.” Responders I spoke with who had 
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not been in the country before reported higher levels of confusion and lower 
levels of information availability than their counterparts with more familiarity.  
But, as I experienced in the time I spent working in the country, the constant 
crush of daily urban chaos eventually recedes into the background. While 
responders can not be inoculated against the stimuli of a disaster-stricken 
country, a general understanding of life in a foreign place will always be of 
benefit. As one experienced CG responder put it, “it took people who knew how to 
get things done in Haiti for us to get things done in Haiti.”
Many USCG communicators attributed some of the Coast Guard’s 
communicative success to operational decisions in the hours following the 
earthquake:
The things that we did at the very beginning of the response, that first 
night, that second night, really shaped the response for us as 
communicators. Had we not put out a press release right away saying that 
the Coast Guard was already moving assets and was responding, then we 
may not have been looked at as a go-to agency for information off the bat 
and so we needed to do that.
The Coast Guard was seen by participants as a, “federal first responder,” uniquely 
situated to “get in there fast...do our thing, and then..turn it over to someone 
who’s got bigger and better capabilities.”
A responder with several years of experience in Haiti summarized USCG 
concerns of needs assessment and restoration upon arriving in the country:
We wanted to know if the Haitian Coast Guard was still operational. We 
had heard reports that half of them were killed...And we wanted to verify 
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the status of the port authority and start the process of getting them, if we 
can, help them get back on their feet and start moving humanitarian cargo 
as early as possible.
The most pressing early operational communication concern reported was 
communicating the logistics of the humanitarian response process. A JIC 
communicator described the early mission, “our job was to get in and rapidly 
enable all these international organizations to be able to provide humanitarian 
assistance in this crisis.” 
Participants agreed that, initially, the manifestations of USCG assistance 
were not working in concert: the Cutters in Port au Prince harbor were running 
triage operations out of the Killick HCG base; the liaison officers working at the 
embassy were coordinating medevac flights on USCG aircraft; and a team of 
responders allied with FEMA had just landed at the airport with the goal of 
restoring the city’s port infrastructure. The USCG had to communicate internally 
in order to unify as a service and as part of the larger response effort, integrating 
with larger USG forces as well as non-governmental organizations. 
The USCG was obligated to communicate with agencies typically outside of 
its sphere of interaction because the Haitian government had requested that the 
US Government, “‘send us everything you can,” as one responder explained to 
me. The response plan in Haiti, though pre-defined in very general terms, did not 
provide solid lines of communication and organization in the beginning, though 
that may have been useful because responding agencies were still going through 
the process of figuring out needs, responsibilities, and interactions. A responder 
said the lines, “probably needed to be blurry, honestly. I mean, too much rigid 
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structure in a chaotic environment like that might’ve been too much.”
Another USCG responder initially eschewed the constraints of a communication 
plan, suggesting:
You don’t have a set protocol for this, when you’re in a position like mine. 
There’s just intuitive things you know you need to do...it was those kind of 
things that, having experience down here to know there could be issues, 
it’s something you identify and handle it as best you can, notify the people 
that are going to find it important, and then move on to your next, the next 
thing that occurred to you.
The same responder maintained his perspective even after a more formal plan 
was in place, suggesting that the emergent response framework still depended on 
flexible independent communication to succeed:
When anybody sits down and you have these huge tabletop meetings and 
they're like, 'OK, you do this and you do this and you do this,' there's got to 
be that person that's standing back, listening to it all, coming up to 
somebody to say, 'hey, I can help you with that, I can help you.'
Most of the USCG personnel I spoke with responded in a similar vein: willingly 
sharing information and expertise with other members of the response, and often 
going beyond their assigned duties to do so.
Operational Restoration
The earthquake crumbled interpersonal relationships as well as 
infrastructure. Both needed to be rebuilt in the weeks and months that followed. 
Almost all Haitian ministry buildings collapsed in the quake including the 
Presidential Palace, removing the geographic hubs of governance. Many Haitian 
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officials were killed as well, destroying the human base. Most of the heads of the 
maritime HGOs survived but they were forced to find and adapt to new working 
environments while participating in the multi-agency effort to reopen the port. 
Following the port opening, the USCG responders had to, “work themselves out 
of a job,” as one responder stated, by returning Haitian agencies to control and 
building capacity to receive aid. Most USCG responders arrived “without an end 
in mind plan...we didn’t know what our exit strategy was immediately, but we 
had to develop it on the fly.”
The responders' desire to work themselves out of a job served as sufficient 
impetus for communicative action, helping organization to emerge in the 
restoration of the port infrastructure. Responders reported that the routine daily 
meetings contributed to this cause. In the words of a responder, the USCG was 
uniquely positioned to facilitate the process,  “because of the nature of who we 
are and how we’ve done that mission in the past we kinda had some corporate 
knowledge on how to do it best.”
A similar perspective was expressed by an official in the PSU, tasked with 
restoring the Haitian Port Security function. His unit developed and 
implemented a training program to help Haitian Port Security workers handle 
the unusually high influx of vessel traffic and he noted that “they really 
appreciated it because they felt like they had ownership of something. And they 
were actually proud, never before had it been done. They were treated like men, 
treated like adults, individuals that could do it.”
I explored a different approach in conversation with UN organizers. The 
UN agency I spoke with had built an ongoing relationship with a Haitian logistics 
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agency of a similar size and circumstance to the agencies with which the USCG 
was interacting. The agency had lost its facilities without losing any of its human 
capital. The UN official explained the situation: “Basically they're still staff of this  
agency even though they work for us. We reimburse them, the totality of this staff 
are here working with us...and at the same time we do on the job training to 
arrange and load up capacity.” The primary difference I observed is that the UN is 
still present, still involved in the administration of the independent Haitian 
agency while the USCG returned its presence in the country to pre-earthquake 
levels and the agency it supported is generally self-sufficient.
Emergent Themes
Flexibility and Adaptability
The Coast Guard’s integration into the overall response structure was 
facilitated by communication flexibility. Participants described flexibility as the 
ability to communicate with different partners, both civilian and military and 
both US and Haitian. This flexibility bolstered the USCG ability to meet emergent 
needs, and was caused in part by the ease with which the Coast Guard's reached 
“into the organization and find people quickly that could be, that could effect 
change positively because of what they know and what they’ve done and employ 
that resource.” As one senior JIC communicator explained: “You can't have 100% 
of your location staffed by your best people, just, it's an impossibility, so when a 
major event like this happens, you need to say, 'this is so important we've got to 
send our best people down there.'”
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“Reach back support,” as it was labeled by several responders, included 
more than personnel to communicate on the ground. Participants described, 
“groups setting up websites, groups back [in Washington, D.C.] helping gather 
information,” and a team within the response structure that:
Took social media...to an operational level... to bring operational resources 
to people who needed them. People were still tweeting and still texting in 
Haiti, and many of them were tweeting that they needed help...so we’re 
able to take real, almost real-time intelligence from social media, give it to 
the operators, and give the operators visibility on a need they may not 
have known existed, and move that aid directly to where it’s needed most, 
and in a fairly rapid fashion.
Off-scene support was critical because on-scene responders were 
extremely burdened with communication and response duties, as one Haitian-
based USCG responder said, “It’s not just like I was doing, it’s not that anybody 
here was just doing one thing, we’re all doing multiple things at the time and 
juggling a lot of different priorities.” 
Lacking local familiarity, the response force was significantly bolstered by 
the arrival of the few Coast Guard officials with experience working in Haiti. At 
any one time there are only two to three permanently stationed Coast Guard 
officers in the country, though training teams and cutters have made frequent 
port calls, as well as temporary forces after the 1994 U.S. invasion and restoration 
of President Aristede. A USCG responder described the benefit of finding and 
drawing in these experienced personnel, “we adapt to the environment, surge 
resources appropriately...I think we valued anyway the right expertise to be a 
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leading edge of what we wanted to accomplish in Haiti.” This strategy was 
espoused by several other agencies, including officials I spoke to in the DOS, UN, 
and the NGO community, some of whose members flew in from around the world 
to help. 
The majority of USG personnel arriving in Haiti had not worked in the 
country before. Responders with experience in the country generally noted this as 
a hindrance, noting the:
Need to augment our folks who are down range without replacing 
them...the CG people who were deployed downrange, the coordination 
with people already downrange...could've probably been improved...You're 
also dealing with people who're directly impacted by the event who were 
now put in the position of coordinating 20, 30, up to 100 people who they 
didn't request and didn't really know what to do with and didn't have any 
control over.
Conflicts of this nature may be unavoidable because the minimal USCG 
presence in Haiti provided limited opportunities for personnel to gain experience 
working in the country. In general, participants felt that the USCG response put 
the existing experience to good use. Many participants noted other US agencies 
operating in the response structure where the arrogance of responders lacking 
experience in Haiti hindered coordination with responders already on the 
ground.
Integrating the responding agencies was difficult because of incompatible 
response plans and organizational languages. The USCG helped bridge many of 
the gaps. Many USCG responders gave personal examples of organizational 
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flexibility, as one explained, “I straddled the line between...Coast Guard Liaison 
to the Joint Task Force and being the person back to that DHS component, where 
FEMA and...those folks were working.” 
Several participants identified communications practices that threatened 
to limit their adaptability to emergent conditions, specifically the burdensome 
bureaucracy created by the plethora of government agencies. Most participants 
agreed that the USCG was more comfortable making localized decisions with 
with the available information, while other USG response assets required a more 
rigid communications structure and higher levels of certainty. As one USCG 
responder described to me:
The culture in which decisions are made is vastly different. DOD and DOS 
are very different, culturally speaking... that’s where the USCG kinda rides 
the line, we kinda hop on both sides of the fence very capably, and I think 
that’s where we were used quite often was to stitch some of the seams 
together.
This contrasted with the bureaucratic culture of involvement described by 
another responder as dangerous to the fragile organization:
Everybody feels that they have to have participation and a say in 
everything that goes on. And there’s some things that you can just let other 
people handle and not get involved in. It doesn’t mean that you don’t care 
about the final outcome, but your participation is not warranted, 
necessary, or even helpful.
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A UN responder's joke about communications around the integration effort 
summarized many participants' perspectives: “It’s a big ugly monster to try to 
wrap your hands around, best to let it alone.” 
Autonomy
Responders both in and external to the USCG credited the USCG Cutter 
TAHOMA with setting the image of the humanitarian response. TAHOMA’s 
captain, utilizing his past experience as a Liaison Officer in Haiti, led his crew 
ashore the morning after the earthquake without formal authorization to provide 
much needed medical response. Autonomy, defined by responders and 
communicators as the ability to set communication and response priorities, 
choose who to communicate with, and choose how to complete assignments, was 
touted as a privilege of experience. Communications were limited by the 
significant security restrictions placed on the inbound USCG forces. Disregard of 
security restrictions was almost absent from the narratives of responders without 
previous experience in Haiti. Although experienced responders described the 
restrictions as “ludicrous,” they also acknowledged their necessity for the safety 
of responders with no local familiarity.
A responder with previous experience in Haiti that arrived with FEMA 
related an example: “I immediately removed myself from that group and grabbed 
[the group leader] and said ‘look, you want to communicate with the right 
people? Then I need to go and do what I know how to do’” This responder 
circumvented security regulations to successfully reach out to important publics:
I drove cars at one o’clock in the morning without any weapons on me or 
anything, with the whole purpose of trying to get people what they need... 
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during the day when the entire road system was just clogged with people 
you can’t move things around very effectively, so nobody knew the roads 
like I knew them, so there was one person that was freed to be able to help 
teams of US Government people outside of the DOD...to get where they 
needed to be with the resources that enabled them to do their job because 
people did things outside the rules.
Another responder associated autonomy with the experience he possessed:
You don't wait for somebody else to tell you what to do. You see a need, 
you go fill it. It doesn't make you a hero, it doesn't make you any more 
important than anybody else, but there comes a point where you realize 
that you're that person that has the knowledge and can help out.
A third experienced responder echoed a frequent criticism of the excessive 
restrictions, explaining mobility restrictions that affected the communicators and 
responders ability to communicate locally:
If you wanted to organize a trip from 'point a' to 'point b' you've got to go 
through the CG, the CG's got to go through FEMA, FEMA's got to go 
through somebody else, and all the way up to the top, then it's got to come 
all the way back down. By the time it's come back down from the top it's 
too late, it's three days later. So the CG's used to making split second 
decisions like, 'head over there, be back by six,' and we weren't able to do 
that. That's what happens when you've got so many organizations trying to 
work together.  
Information Sharing
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In the absence of rigid response frameworks, several participants 
identified forms of information sharing as an important cohesive element, 
contrasting the typically tight-lipped military organization to the 
necessarily free-flowing humanitarian one:
Because it was blurry, chain of command and sharing information 
happened on a need basis...people went and got it, people gave it. You’re 
not working in a terrorist environment, you’re working in a humanitarian 
disaster response environment and I think the DOD recognized that, they 
said, ‘none of this stuff that we’re talking about here is classified so I’m 
going to push it out and give it to whoever wants it.’
Sharing information helped agencies communicate before formal lines of 
communication were formed. 
Language barriers impeded information sharing, but not how I expected 
them to. Though USCG communicators could only name a handful of Haitian 
Creole translators, they agreed that the English/Creole language barrier did not 
significantly hinder the response effort. They did note, however, a conflict in the 
language of the response structure between USG agencies. In the words of one 
responder: “There wasn't alignment with any elements...at either State or DOD, 
because...There's not a natural translation between the [DOS and DOD] Staff and 
the [USCG] staff.” While this lack of translation initially limited interagency 
information sharing, it was resolved by communication outside of the response 
structure, or as the responder put it: “The [USCG staff] were also maintaining 
their day jobs too and that's when they would talk to their counterparts at 
SOUTHCOM.” Several responders noted a similar solution, “honestly it’s just face 
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to face decision making and creating.” The response was routinely bolstered by 
responders and communicators learning to communicate outside of the 
boundaries of the response structures, and by organizational practices that 
enabled the growth to meet the emerging needs of the disaster.
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RQ2: How did the publics of the US Coast Guard receive and respond 
to USCG communicative actions?
USCG communicators had to span a chasm between the first world and 
the third to help American audiences attempt to understand the human impact of 
the earthquake and the importance of the USCG's mission. Similarly, they had to 
help responders landing in Port au Prince make meaning of the devastation while 
adapting to an environment drastically different than the country they had flown 
from. The Haitian news media, HGOs, and Haitian public were the most 
important publics of all – responders and communicators needed to convey 
information critical to their survival,  restore the infrastructure that millions of 
Haitians depended on for aid and commerce, and restore incapacitated HGOs.
USCG responders and communicators I interviewed identified numerous 
publics of the response, and while there may have been more publics I only used 
the ones identified by my participants.  I did not ask participants to identify 
characteristics of each public they listed, but I believe that their selections are  
sufficiently granular to stand alone. My questionnaire asked three questions 
identifying publics, message content, and methods of communication. The 
responses are compiled in Table 1. In this section, I elaborate on the publics as 
perceived by participants, describe the methods and messages used to 
communicate with each public, and discuss the impacts I was able to assess. First,  
I will address unique considerations on message content, methods, and impact 
evaluation imposed by the crisis environment of Haiti.
Message Content
One DOS communicator I spoke to described being overwhelmed by 
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diverse stimuli when arriving in Port au Prince. She posited that the glut of 
information caused overload and decreased the efficacy of all messages being 
transmitted. I felt the same way during my month in the country: awash in a sea 
of color, buffeted by crashing waves of  traffic and commerce. The information 
environment felt similar; a full 18 months after the earthquake I found public 
information notices printed by the UN, USAID, the Haitian Government, dozens 
of community based organizations and as many NGOs, and corporate interests. 
Local cell phones buzzed constantly with messages from the Red Cross, the UN, 
and various other organizations transmitting in partnership with the cell phone 
companies. Though the content I observed was different from the post-quake 
environment: cholera prevention, gender-based violence reduction, and political 
campaign messaging, I was better able to understand why so many of the 
responders and communicators I spoke with had emphasized the importance of 
unified, synchronized messaging. Many voices saying a single thing is one way to 
speak through the tumult.
I asked each participant what they perceived to be the message content of 
the USCG communications effort. Because the USCG communicators were 
embedded with the JIC and the JIC was credited with setting thematic order for 
most USG communicators, many of the answers included the larger USG focus. 
The quotes provided are not direct quotes, instead I compiled the perspectives by 
theme, presenting the combined summary of their statements.
Communications Methods
The earthquake devastated communication infrastructure, significantly 
decreasing responder access to information. Pay-as-you-go cell phones are 
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ubiquitous throughout the urban areas and countryside. Haitian men and women 
in red or green colored vests recharge phone credit at intersections and 
community centers. Two out of the three major cell-phone carriers (Digicell, the 
red vested company, and Voila, in green) ceased working within 30 minutes of 
the first tremblor and the third (HiTel) failed shortly afterwards. Coast Guard 
daily briefings tracked the cell phone availability in the days after the quake and 
cell phone coverage remained at or below 70% for the first week.
A senior communicator in the JIC summarized the issue facing response 
communicators, “you can't just talk to the media and call yourselves strategic.”  
The communications response encompassed significantly more than media 
advocacy, and so more methods of interacting with the publics were necessary. 
Communications methods differed depending on the target public. Language 
played an obvious role in this, English broadcasts would fall on deaf ears in Haiti 
and Haitian Creole messages would garner no public support in the US, but 
cultural nuance was needed as well. Direct translation of messages does not 
always capture intent. Additionally, as one communicator noted, “a lot of the 
traditional methods that we kind of take for granted in the US, like broadcast 
cable or print media were not available. In Haiti you had to do things by radio, 
you had to do things by word of mouth.” A participant described a “nation-wide 
game of telephone,” “radyo trant-de,” Creole for “radio thirty-two,” in reference 
to the number of teeth in the mouth, is a local expression for the pervasive and 
rapidly propagating rumor mill.
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Impact and Evaluation
I was able to speak with members from two of the identified publics: the 
HGOs and other USG agencies. My assessment of USCG communicative success 
with other publics was drawn from my discussion with USCG communicators and 
from the perspectives of other USG participants on the USCG response. The Haiti 
I visited, 18 months after the earthquake, was still in ruins. Hundreds of 
thousands still lived in tent cities, and food, water, health, and personal 
insecurity remained pressing issues. Though I lacked pre-quake perspective, 
most people who I spoke with who were familiar with Haiti said that it had only 
gotten worse. Claiming a successful response might ring hollow, but evaluation of 
specific actions is still meaningful and useful to future response efforts.
Publics
US News Media
The US news media was the first identified public of USCG responders in 
Florida and was also listed as a public by members of the JIC. Florida-based 
communicators offered a finer differentiation, suggesting that the South Florida 
news media was more sensitized than the national news media to the possibility 
of a mass migration. Although the differing concerns could warrant labeling them 
as a separate public, I have combined them here. 
Message content directed towards the American people and International 
Community focused on the role of the US Government, and sought to present the 
image of the response as humanitarian instead of militaristic or imperial. The 
 83
communicators I spoke with generally agreed that the majority of the message 
content was set by the State Department:
This is the federal government quickly and effectively responding to a 
humanitarian disaster by providing relief and supplies and helping people. 
We are enabling some of the efforts here but we are nowhere close to being 
in charge of these efforts...USG will provide anything and everything 
within our power that the Haitian government will accept to be able to 
help the Haitian people get out of the pending crisis and try to move down 
the road towards restoration. The next Mass migration is not occurring, 
but we are prepared if it does.
A USCG responder provided an example of communications that his team was 
trying to avoid, citing his perception of one of the DOD messages: “We provided 
thousands of troops to help secure the nation of Haiti.”
USCG communicators employed traditional Public Affairs communication 
methods interacting with the news media, as one communicator summarized:
We did a lot of hometown news releases. We also put out a lot of press 
releases. We put out packaged video stuff and we did a lot of interviews, 
from everybody on down from the largest national and international 
media to the locals as well. And then we also did a lot of embeds with 
national media, for instance we had Katie Couric on one of our 
[aircraft]...we used social media a lot, too. We brought in some social 
media experts to help us do that.
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Communicators focused on visual aspects of the response and pre-packaged 
imagery and video content to make it easier for news media to incorporate it into 
their broadcasts.
Impact
I chose to rely on perspectives of the USCG and other USG communicators 
to determine the impact on US News Media. The Coast Guard did not have a very 
daunting task in winning news media support. As one USCG communicator 
observed:
What [the Coast Guard was] doing was not a controversial thing. I mean, 
everything we were doing was really beneficial to the Haitian people and 
really beneficial to everyone - US citizens and Haitian citizens alike - with 
the exception of potentially repatriation, which did receive some critical 
comments.
This communicator described his department’s evaluation process: a 
conventional media analysis tracking impressions, how much of the applicable 
articles were devoted to Coast Guard messages, and content analysis. He reported 
that the CG also tracked social media trends to get a more general awareness of 
the US public. Overall, he found a positive treatment of the USCG and USCG 
missions in his review. The USCG communicator with the mass migration task 
force also reported success, crediting the quick shift in media attention away 
from the mass migration plan to his effective communication of preparedness.
Haitian News Media
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The Haitian news media became a public once the Haiti JIC was 
operational. They were treated similarly to their American counterparts, though 
special effort was made to translate press conferences and releases into Haitian 
Creole. Several communicators operating in Haiti noted that the Haitian news 
media were used to address rumors about the response. A senior USCG 
communicator said: “We take the [Haitian] media out to the [USNS Medical 
Ship] COMFORT... and show them that we’re treating Haitians onboard because 
the rumor in town was only US citizens were being treated on the COMFORT.” 
Although much of the Haitian news media is educated and bi- or trilingual, USCG 
communicators took specific actions to ensure that press conferences and 
mediated messages reached the majority Creole speaking population. To promote 
this, as a senior JIC communicator told me:
Every press release we wrote was also translated into Creole and sent to 
the Haitian media so they could either read it or report it on radio. And 
then the same thing when you had a press event that were multiple times a 
day in the first week, to once a day, to several times a week as time goes 
past, but ensure that you get the Haitian media there, too. And if 
necessary, do two simultaneous press events so that the Haitian media can 
also get the story as well and not depend on just getting it in English and 
then have to turn it, turn around into Creole.
In addition to crafting the messages and holding multiple press 
conferences, communicators engaged with radio stations to garner support and 
dispel rumors. A senior JIC communicator reported, “We helped bolster the radio 
stations by giving them fuel for their generators so that they could be on air.” This 
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public outreach was critical in gaining credibility for the USCG and USG 
messages. 
International/Caribbean News Media
Though the priorities of news media from Europe may not align with those 
of Bahamian reporters, most communicators I spoke with lumped them together. 
Communicators cited controlling the response image as one of their chief 
concerns, noting competing suggestions that the US was invading Haiti. Mass 
migration was perceived to be a concern of the Caribbean news media, prompting 
the HSTF-SE to share response plans with them as well as with the South Florida 
news media. Though USCG communicators mentioned these publics, they also 
shared that much of the international news media communications originated at 
the JIC, outside of direct USCG concern and influence.
Haitian Diaspora
Haitians in South Florida, New Jersey, Boston, New York, and around the 
Caribbean were a primary target public because of their link to Haitians still in 
Haiti. They exerted what one JIC communicator labeled, “a huge effect” on the 
Haitian public, “because once cell-phone capacity was re-energized and fixed, 
people were talking to family back here in the states, asking for help, finding out 
what's going on.” A USCG communicator reported that the USCG had built ties to 
the Haitian communities in South Florida that proved beneficial to the 
information response, especially in communicating US policies and the role of the 
HSTF-SE to the Haitian public.
Haitian Governmental Organizations 
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Officials and workers in the Port Authority, Haitian Coast Guard, and Port 
Security  were subjected to the same influences as the rest of the Haitian public, 
both mental and physical. Every Haitian government worker I spoke with 
reported a conflict of interests, divided between caring for their families and 
crumbled homes and assisting in the response, but the majority also reported 
going to great lengths to continue their service, as one member of the HCG told 
me, “I live a little far from here. I had to buy myself a bike to come here to 
help...And everybody did, in his or her way, did something similar to what I did.”
USCG responders with experience working in Haiti reported giving extra 
consideration to their interactions with the HGO public to ensure that they 
supported the recovery effort without impeding restoration of the Haitian 
agencies to control. A locally experienced USCG responder explained:
[The USG/USCG response]... had to agree that these folks...could take over 
themselves by the time [the USG/USCG response] left. But, as the director 
general [of the HGO] says, it’s a collaborative effort. They’re always in 
communication....Some of these things are really integrated and some are 
separate, so it’s a difficult question to answer. Because the answer could 
be, ‘a month later they could do what they needed to do,’ or the answer 
could be, ‘we still need this.’
Many of the Coast Guard responders I interviewed described interactions 
with upper-level HGO workers. One responder, a senior USCG official, described 
a series of negative interactions with lower-level workers.  This responder arrived 
two weeks after the earthquake, and as he observed:
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After I arrived it was at least a week [before the workers showed up]... 
[they] getting their families together, trying to get housing...where you and 
I being in the military, or somebody being a police or fire, they know at 
some point, ‘OK, I’m working,’ it wasn’t that same attitude that I could see.  
They were taking care of their families, which, OK, I can see that...
When he noticed them back at work, he was disappointed to see, “they kinda 
were sitting back kinda like, ‘OK, you got it,’ and we went with, ‘Americans 
(laughs) we’re going to do the job, we’re not going to sit around and wait when 
you’ve got stuff that needs to be done and people that need to be served.’” Which 
he explained:
I guess we were a little bit more intense, whereas they were...by our 
standards laid back. I don’t know if they were as concerned. I hope that’s a 
fair statement, just from my impression, it was almost like, ‘yeah, OK, my 
family’s taken care of so I’m not worried about anyone else,’ ...content to 
watch us...we came with all this equipment and forces, it’s almost by 
default that we just kind of took it because they weren’t doing anything. 
You had ships coming in, it’s like ‘somebody has to be in charge of these 
ships coming in and making sure it gets where it needs to.’ And they 
weren’t doing it.
He attributed this in part to the lack of Haitian government control:
Normally, the way it works in America, if you’re responding to whatever 
state needs help, if it’s federal help, you respond to that governor...But that 
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wasn’t the case here, we were responding to nothing. So, we were not 
going to sit around and wait, so we just kinda started reacting.
And, when it was time to return control to the HGOs:
The plan was to wean, to kinda move ourselves back and push them to the 
forefront so they can start doing. It’s your country, y’know? And before I 
left, that’s where it was... we started to train the port authority like, the 
communications people, on radio communications. We would train the 
security personnel just on port security and entry and exit security in the 
port area. Haitian Coast Guard would start riding, and we were doing 
patrols, joint patrols with them in order to get them back, once they start 
coming back to work.
Responders focused on a message of agency in attempting to restore the 
maritime transportation system. This message that they directed at the Haitian 
agencies and private business owners, and was designed to prompt restoration of 
local control was: “The sooner you guys get back in control, the sooner you can 
charge what you want instead of the humanitarians using our services for free.”
Many of my participants identified the the face-to-face interaction that 
occurred daily at the port and the Coast Guard base as the most important 
communication method in realizing the USCG’s operational objectives. As simple 
as this may sound, it was fraught with difficulty in the aftermath of disaster. A 
USCG responder experienced in Haiti explained that the Haitians had “just lived 
through a horror that only a few of us who’ve lived through earthquakes of that 
nature might be able to...apply...people are looking at you with a thousand yard 
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stare.” He had built personal relationships with HGO officials whom he saw 
grievously affected,  “The port director came up to me... crying, and he was happy 
to see me of course, but his entire home was demolished and his family was living 
under a tree.” This experienced responder's perspective echoed many of the other 
experienced responders', “you were doing therapy with someone just so you could 
get through that and have a conversation...and then we need to get down to 
business, we need to figure out how we’re going to get this port up and running.”
For these experienced responders, hierarchy and image were important: 
“How are we going to make sure that [the HGOs] are at the top of this food chain 
of decision makers so that the government of the United States is not seen like it’s 
taking over the government of Haiti?”  But it was also difficult to balance these 
needs, as one explained, “you’re trying to respond and help them while you’re 
trying to help your own agency and your own government be effective.”
The USCG practice of permanent liaisons to the maritime agencies of 
neighboring countries was highly effective in this response. The liaison 
relationship created an experienced local responder able to communicate with 
USCG and HGO personnel. The HCG thought this relationship was so important 
that participants feared its absence: “If something were to happen right now, we 
know [the liaison officer] would be in contact directly and we would have other 
people like him, but, let’s say what if something happened to this specific 
person?”
Impact
At the time of my visit, the HGOs who had been publics of the Coast Guard 
were operating at a reasonable level of self-sufficiency. Most of their day-to-day 
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operation was conducted in tents because there was no funding for new 
buildings. HGO officials recounted the response in very positive language, though 
the presence of a USCG official may have biased their feedback. I observed a 
positive working relationship between the HGOs and the current USCG liaison, 
which supported their reports of a successful response. Several of the USCG 
responders I spoke with highlighted the efforts that had been made to include 
HGOs in the response and restoration meetings, though when I solicited 
constructively critical  guidance to future responders, one official in the HCG 
offered:
I would ask them to work hand-in-hand with us, not to work in our place. 
Come along, alongside. And, and I would suggest that there be a clear 
chain of command so that information can flow the way it should, and in 
order to not step on someone’s toes. [this didn't occur] intentionally, but it 
happens.
Local USCG responders corroborated this report, suggesting that inexperienced 
response personnel arriving after the earthquake acted too boldly, often ignoring 
the existing organizational structures. In general, though, all participants agreed 
that the relationships were a success.
A possible contributor to the successful aspects of the USCG/HGO 
relationship might lie in the words of one of the HGO directors, “It’s easier for us 
to work together [because of our mutual involvement in] the maritime field.” The 
directors of the HGOs had spent time in the US, attended conferences at US 
facilities, with US agencies. The senior officials in the HCG had received training 
from the USCG, attending Officer Candidate School at the USCG Academy or the 
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Chief Petty Officer's Academy, and regularly worked with USCG forces. The 
history of the working relationship contrasted sharply with negative reports on 
the relationship between the Haitian Coast Guard and the UN waterborne forces. 
As one USCG responder informed me, after the earthquake, “the UN was not 
patrolling, their boats were on land, sitting on trailers.”
I also noticed a general amiability towards US military forces in Haiti. One 
USG communicator explained, “The [US] forces that came in here, they didn’t 
have a track record of anything negative or positive, frankly, but people sort of 
took them seriously.” Many participants contrasted public perception of the US 
forces against those of the UN, who had been in the country since 2004 and had 
occasionally held an adversarial relationship with the Haitian public. A Haitian 
NGO worker offered a complementary explanation: that the US presence in Haiti 
did not last long enough to affect public opinion.
USG Agencies
USCG responders and communicators indicated a variety of USCG 
agencies as publics: FEMA, OFDA, USAID, the DOS, the JTF, DOD assets, and 
the JIC. USCG responders with local experience commented on the size disparity 
of the relationship with SOUTHCOM, saying that the USCG was, “more like a 
remora feeding off a shark.”
Internal USCG Publics
USCG participants expressed little internal dissent with how their 
organization responded to the earthquake, which suggests a unified public. 
Experience working in Haiti appeared to be a significant division: responders 
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who had worked in Haiti for a year or more generally presented themselves as 
cultural translators, helping the glut of incoming USCG and USG personnel to 
adapt to the working environment of a foreign country. USCG responders 
describing internal publics generally used geographical separation as their 
segmentation, identifying individual USCG ships, responders in Haiti, 
communicators and responders in Florida, and USCG leadership in Washington 
DC as important groups. 
Communication between USCG assets was difficult in the aftermath of the 
earthquake, according to responders and communicators both on the ground in 
Haiti and in Florida. Cell phone networks were incapacitated, internet access was 
extremely limited, and many of the radio towers around the city had collapsed, 
but asynchronous methods proved more successful. Communicators in Florida 
had to find alternate methods to contact USCG members in Haiti to ensure they 
had survived, receive damage assessments, and pass operational information. 
One Florida communicator described how they used social media to re-establish 
contact and text messages to pass important information:
The first way I was able to communicate with the [USCG forces in Haiti] 
was through text messages and Facebook....text messages don't use as 
much broadband as phone calls do, so you can get a lot more text 
messages through than you can phone calls. And the circuitry in Haiti that 
was operational crashed pretty quickly just because of all the traffic...we 
tried several methods... Email was delayed in responding, in part because 
the people we were trying to reach were responding or either directly 
impacted themselves.
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The USG was quickly able to set up a temporary workaround, in the words 
of one USCG responder in Haiti:
A lot of the stuff...was not done on a computer, but done over radio with 
various entities...we had I think 20 or 20-something bases set up with the 
radios going off of a repeater that FEMA had set up on a mountain top. So 
we were able to communicate throughout the city. A lot of this stuff was 
done by satellite phone, coordination while I was out on the road.
Much of the early data collection used first-person accounts for needs assessment 
from, “the teams, the crews that flew down there, some of the evacuees and the 
people that came with the evacuees.” 
Haitian Population
Though the Haitian population was not identified as a direct public of the 
USCG response, the HGOs that the USCG targeted were subjected to the same 
influences, so I have chosen to include some findings from my research. Having 
witnessed the response through American mediated sources, I was somewhat 
surprised to learn from an NGO worker with several years of experience in Haiti 
that:
The [early] response was entirely Haitian led... except for a few search and 
rescue teams, everyone that was pulled out of the rubble was pulled out of 
the rubble by Haitians... By neighbors, by family, by strangers... people 
were sharing their food with each other...Haitian nurses and doctors were 
responding and working 24-7 to respond to people's medical needs.
The resilience of the Haitian people was recognized by responders, even in the 
form of gallows humor as one UN official joked:
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You're either a resilient Haitian or you're a dead Haitian, simply put. 
Because no one else in Haiti's going to look after you, you have to look 
after yourself. They don't like their government, they don't trust their 
government, they run – that's why every community's quite strong – 
because they run themselves.
One USCG responder with several years of experience in Haiti added to 
that statement, suggesting that Haitians would like the US to annex Haiti. Other 
responders disagreed, though there was general agreement on an underlying 
principle: that Haitians did not trust their own government. One military 
responder added nuance to the idea: “[Haitians] want that protection of the US, 
they want to know that. As much as they want autonomy and self rule, there's a 
lot of nationalistic pride but there's not a lot of nationalistic trust.” 
Regardless of which interpretation reflects reality, I found a consensus 
from responders that the US government was trusted and appreciated for openly 
offering information on the response because of the Haitian government's history 
of reticence. Additionally, as an NGO responder with several years of experience 
in Haiti noted: “People's perception right after the earthquake was that they had 
no government, like the government no longer existed...Because there was just no 
word from the government, and everybody knew that most of the ministries had 
collapsed.”
The same traumatic experience that created a mental gulf between victims 
and responders fostered a spirit of solidarity in the aftermath. As one responder 
who had spent several years in Haiti reported:
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Our experience the night of the earthquake, as traumatic and horrible as it 
was, was also, I mean it was incredible to us to see just how the, all of the 
layers of racism and classism and elitism that are so embedded in the 
country just fell away and, and that people with, y'know, Mercedes Benzes 
were piling up the back of their cars with wounded, bloody, bleeding 
people and taking them to the hospital yards. 
This description, similar to the concept of a cosmology episode as described by 
complexity theory, lasted anywhere between a few days and a few weeks and, in 
the words of the responder:
Changed the way that people related to each other, to be common, kind of 
survivors of the same massive disaster. I don't know if that makes sense... 
[an] instant bond with everyone that you come across and the, caring and 
sharing and kind of acknowledgement of others' humanity, and that that's 
what matters more than where you live or what your job is or what color 
your skin is.
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RQ3: How did cultural and historical factors influence 
communications between the USCG and its publics?
Awareness of Haitian Culture
I asked participants to self-assess their overall awareness of Haitian 
people, history, and culture. My reasoning behind the broad question was to give 
an opportunity for them to define their own areas of expertise and ignorance. Of 
22 total participants, six reported low awareness, two reported medium 
awareness, and 14 reported high awareness. Nine of the 22 participants were in 
the USCG, and a majority of the USCG officials reported high awareness. Though 
I could not correlate their self-assessment to a specific level of knowledge, I found 
it a useful point of comparison for their personal narratives.
My time in Haiti troubled my understanding of awareness - I witnessed 
hundreds of US and international workers conducting their day to day business 
removed from the majority of the Haitian population. They drove from protected, 
isolated office space to protected, isolated office space, ferried around in 
armored, air conditioned sport utility vehicles. I imagine that these workers will  
eventually leave Haiti and consider themselves experienced. I lack the 
perspective to judge whether fears of violence and instability justified these 
segregating security decisions, but I am confident suggesting that the isolation 
slows the development of intercultural awareness. 
An Assembled Description of Perceived Haiti
All of my participants described Haiti during the interviews, or the 
characteristics of Haiti that they perceived. In an attempt to derive some meaning 
from their broad responses, I have assembled the various perspectives of the USG 
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and USCG responders into an overall summary of Haiti as they see it. The 
following quotes are drawn from my interviews and represent a compiled 
description of Haitian culture from the perspective of the American forces that 
responded to the earthquake. Because it is assembled, I should emphasize that it 
does not represent the perspective of any single responder. Additionally, this 
assembled description excludes most mentions of violence and instability 
because enough participants commented on that to prompt a separate section.
Haitians are “a relatively fragmented community and they don’t much get 
along.” The divisions of power are severe, “You’re either a serf or you’re a lord,” 
and the lords are the “mercantile class...in many cases, not Haitian.” This division 
is observed primarily in Port au Prince. Outside of the urban areas, “it’s still  
feudalism with cellphones and fuel burning vehicles.” The countryside is typically 
considered equivalent to the slums of the Capital. 
“It’s really an impoverished nation, exploited time and time over, and 
they’ve exploited their own resources to the point where they don’t really have 
any natural resources to speak of.” Haiti has suffered from foreign exploitation, 
but also self-governance has repeatedly failed:
They have had two stable governments, the Duvaliers and the United 
States Marine Corps. That’s it. That’s it. Duvaliers ruled for 29 years and 
the USMC ruled for 16. So that’s the stable government in Haiti. They’ve 
had 63 heads of state. 63. And that doesn’t include the military juntas. OK, 
we’ve had what? We’re on 44. They’ve had 63.
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Weak government control has weakened the education system, which is primarily 
for profit, serving  more affluent members of Haitian society. Low literacy rates 
and high unemployment contributes to the pervasive influence of the rumor mill.
The rumor mill, also called the “bush radio” or “radio 32,” is a primary 
means of spreading both information and disinformation through the country. 
“The underground in Haiti is better than any given country.” But this causes 
optimistic rumors to spread rapidly: “If you start a viable enough rumor that 
people want to believe, guess what? It’s fact. It’s not fact, but they don’t care.  
They see it is fact, so that’s what they get.” After the quake, Haitians were,  
“expecting Frigidaires to fall from the sky,” and believed that the outpouring of 
international aid would both repair the earthquake damage and improve their 
lives from pre-earthquake conditions. 
Responders to Haiti must contend with a lack of “capacity...to even absorb, 
or manage the level of assistance to be given.” Haiti maintains a limited technical  
capacity to harness assistance due to an infrastructure considered under-
developed by American standards. Additionally, Haiti displays  a lack of “moral 
capacity, talking about corruption” Corruption, infrastructural weakness, and a 
culture increasingly dependent on international aid mean that “seeing the need is 
one thing, but providing what can cure the need through channels that they need 
to make sure are proper, it's something else.” Haiti will frustrate an unprepared 
aid worker or responder, “Probably 8,000 people have failed in whatever it is that 
you’re attempting to do now, so be very careful about what you pick to be, what 
you want to hang your hat on and feel good about.”
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Haitians have developed aid dependence because of constant foreign aid: 
“Here’s a thing: if you hand out free stuff, people show up there...IDP camps 
really formed around where we were handing out free stuff.” During the 
response, Haitians were: “Content to watch,” quick to accept assistance, and slow 
to show gratitude for fear of ending an aid transaction. Recipients of assistance 
would generally wait until after the fact to express any frustration with the 
procedures or perceived slights. 
Though these comments are not presented to describe the reality of Haiti 
to an unbiased observer, they are indicative of the perceived reality of the 
responders, and may have impacted their efforts to communicate. While only 
participants claiming at least some familiarity with Haiti chose to comment on its  
cultural status, almost every participant had opinions on violence, safety, and 
security.
Perceptions of Violence
Violence exists in Haiti, but is Haiti a violent place? I am uncertain if that 
is a quantifiable statement; medical records, when they exist at all, rarely list a  
cause of death (Friesen, J. Personal Communication). An objective, supportable 
answer to that question is less important to my study than the perspective of the 
responders. Fear of violence can mean the difference between a compassionate, 
interpersonal relief response and the dehumanizing experience of food dropped 
out of a helicopter to Haitians scrambling in the dust storm below. Fear of 
violence and a perception of insecurity can thus drastically influence 
communication practices. Participants described their perceptions of violence 
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and also how they observed these perceptions affecting communication during 
the response. I conclude this section with my own limited perspective, developed 
during my month in the country, spent living both in the city and in a more rural 
area.
Why Responders Expected Haiti to be Violent
The majority of participants agreed that violence was present but not 
prevalent after the earthquake, though flaring tempers sometimes lead to tense 
situations. I witnessed this too: everyday arguments between friends, filtered 
through a language barrier and cultural differences in tone and body language, 
appeared to me as precursors to a physical fight. Most of the responders with 
experience working in Haiti hinted at systemic origins of violence, citing the lack 
of trust in government as the reason “why lynching's such a big feature in this 
country;” or, to the circumstances, “anybody who's been down-range to a place 
like that knows that three days after an event, that's when people start rioting 
because the response just can not be quick enough.” Several US responders cited 
previous periods of violence in Haiti, including food riots in 2008 and political 
violence throughout the past decade. A Haitian responder I spoke with suggested, 
“violence is inescapable in the presence of poverty and instability, but the 
violence in Haiti is not as bad as the violence in surrounding countries of similar 
socioeconomic status.” 
Responders arriving in Haiti for the first time encountered overwhelming 
images with the potential to instill fear of violence. Being exposed to the 
morbidity and mortality associated with a disaster may have primed them to be 
afraid, “It has an effect on people mentally, they’re not ready to see what could’ve 
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easily looked like post-battle. Arms missing and all that kind of stuff. Dead 
bodies, piles, people in miserable states, no food no water.” Later responders, or 
communicators working from the US were exposed to mediated news accounts of 
conditions on the ground, which many participants disagreed with. In the words 
of an NGO worker with several years of experience:
CNN coverage of Haiti...made me sick to my stomach...I just thought it's so 
not like that, what's happening [was] sensationalism and meanwhile 
people...are grieving, and they're praying, and they're putting sheets up 
over pieces of wood to try to make little shelters for their families, and 
they're dealing with the disaster in the best way they can. And it felt like it  
was really de-humanizing the way that most of the coverage that I saw 
there played out.
A senior JIC communicator concurred that news media, “were not helpful 
because they weren't truly telling a balanced story.” 
Violence and the threat of violence towards foreign responders was not 
absent from the country. One USCG responder cautioned, “if it's your first time 
there and you've never been in the country, you'd better be careful because they 
will take advantage of you...Most, all the crime that takes place is because they're  
hungry.” The security precautions implemented by the US Embassy were 
comprehensive even before the earthquake, but afterwards they were intensified 
in anticipation of the large numbers of inexperienced personnel arriving in the 
country, which experienced responders credited as instilling fear, whether 
necessary or not, in the minds of the arriving USCG and USG personnel.
How Perceptions of Violence Affected the Communicative Response
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I can understand why USCG and USG security planners were concerned 
during the response. As one USCG responder observed, “if something happened, 
if someone did get shot or hurt...the whole [response] would’ve been in question.” 
Every response effort presents hazards, and every response planner is tasked with 
mitigating those hazards while effecting a safe and beneficial response. I asked 
my participants to elaborate on how institutional and personal perceptions of 
violent risk affected the response. Their replies were generally negative, 
suggesting that the response effort was limited by draconian security regulations 
that were occasionally justified. Face-to-face communication was frequently cited 
as a vital component of the communicative response, so any restrictions causing 
USCG personnel to fear for their safety would likely have impacted their ability to 
interact with the people they were being “protected” from.
A senior USCG communicator felt that personnel who feared violence were 
a hindrance to the JIC communication effort, citing a specific interaction with 
two communicators working in Haiti for the first time:
These two that I’m talking about, these junior PAs, always complaining 
about “oh, I feel unsafe”... They didn’t want to leave the embassy. And then 
one time they sent messages saying they felt unsafe at the embassy, so I’m 
like, ‘listen, if you feel unsafe at the embassy, you shouldn’t be in Haiti.’
Actions are often said to speak louder than words. A local NGO responder 
working from the UN LogBase in the days after the response gave a powerful 
example of how security concerns may have presented an image counter to the 
humanitarian framing of the response. He reported that Urban Search and 
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Rescue teams were prohibited from going into the city without a security escort. 
Because there were not enough escorts:
there were search and rescue teams sitting around...it was infuriating to 
me knowing that the people like my neighbors were exhausted, had no 
resources, were unable to dig, to keep trying to dig people out of the 
rubble, and again this is two days later, a lot of people still alive.
The perception of many inexperienced response personnel was summarized by 
the reaction of UN personnel to the thought of leaving the LogBase:
They were shocked and horrified that we were out, when we showed up, or 
were going to leave, they were like, “you're not staying here? You're going 
out there?” as if we were like going to get hacked up into little pieces if we 
left the logistics base and we were, 'we live, I mean, our house is out there' 
(laughing), y'know?
Fear of violence may have also limited the USCG capability to collect 
information in the aftermath of the response. Less-restricted NGOs reported 
higher levels of situational awareness in the aftermath, though that might have 
also been the consequence of increased local knowledge: 
We didn't have any security restrictions and spoke Creole and had 
motorcycles and knew our way around the city, [which] gave us the 
opportunity to help, or... act, react in a way that other people were not able 
to do because [of] the blanket security restrictions.
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Locals I spoke with, both associated with the USG and independent, 
offered a unique perspective on perceptions of respect, and how fear of violence 
can harm the overall communication process. Their concerns were echoed by a 
USCG responder with several years of experience working in Haiti, who proposed 
that the strict security methods may have ultimately been counterproductive:
Makin' that country out like it's so dangerous to go from point a to point b 
when it's totally wrong. They did that to us, too. 'You gotta have an armed 
escort,' 'you gotta be kidding me.' All you're doing is inviting crime by 
doing that, people are insulted when you have that kind of a situation, 
when you have to lead a group by armed gunmen. They're very much 
insulted.
His comment resonated with me, especially because of the USCG's overall goal of 
working itself out of a job. If one of the communicative objectives of the response 
was to restore the local organizations to control, taking actions that the target  
publics might find offensive would seem counterintuitive. In addition to the fear 
of violence, responder considerations of target publics may have helped or 
hindered the response.
Considerations of Culture in Communication
The USCG, despite having a permanent presence of only two to three 
personnel in Haiti, became an essential part of the USG response from both 
operational and informational perspectives. USCG responders acted as cultural 
translators, using their local knowledge of systems, personnel, and practices in 
Haiti to inform inbound inexperienced USCG personnel and also other USG 
response agencies. Cultural translators helped effect the communicative 
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response. They frequently intervened to alter the tone and course of US 
communication, fine-tuning it to avoid isolating specific publics or derailing 
necessary inter-organizational relationships and keeping the US response “on 
message.” 
Tapping Cultural Experience
Intercultural considerations in crisis management are necessary even 
within our country, or as a USCG responder put it, “going down to the bayous of 
Louisiana and understanding the culture of how the Parish works or doesn’t work 
is still even a challenge for the US government, federal, and even state.” A senior 
communicator at the JIC described how his team used Foreign Service Nationals 
(FSNs), Haitian citizens employed by the US Embassy, to offer cultural and 
language translation, asking:
If we're going to do these information operations campaigns, how do we do 
it? What do we say that makes sense? Because you can't just go in there 
and act like you're doing a commercial in America, you had to, you had to 
write it and word it in a way that it was a) respectful, b) understandable,  
and actionable by people of a different culture, so they also helped with 
that.
The JIC also utilized the FSNs to shape the press conferences with Haitian news 
media, determining:
Who to bring in because they already had relationships with these 
people...they did a really good job of making sure we had a cross section 
of...pro-government, anti-government. You didn't want just one group, 
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you wanted to have a cross section to get information out in a balanced 
way.
JIC communications with the Haitian news media may have been bolstered by 
the Haitian government's historical lack of communication.  As a USAID 
responder explained to me:
The Haitian government in general is averse to communicating with 
constituents. Governmental communication is not in the culture, though 
the earthquake may have changed that. Additionally, since official 
communications were unusual prior to the earthquake, the Haitian 
population may have appreciated any efforts made by international 
responders to communicate with them.
  The USCG reached back into its ranks to identify and harness 
experienced personnel for the response. The ratio of experienced to 
inexperienced responders was low, so the USCG planners typically assigned more 
familiar responders to leadership positions where they would have more 
communicative responsibilities and recommended similar actions to other 
agencies. This was necessary because time constraints prevented the majority of 
responders from receiving cultural sensitivity training typically provided to 
routinely deployed US and UN forces. 
I had the opportunity to review some of the UN cultural training materials 
at the conclusion of my month in Haiti, though I did not have the opportunity to 
sit in on the live training. A senior UN responder described the content to me: 
“There’s a Haitian staff member who comes and gives a pretty good presentation, 
I must say, about Haiti, where they came from, the great revolution, things you 
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do and don’t do around Haitians, body language.” Second-hand education of 
cultural practices is not a reliable enculturation aid. A USCG responder with 
several years of experience in Haiti related in a story about a high-ranking US 
military officer sharing his experience after the response as an example of how 
misperceptions can enter the communication process, and a demonstration of the 
limitations of any non-experiential training:
He started telling about what it’s like in Haiti and...he was getting kinda 
choked up near the end of his presentation, and he was saying things like, 
“y’know, you’re out there, and it’s just heartwarming to see these Haitians, 
they’re so grateful to us, and we’d be driving by and they’d make these 
motions, like this (brings back of hand towards his mouth) like they 
wanted to kiss our hands they were so grateful.” This means “give me 
something to drink,” or if it’s a girl and she does this, that means... 
prostitute... And then...he said, “and it really was touching because they 
were following us around doing this (touches fingertips of two hands 
together above his head) and we finally found out that it was, they saw 
[his organization] as guardian angels...” That means they want a tent, that 
does not mean they see you as a guardian angel. 
A USCG responder identified cultural familiarity as critical to responder 
mental health, citing a case where a responder was unable to resolve her 
perceptions of what a response effort should be with the reality of how it was 
developing:
[Responders] want to be successful. But they may not think about how 
they’re going to apply their expertise and knowledge to the problem 
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without any consideration to culture, language, and the realities of doing it 
in that environment....I’ve seen people get so frustrated they just break 
down, it’s done, get ‘em on a flight. It happened in our group, someone on 
the FEMA team just couldn’t handle the realities on the ground, we had to 
send her home.
Another USCG responder's advice to new arrivals captured the importance of 
cultural familiarity for decreasing the stress of of the new environment on 
responders: “The fact that you see a guy walking down the street with a machete 
in his hand, don't let it bother you. He's a worker, he's not out there to cut your 
head off.”
Controlling the Image of the Response
With hundreds of thousands dead and countless more dying or critically 
injured, the USCG and its partners had extremely little time to not only provide 
direct assistance, but also facilitate improvements to the maritime infrastructure 
to allow an international stream of aid to enter Haiti. Throughout all of this, the 
responding forces had, in the words of one responder:
To value the sovereignty of Haiti and reinforce that in every way possible, 
was critical and you have a very heavy handed DOD capability that arrives 
with so much capability and resources... being very cautious about how 
you communicate who’s making the decision in a foreign government is 
not something that the DOD trains for per se, and I mean like that’s State 
Dept role, that’s a political role and, but yet we were on the ground putting 
the functional pieces of the Haitian government back online and I think we 
had to be very very cautious and there wasn’t a lot of guidance.
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The USCG helped address this concern in the first hours after the earthquake and 
continued to promote the desired appearance throughout the response, as the 
same responder pointed out, “We’re viewed as humanitarians first and 
supporting DOD second, so I think there’s an advantage for us on the diplomacy 
side of that and just for responding effectively, and that the DOD cannot do.”
Coast Guard responders were able to dissuade partner agencies from 
certain courses of action that could have caused a shift in international and 
Haitian perception of the response, for example:
We had cargo containers floating out, and this would be an example of a 
crazy idea: a CO of a vessel suggested that they sink the cargo containers 
by gunfire out in the bay...when I got wind of this I immediately got on the 
horn with my superiors and said “for the love of god, please do not allow 
this to happen. The Haitians are going to think we’re out there shooting 
Haitians trying to flee the country, or we’re going to have a wild shot and 
somebody’s going to get hurt... To their credit they were like “what? who 
said this? no, that’s crazy.”
The USCG used its experience as a humanitarian agency in the role of 
cultural translators, helping responders from a military culture operate in terms 
and actions appropriate to a humanitarian culture, which was critical for 
controlling the image of the response. One USCG responder shared the following 
story:
I was on the pier in Haiti at like six in the morning and I was talking to 
some Coast Guard guys and this...Marine General...was just so aggravated 
because the French Marines from Martinique, so the French Navy, the 
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French Marines from Martinique were in Haiti tying up at the pier... the 
Marines see a beach and take a beach. So what he asked me to do was, he 
said “OK, you’re a [PAO]? I want you to get CNN here live and I’m going to 
have three [Marine landing craft] come up in an hour and...drop their 
ramp and we’re going to have Marines come storming ashore...and this is 
going to show the US government’s here. You understand that?” and I said 
“yes.” and he’s like, “well, what’s the problem?” and I said, “it’s completely 
off message. it’s not what we want to do’ and he was like ‘you don’t 
understand what we’re doing here. We need to do this.” and I’m saying 
“you don’t understand, general, that’s not what we’re going after. That’s 
the wrong message. The message might work in Dubai, the Middle East. 
[Haiti is] a sovereign nation.”
Most USCG and civilian responders had similar stories to relate, generally 
involving an over-enthusiastic US responder seeking to present an image outside 
of the agreed upon humanitarian response framework. 
Cultural Fear of Mass Migration
According to the USCG communicators that I spoke with, “we didn’t sit 
down and think about the whole history of Haiti...but we did think about the 
mass migration history of Haiti.” Communicators in Florida were reluctant to talk 
about the HSTF-SE and preparations to intercept a mass migration to avoid 
disrupting the image of the response. As one communicator shared, they:
Knew that because of the humanitarian aid that we were rendering, the 
assistance that we were providing, [we] would be sending mixed 
messages...talking about, ‘we’re going to repatriate you and we’re going to 
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do, we’re going to interdict you at sea, and you’re migrants’ and that kind 
of thing, so [we] did not do that aspect of it.
Though participants noted the disparity between the historical triggers of mass 
migration and what they witnessed in the aftermath of the earthquake, they 
feared a mass migration because the unprecedented severity of the earthquake. 
However, USCG responders in Haiti for the earthquake conducted research on 
the ground and quickly determined that a mass migration out of the country was 
unlikely, though more than a million Haitians were reported leaving Port au 
Prince for the countryside. 
Floridians perceived a higher threat of mass migration than the USCG 
responders in Haiti. As a Florida-based USCG communicator explained to me, 
“South Florida has that unique experience of having gone through Mariel, having 
gone through the ‘94 exodus, where you had both Cuban and Haitian migrants 
coming in droves. So they’re a little more attuned to that specific issue and 
they’re a little more gun-shy about it.” Many of the communicators working at the 
JIC had no experience working in Florida, so they did not consider the 
ramifications of releasing an image of an overloaded Haitian ferry without 
providing context. The Florida-based communicator offered perspective:
When that image came across the wire...the cut-line didn’t provide a full 
context of what that was, the media looked at it and interpreted it and 
reacted to it, and it was game-on at that point...So when I started seeing 
that trend in the line of inquiries from the media, I could recognize right 
away how this thing would get legs in South Florida and you’ve got a, you 
know, you’ve got a CNN bureau there, you’ve got [Associated Press], you’ve 
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got a FOX bureau there, so if you don’t deal with it, it’s gonna get national 
legs and that’s really what we didn’t want to do so it had to be dealt with 
pretty quickly.
Demonstrating the concept of a cultural translator, this communicator 
and his department immediately addressed the JIC and the DHS to make them 
understand how the messages would be received and interpreted in South Florida 
and begin publicizing the preparations of the HSTF-SE to prevent an adverse 
public reaction with potential national consequences. His efforts were successful 
as he explained: “When it hit, it was a real sharp spike, it went on for about a 
week and then it dropped right out. We were really effective. Got the message out, 
then everybody got off it and got back on talking about the humanitarian effort.” 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a federal protection granted when foreign 
nationals in the US are unable to return to their country safely (US Citizen and 
Immigration Service, 2011) had been granted when the photograph was released, 
which he was identified as a critical point of interaction in the public's eye: 
There were a few inquiries that were generated by the granting of TPS for 
Haitians that were in country by [the] Secretary of State. It didn’t really 
change. And that created a certain amount of stir within the community as 
well. It’s kinda like a one-two punch. First we do the TPS thing and then 
this photo shows up.
Surprisingly, responders reported that the granting of TPS had minimal 
consequences on the ground in Haiti, perhaps because the infrastructure was so 
devastated and food insecurity was so prevalent that no one could dream of 
stockpiling enough food to make a six-day boat journey north, or because of the 
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influence of the Haitian diaspora in the US, whom the USCG had already begun 
communicating with.
Interpersonal Cultural Considerations
The majority of the intercultural considerations that participants 
discussed in our conversations dealt with interpersonal communication. Haiti is 
reported by natives and visitors as a face-to-face country, so this was not 
surprising. Interpersonal interaction was critical to the response, especially for 
long-term restoration. Satisfying the immediate needs in the aftermath of a 
disaster is only half of a responders job; the other half is restoring the pre-
existing organizations to a functional state. USCG responders had to balance the 
task of opening the port with the necessity for the HGOs to play an integral role, 
and in order for the HGOs to participate, they needed to be treated with 
compassion and respect for their circumstances and their cultural practices. I  
found the concept cultural translators frequently. HGO members I spoke with 
verified both the roles and importance of these individuals.
An experienced USCG responder explained an important consideration 
that time-strapped American responders might not otherwise have made:
You just can’t pass people in the Haitian, in the US Embassy that are 
Haitian and not say something to them. I mean, that’s so rude, right? We 
do it all the time, you walk the streets of DC and pass everybody on the 
street and you may not greet them, not a single person. But in Haiti that 
seems so foul, so wrong. Particularly if you want to interact with them, the 
greeting is important. 
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Many of the responders who had previously worked in Haiti before 
identified the importance of interpersonal relationships in the response. One 
reported making it a focus of his efforts: 
I was going all different places doing the best I could and establishing 
friendships amongst the Haitians and the CG people who couldn't speak 
the language. And what we ended up doing was, some of the Haitians who 
wanted to learn [English], I hooked them up with some, or some of the 
Americans that wanted to learn Creole, I hooked them up with some of the 
Haitians who knew a bit of English that worked in the same area, so at 
night they'd be sitting together and they'd be learning both languages.
Some responders and HGO officials criticized the response for not aligning with 
the needs of target publics. I asked a senior member of one of the HGOs what she 
would suggest to incoming responders in the future, and she agreed with the 
following paraphrase:
Don’t assume that [the Haitians] don’t know anything, because they know 
their country, we don’t, we have to listen to what they have to say. We 
don’t just come in and do everything our way. To me, that’s the the big 
thing...It doesn’t matter... who comes out, they’re not going to know.”
and she added, “And that’s something simple...you have to learn, you have 
to have an idea who is that person you are going to deal with it. You want 
to ask me something you should learn the land, the field.
Clashes of Responder Culture
The most controversial issues addressed by participants were the levels of 
assertiveness used by responders in their interactions with the HGOs. One USCG 
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responder summarized both the benefits, “we’re the take charge kind of people 
that they don’t have to be at that point,” and the situations in where the approach 
was harmful:
We had a lot of people here who were very overbearing. I’m not saying 
USCG, lot of people in uniform though, came in here very overbearing like 
we owned the country. But this is their sovereign nation... unless the 
people you’re dealing with are so obstinate that they’re not allowing you to 
do the right thing, and the Haitian government officials were not... we 
didn’t need to act as arrogantly and overbearing as we did in some cases.
This person identified himself as a cultural translator, assisting responders 
operating in a military mindset who were used to rigid, hierarchical structures of 
authority to succeed in a decentralized, less formal, less confrontational 
environment:
I was a very big player in that role, and more of a peacekeeper between, for 
example we had a big ship show up down at the [Haitian Coast Guard] 
base and there was a, there was a high ranking person that came ashore 
from that ship. And that person was being extremely overbearing about 
what was going to get done on the base...I saw it happening and I pulled 
this person aside who outranked me and I said, ‘listen, you, I understand 
what you’re trying to do but you’re making these people angry...you can’t 
talk to them like that. This is their base. They can tell you to get out if they 
want. They won’t do that, but they could..'. And that person said they 
understood, but I think their personal way of dealing with people was 
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always that way so I’d always constantly see it reverting back. So I was 
constantly having to do that.
This intervention was essential because, as a senior leader of an HGO explained 
to me, “We can say that Haitian mentality is so complex... Haitian people like to 
make people feel welcome,” by which she meant that Haitians would be non-
confrontational when interacting with strangers, but also acknowledged that  
displaced Haitian officials might be resentful and unwilling to work with 
responders after being slighted.
Assertiveness is a necessary part of military organization, and is especially 
so in a high-uncertainty environment. In the words of one responder, 
autonomously identifying and addressing needs is, “how we operate, and we have 
our policies and our directives and we can't deviate that much until a certain 
amount of time goes by and we really get a feel of where we are and what the 
people are like.” To go in without structure would have been counterproductive. 
Consequences of Cultural Considerations: Restoration
Cultural translators may have served to prevent the forceful and assertive 
US responders from communicating in a way that undermined the pre-existing 
organizational structures, which empowered HGO leaders to eventually resume 
control of their organizations. The HGO representatives identified specific 
instances of arrogant responders communicating poorly. One member of the 
HCG said: “[The responders] just wanted to help, [but]...they asked you to do it 
the way they want them to be done, and most of the time, most of the time they 
were wrong.” The HGOs did not appreciate pompousness, but in this case it 
appears that it was prevented from derailing the response effort.
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Both the HGO representatives and the USCG responders believed that the 
majority of their communication with the USCG were facilitated by an existing 
relationship between the HGOs and a USCG liaison. The pre-existing relationship 
was also credited with decreasing the negative impact of the rumor mill on the 
USCG/HGO interaction – the trust already developed lent more credence to what 
the USCG said, and the experiences of past coordination fostered higher HGO 
awareness of what the USCG was and was not capable of. No participant 
expressed frustration with the amount of time needed to transfer control back to 
the HGOs.
Did Cultural Considerations Influence How USCG Forces Were Received?
The USCG was well received by Haitians and HGOs. Participants did not 
identify any instances of hostility directed at USCG forces. The HGOs and Haitian 
nationals I spoke with reported positive memories of the USCG presence, when 
they were able to identify it at all. One responder reported that the USCG was 
received positively:
But not any more so than anybody else. They see us ashore, they assume 
we’re US Marines, believe it or not... They think we’re MINUSTAH, 
MINUSTAH being the UN. They think big white boat, that’s the UN. 
Everything white is the UN. Wear blue uniform, this is a bunch of UN 
people here.
I found the previous statement unusual because many responders identified a 
distinct difference in public perception of US and UN forces, suggesting that the 
positive reception of the US forces was a direct result of public discontent with 
the UN presence, though several responders added to this argued that the US was 
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well received for presenting a consistent image of a humanitarian response and 
avoiding the use of violence. Two participants suggested that cultural awareness 
had little impact on the reception of the response. Others felt that the political 
climate of the country affected communication more than any specific cultural 
considerations. A responder with USAID who had assisted following devastating 
floods in the northern city of Gonaïves in 2004 suggested:
If the international community would’ve tried to do the earthquake 
response in the political environment of that time we would’ve 
accomplished nothing, because back then...if we funded an NGO to work 
in this neighborhood, they would not be permitted to work in that 
neighborhood because this was a pro-Aristede neighborhood and that was 
an anti-Aristede neighborhood, so if you’re working there you ain’t coming 
in here.
Did Cultural Considerations Impact USCG Communication Efforts?
Releasing a photo of an overloaded ferry to a region of the US familiar with 
the history of mass migration was, in the opinion of all the communicators who 
were aware of it, unwise. I was unable to interview anyone involved in the 
decision to release the photograph, in part because they were not in the USCG 
and in part because releases were generally attributed to the JIC instead of to an 
individual communicator. The rapid assessment of the situation by a skilled 
USCG communicator and the willingness of his command to allow publication of 
the USCG's mass migration plans prevented public outrage. 
The HGO officials offered a single criticism of the USCG response related 
to communication. The USCG set up a medical triage clinic at the Killick Coast 
 120
Guard Base providing medical assistance and medical evacuations in the early 
days after the quake, but as one HCG responder reported:
parents might be looking for [a person who received care] for days and 
they cannot track them down...some of them were taken to someplace, I 
don’t know where...So, when [the families] ask us because we are Haitians, 
they expected us to give an answer, ‘I have my son, I have my daughter, we 
came here this morning' or 'he was dropped off here, but I come, I don’t 
see him, I don’t know where he is,’ I know that people were brought to 
some other places to be taken care, but in fact we don’t have any record...  
sometimes the USCG personnel would put the person on the helicopter 
and take them somewhere, and they assumed that any Haitian they talked 
to was going to pass the word.
While the media depiction of Haitians was not a stated concern of USCG 
communicators, the sensationalism drew focus away from the response effort. US 
and Haitian NGO workers I spoke with in Haiti resented the negative portrayals 
of Haitians in the US media. Additionally, depictions of violence resulted in, as 
one senior responder described, “many of us who were sort of colored by or 
programmed to expect Haiti to be an unstable and conflicted place, so that our 
sense getting off the plane post-earthquake was that we were in a place that was 
going to be unstable along political lines.”
Though responders were fearful of further violence because of their previous 
experiences in the country, most felt that US communication efforts emphasized 
the humanitarian intent instead of a militaristic security intent, and most of the 
Haitians I spoke with concurred. 
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Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study used qualitative methods to reconstruct the USCG 
communicative response to the Haitian earthquake. My goal in assembling the 
response narrative was to trace the emergence of ordered systems out of post-
quake chaos and how communication shaped that system. Interviews helped me 
understand the development of communicative actions, strategies, and networks. 
One of the most important themes I uncovered in analyzing the results 
was the utility of cultural translators. I identified these as agents at the 
individual or organizational level that bridged knowledge gaps between the 
response forces and their publics. The USCG as an organization performed this 
role by connecting military and civilian response agencies. Individuals within the 
USCG performed the role in even more communicative functions both at the 
micro and macro levels. 
USCG responders and communicators used their experience in Haiti and 
South Florida to manage the crisis and prevent further crises that could have 
resulted from inexperienced response forces acting without regard for the local 
environment. USCG personnel helped maintain an appropriate balance between 
relief and restoration when working with the HGOs and educated American 
responders on the intricacies of Haitian social interactions to preserve and foster 
the critical working relationships. In the US, USCG personnel worked to prevent 
public uproar over fear of mass migration from Haiti. Personnel in the US and 
Haiti helped the response present an image of humanitarian assistance instead of 
security driven invasion.
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Cultural translators were not a panacea, nor were they cultural experts. 
Every one of the participants I spoke with who identified their role consistent 
with my definition of a cultural translator was a caucasian American male, 
generally a senior USCG official, with between two and four years of experience 
in Haiti. I found anecdotal evidence of Haitian-American USCG personnel 
participating in the response, specifically as translators. I did not have the 
opportunity to speak with these members.  The cultural translators were not 
operating from a point of full cultural awareness, but rather were more aware 
than the remainder of the USCG and many of the other USG personnel that 
responded. 
Autonomy emerged as an important theme that enabled the USCG to 
adapt and stay flexible to emergent needs and situations throughout the 
response. Autonomy, the ability of an individual actor to identify needs, set goals, 
and choose strategies and tactics without direct approval from a central 
authority, expanded USCG capabilities without requiring a commensurate 
expansion in structured command presence. In the low organization environment 
of the early response, this enabled the USCG to act quickly and effectively and 
accomplish more than other response agencies.
A note on complexity: When I began planning this study and conducting 
my research, my focus was on the organizational level response, and I had chosen 
the USCG's actions as my unit of analysis. As I completed more interviews and 
added depth to the response narrative, I realized that the response could not be 
reduced to a single unit of analysis without a significant loss of meaning. The 
USCG communicative response was heavily influenced by the actions of 
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experienced individuals, just as the overall USG communicative response was 
inextricably linked to the early actions of USCG assets. In the discussion that 
follows, I attempted to hew as closely to my original unit of analysis as I felt 
would provide an adequate test of the theories, but I deviated as necessary – 
noting when doing so – to show where the complex interactions between 
individuals had a critical impact on a higher unit of analysis like the 
communicative response effort or the USCG.
In this section I discuss how my results confirm or challenge complexity 
theory and the STPS. In hopes that my work may some day be used to lessen the 
extreme suffering, of which I only witnessed the powerful echoes, I address 
practical implication of my findings. Before concluding, I tally the limitations of 
my study and also highlight directions for future research, which are plentiful.
Theoretical Implications
Complexity Theory
Complexity theory is generally incompatible with testing. Instead, I 
discuss whether the USCG communicative response fit the parameters of a 
complex system, identify the conceptual themes of complexity theory present in 
the response, and compare the USCG's communicative actions against the 
normative advice offered by complexity scholars to assess how the USCG 
performance adapted to the complexities of international crisis management. To 
conclude, I compare the successes identified by participants to those identified by 
the scholars.
The USCG Communicative Response as a Complex System
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The USCG response presented by participants fit all the criteria of a 
complex system as described by Gilpin and Murphy (2008). On both the 
organizational and interpersonal level, the USCG response systems were 
composed of independent actors whose actions altered the face of the response 
over its course, transforming it from a disorganized flood of personnel and 
interactions into a relatively streamlined joint response and communication 
structure and restoration effort. These self-organizing interactions occurred 
locally, in the PaP airport, in the Embassy, at the Killick HCG base, and on the 
streets of the city. They were rule based; often guided by organizational standards 
and influenced by the suggestions of cultural translators. They provided a critical 
degree of adaptability to the response process. Interactions occurred on a 
recurrent basis – the USCG was in Haiti every day, communicating with publics,  
assessing needs, and running meetings. Interactions were non-linear; many 
situations spiraled unpredictably out of immediate USCG control until new 
strategies were made to address them. Most participants concurred that the 
overall scope of the response was greater than any one person could grasp, but 
the response was not the only complex system present. HGOs, other USG 
agencies, and the Haitian population all exhibited the characteristics of a 
complex system, which I have compiled in Table 2. I have separated the USCG 
response from the USCG as an organization because the response required a 
higher degree of complexity absorption than day-to-day USCG operations. 
Cosmology Episodes
Severe social stratification was evident during my visit, but those 
boundaries temporarily fell with the buildings throughout Port au Prince. I lived 
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on both sides of the divide: from camping on the beach and walking the 
decimated streets of Leogane to staying at a bed and breakfast behind guard dogs 
and an eight-foot concrete barrier in the hills ringing the capitol. Many 
participants described a homogenization following the earthquake; Haitians were 
forced to question their understanding of the world, and in the ensuing chaos 
acted outside of traditional boundaries to help fellow citizens. The reported 
duration of this effect varied, but another unreported example of cosmology 
episodes lasted longer and was more closely related to the response.
USCG personnel with experience working in Haiti were confronted with 
hundreds of responders lacking cultural familiarity. The experienced personnel, 
working as cultural translators, had to guide or even incite cosmology episodes 
for the inexperienced responders to increase their capacity for effective 
communication across a cultural barrier. Weick (1993) highlighted that 
recovering from a cosmology episode required an intense learning process, which 
was the stated goal of the cultural translators. This occurred on an 
organizational level as well: the USCG helped partner USG agencies in the JTF 
recognize that the partner agency's traditional communication methods were 
unsuitable in the context of Haitian crisis management. 
Attractors: Stable, Unstable, and Strange
Complexity theory challenges the belief that control of a complex system is 
possible, but posits the existence of influential forces known as attractors. I 
found examples of attractors, organizing or destabilizing forces pulling the 
response to higher or lower states of organization. Stable attractors: the face-to-
face communication of daily meetings of the JIC, JTF, and MTSRU, the 
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coordinated themes of JIC communications, the USG response mandate, and the 
USCG ethos and guiding principles of operation, influenced the USCG response 
towards a higher level of organization, forming an ideological structural 
framework that transferred into organizational communication structure or 
guided decisions before organizational communication structure was cemented.
Erratic and unpredictable unstable attractors threatened to do the 
reverse. Cultural ignorance, troubling stimuli of the post-disaster environment, 
and prejudices of violence affecting communication with publics could all have 
thrown the response into a more chaotic state. The preventative educational 
efforts of cultural translators and the policies of the response structure 
prevented most of these from happening. The photo of an overloaded Haitian 
ferry, released out of context, was a powerful example of the destabilizing effects 
of an unstable attractor: the entire HSTF-SE response framework had to shift 
course to prevent the disorganization of public panic.
Strange attractors, non-linear influences that eventually demonstrate 
their ability to prompt higher levels of organization, were also present, though by 
definition their existence is harder to demonstrate. I identified two strange 
attractors in my examination of the response. The first was the PaP airport. The 
airport was the initial entrepôt for all relief supplies, communications personnel, 
and news media, and functioned throughout the response as the point of 
departure for American citizens and critically injured victims requiring treatment 
in the US. The airport influenced initial organization; the JIC Forward was 
formed there and the much of the USCG response originated there. The 
communication patterns that connected the small city of response forces that 
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sprang up on the tarmacs and open spaces of the airport persisted throughout the 
response. The high-density interactive environment persisted even when the 
response forces had more room to spread out. 
Interpersonal and organizational relationships emerged as the second 
strange attractor. Perhaps not so strange, given Haiti's reputation as a face-to-
face interpersonal culture, these relationships informed and influenced the 
response. Several of the more experienced USCG responders actively tried to 
foster these relationships between HGOs and newly arrived USCG personnel. The 
majority of the reports that I identified as the work of cultural translators were 
prompted by pre-existing relationships informing an intervention to avert a 
counterproductive communication decision or action. I believe that the 
relationships existing prior to the earthquake and those formed during the 
response were instrumental shaping the communication that ultimately restored 
the HGOs and the maritime transit system. Relationships helped influence the 
response towards a unified state, with engaged HGOs, considerate USG agencies, 
and collaborative needs assessments and restoration. Stronger interpersonal 
relationships would have improved the ability of responders to conduct 
productive needs assessments, addressing one of the primary criticisms made by 
the HGOs.
Historical Context
The concept of a historically situated system inspired my third research 
question. I found its presence in the answers to all of my questions, but not in the 
way I expected. My preliminary research caused me to interpret a dire history 
between the United States and Haiti, one fraught with military interventions, 
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economic manipulation, exploitation, and political intrigue. I expected this 
history to manifest itself in animosity towards the US response and rebellion 
against a perceived neo-colonial invasion. I didn't find that. Instead, I found a 
historical perception of violence held by many of the foreign responders that may 
have hindered the response with unnecessary security restrictions. I also found 
that US forces were received favorably because Haitians disliked the UN and the 
US was seen as a better alternative. The USCG response benefited from the recent 
historical context of the Haitian system it was interacting with, but it was also  
successful by its own merits.
Evaluating Success in a Complex Environment
Complex systems do not revert to their old states, which makes dominant 
paradigms of crisis management assessment difficult (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). 
Both USCG and HGO personnel considered the response a success. The specific 
items that they identified as successful were the coordination of the JIC, the 
restoration of HGOs, defusing concern in South Florida about the threat of mass 
migration, and the control of the humanitarian response frame. I compared the 
methods they reported as contributing to the success to the metrics presented by 
complexity scholars and found general agreement between the two lists (Ashmos, 
et al., 2000; Falkheimer & Heide, 2010; Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). The USCG 
response generally absorbed complexity, maintained permeable boundaries and 
predicted a range of system outcomes. Though fostering requisite variety in the 
traditional sense of mirroring the target public demographics was impossible, the 
USCG used cultural translators to help increase the diversity of responder and 
communicator viewpoints. Additionally, USCG responders and communicators 
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made efforts to enact their desired reality. One metric of a successful complex 
response that was not consistently present was the concept of double-loop 
learning. In this section I will briefly match each of the metrics to aspects of the 
USCG response and compare them to the metrics of success identified by 
responders.
Complexity Absorption
Goal Complexity. As can be expected from an organization with the motto 
“always ready,” USCG responders and communicators pursued a complex variety 
of communications goals, though the stated organizational goal of decreased 
involvement was a form of complexity reduction. The USCG was able to shift 
focus as time passed, challenges were met, and new problems emerged. 
Participants noted an organizational willingness to absorb goal complexity, 
communicating in collaboration with the JIC, with HGOs, and with US news 
media for different purposes. The capacity to absorb complexity earned the USCG 
the title of “federal first responder,” a label that speaks less to medical capabilities  
and more to resourcefulness and willingness to take on new challenges. Goal 
complexity absorption contributed to creation of the JTF and the JIC, and 
emerged in discussion as themes of flexibility and adaptability. Many 
participants noted it as a measure of success.
Strategic Complexity. The USCG employed a diverse array of strategies to 
communicate with their publics. Early in the response USCG communicators 
developed several strategies to gather information and imagery: manually 
transporting digital media cards onboard medevac flights, interviewing personnel 
returning from the scene, and using media inquiries to assess needs on the 
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ground. Non-traditional USCG strategies facilitated the restoration process: 
Responders drove to the homes of HGO professionals to make sure they were 
included in restoration planning meetings, and the PSU crafted a customized 
training program to increase HGO capacity.  USCG participants took pride in 
their strategic complexity, often highlighting the ways that Haiti did not allow 
traditional response models to work as context for their achievements. 
Interaction Complexity. USCG communicators and responders targeted 
multiple levels of the response structure: other agencies, news media from many 
countries, and Haitian partners. Their absorption of interaction complexity was 
manifested as a communications network instead of a hierarchy, but the USCG 
response participated in both complexity absorption and reduction. The JIC 
displayed characteristics of a hierarchy: centralized reporting and strategic 
formation. Autonomous USCG agents operating in Haiti created a 
communication network that influenced the course of the USCG and USG 
response. Responders and communicators expressed frustration with 
hierarchical elements of the response, but generally did not identify network-
based communication as more successful.
Permeable Boundaries
The impermeable boundaries I observed while in Port au Prince were 
troubling. Even the minimal number of USCG personnel with experience in Haiti 
prior to the earthquake would have been insufficient to provide the entire 
response with an accurate view of local needs, so interaction with local publics 
and information exchange was critical in shaping the response. Cultural 
translators worked towards permeable boundaries by both encouraging 
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interaction and filling in the gaps when it hadn't yet occurred. Autonomy was 
also instrumental at maintaining permeability. Autonomous agents increased the 
“surface area” of the communicative response, allowing more points of contact 
between the communicators and local publics and speeding up diffusion or 
absorption of needs, concerns, and messages. The joint operational and 
information responses also attempted to maintain permeable boundaries. The 
JIC challenged basic media relations models in favor of a more holistic approach 
by including InfoOps, public relations, public affairs, and partnerships with 
NGOs. The permeable JTF boundaries were not planned, but participants 
identified the loose lines of communication as an important source of 
adaptability in the early stage of the response.
Predicting a Range of System States and Emulating Requisite Variety
These two concepts are closely related, though they were not equally 
present in the response. The USCG response attempted to foster requisite variety 
by tapping USCG responders with past experience in Haiti. USCG cultural  
translators sought HGO participation, but their stated purpose was restoring 
HGO control, not seeking HGO input on problems confronting the response. I 
believe that the theoretical metric correlates with a shortcoming of the response: 
the lack of Haitian voices in guiding the USCG actions may have been a weakness 
retarding the restoration process. The requisite variety that the USCG was able 
to emulate allowed responders and communicators to predict a range of  
outcomes. In Florida, communicators balanced their predictions throughout the 
response, identifying when to remain silent and when to broadcast their 
preparations for mass migration. The JIC was also successful at predicting 
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potential outcomes, carefully guiding the focus of communications to coincide 
with accomplishments of the response. The operational response demonstrated 
the necessity for many inputs – its interagency structure drew on the diverse 
organizational specialties to realize a whole of government response.
Enacted Reality
Military Public Affairs Officers preferred to disassociate from the label of 
public relations. They felt it was too closely linked to image, spin, and 
manipulation. Despite that, image concerns shaped the USCG response. 
Responders and communicators wanted to show that the US Government 
supported the Haitian Government in a humanitarian response, and their desire 
to present that image pushed the response towards that pattern. Cultural  
translators discouraged actions that were inappropriate to the humanitarian 
image. Similarly, the desire to present a joint communication effort manifested a 
joint communication effort; the communicative framework came together in part 
to broadcast its own existence. This appears circular, but I consider it enactment 
because the desire to present an image influenced the operational and 
informational structures to fit that image. The image that responders hold of 
their own actions can drastically influence how they respond.
Double-Loop Learning 
Double-loop learning (DLL) that had occurred during previous responses 
helped the USG forces organize after the earthquake, and DLL related to this 
response helped the USCG keep focus and achieve objectives. Beyond just 
addressing the needs following the quake, USCG responders had to learn to work 
and communicate in a foreign system, though not all responders “got it” 
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afterwards. The JIC structure was a successful result of previous DLL, and was 
credited as a strong success by all of the participants involved in it. Participants 
expressed frustration with the communication and organization structures of the 
JTF and doubted that it would be retained or effective in future international 
disaster responses, indicating an absence of DLL. My conversations with HGOs 
led me to believe that DLL was absent at the local level because their only lesson 
learned was that they should make a plan for earthquake response, instead of 
addressing general communication and response principles on a broader scale 
but I may have failed to access the proper information during my interviews.
Matching Themes to Theory
Several of the themes that participants mentioned when describing 
successes of the response had parallels in complexity theory. The USCG response 
was lauded for its flexibility and adaptability. Flexibility, identified by 
participants as a responding agency's capacity to the communicate with different 
partners in pursuit of different objectives, is similar to the concept of goal 
complexity, but also included a willingness to maintain permeable boundaries  
and take historical context into consideration. Adaptability, which participants 
used to describe instances communicative action helping the response overcome 
unexpected obstacles, is similar to strategic complexity, but also shares aspects 
of self-organization, and their descriptions of adaptation often included 
references to interaction complexity. Cultural translators enabled both 
flexibility and adaptability. They helped an unfamiliar response communicate in 
Haiti by causing small-scale cosmology episodes and filling in gaps of 
understanding. By promoting relationships between the USCG response and 
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HGO publics, cultural translators infused the organization with a closer 
approximation of requisite variety, which resulted in greater flexibility. 
Autonomy may be the most important theme to emerge from a complex 
examination of the response. Complex systems are by definition averse to 
centralization and reduction. Autonomous communicating and decision-making 
by trusted actors, which the USCG and its locally-experienced responders were 
generally considered, allowed the response to absorb goal, strategic, and 
interaction complexity. Self organization without autonomy is significantly more 
difficult, as evident in participant complaints about excess bureaucracy hindering 
quick action and effective communication. 
The inefficiencies that responders attributed to excessive bureaucracy 
could have instead been the result of the nascent communication structure 
working towards a more functional organization, though one USCG responder 
shared a cynical perspective on the process: “We won’t learn the lessons that we 
need to learn and change quickly or adequately enough for the next 
response...we’re not quick to change.” An alternate explanation may be the 
frequently cited security restrictions that many responders felt were excessive to 
the actual risk. Autonomy could have alleviated these issues as well, and can 
coexist with centralization as long as the centralized authority trusts its agents:  
the response to fears of mass migration serves as an successful example of this 
arrangement. The strongest support for autonomous operation I found is that the 
majority of highlighted themes central to the responses success were not planned 
prior to the response. Instead, they were introduced by experienced actors and 
organizations operating independently and immersed in the local context of 
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events. Many of these themes also emerged when I considered the response 
through the lens of problem solving theory.
Situational Theory of Problem Solving
I tested Kim and Grunig's (2011) Situational Theory of Problem Solving by 
picking problems identified by participants and examining the problem solving 
process from a communication perspective. Kim and Grunig labeled the STPS as 
an extension of the STP, and each of my problem solving scenarios includes one 
of the USCG's publics, but I have chosen for my test to include the USCG 
responders and communicators involved in each problem in the scenario. While I 
recognize this decision deviates from the application suggested by Kim and 
Grunig in their presentation of the theory, I believe that the embedded nature of 
crisis management requires a similarly embedded approach. Crisis managers are 
not some abstract managerial function removed from their publics, many times 
they are subjected to the same social forces, or in this case, the same catastrophes 
and problems.
I identified many more problems than I have room to address, so I chose 
three problems demonstrative of the larger grouping. The three problems I 
picked covered three planes of applicability: internal to the response 
organization, external to the response organization, and across the boundaries of 
the response organization. In their response narratives, participants described 
the communicative actions taken in solving the problems, which I attempted to 
fit into the model proposed by Kim and Grunig (figures 1, 2, & 3).  The problems 
were:
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 Creating a communicative framework integrating the responding agencies: 
DOD, USG-civilian, and USCG (an internal problem).
 Planning mass migration response and addressing public fear of mass 
migration (an external problem).
 Restoration of HGOs to control (a boundary crossing problem).
Each of the problems I selected was reported by participants as solved by the 
time the bulk of the USCG response left Haiti in late February, approximately one 
and a half months after the earthquake.
Too Many Chiefs: The Problem of Integration
Integration was the “big ugly monster,”challenging the response effort. 
This scenario allowed me to test the STPS as intended by its authors because the 
joint response force fit the definition of a public. As presented in Figure 1, the 
problem of integration was viewed in similar terms by most participants and all 
recognized that there was a problem. The USCG and its interagency publics did 
not initially acknowledge similar levels of involvement; participants reported that 
the individualistic communication approach of some response agencies conflicted 
with the joint approach espoused by the JIC and JTF. Participants identified a 
consistent list of constraints, which combined with the conflicted perceptions of 
involvement may have decreased the situational motivation for the problem 
solvers and may explain why many participants reported a prolonged process of 
integration. Of note is the differing perceptions of justifiable presence, which may 
have influenced the level of bureaucracy manifested during integration - less 
certainty would contribute to a self-conscious response structure reluctant to act  
for fear of international reprisal, whereas low uncertainty of presence could 
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manifest as a less restrictive organizational framework, the equivalent of a carte  
blanche.
Respondents identified several characteristics of the USCG response 
matching the description of referent criterion. Kim and Grunig (2011) described 
the criterion as cognitive problem solving shortcuts created by previous 
experience, knowledge, or judgement patterns. USCG had a history of 
coordination with both civilian and military partners, which provided the 
decisional framework necessary at both the interpersonal and organizational 
level to  communicate through a successful integration. The informational 
response was similarly facilitated by the existence of the JIC model, developed in 
the early 2000's and adopted by most of the responding agencies prior to the 
earthquake. The ability to reference an existing framework for the informational 
response decreased-- though it did not eliminate--the need for communicative 
action to solve the problem of integration. 
Respondents identified information transmission as the most critical 
communicative action for solving problems of integration. Operationally, 
forwarding information allowed agencies to cooperate in the absence of formal 
organizational bonds and relationships. The DOD, traditionally tight-lipped 
about operational capabilities and missions, eventually loosened and began 
sharing response information with the rest of the response partners, but the 
USCG took the lead. The informational response pushed shared talking points, 
daily themes, and an overall USG image out to all the participating agency 
communicators, which fostered an integrated communicative effort. 
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Responses conformed to the three categories of communicative action. In 
general the successful actions conformed to the active categories of forefending, 
forwarding, and seeking information, matching the theoretically predicted 
results. Responders offered anecdotes where a lack of information forefending 
impeded the problem solving process, suggesting that passive communicative 
action did not support problem solving. Information seeking was highlighted as 
an important communicative action in both the informational and operational 
integration. Drawing on experienced responders – identified here as cultural 
translators – and conducting daily meetings to seek out emergent needs 
facilitated the integration process.
Working Ourselves Out of a Job: How to Restore Local Control
The problem of restoration crossed the boundaries of the response 
structure and entered the realm of the HGOs. Figure 2 displays the problem 
solving effort in the STPS framework. In this problem solving action, participants 
concurred on the problem, but opinions differed on the constraints and levels of 
involvement. Responders who reported low cultural familiarity perceived a weak 
work ethic in the HGOs, while responders reporting high cultural familiarity 
attributed the same attitudes to the trauma of the disaster. Responders reported 
disagreements over level of involvement; some responding forces saw their role 
solely as providing the needed aid to the afflicted populations while other 
responding forces saw their role as assisting the HGOs. Cultural translators 
facilitated the solution of this problem, using their familiarity with local systems 
to educate unfamiliar responders and maintain restoration as a primary objective 
of the response. 
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USCG experience served as the obvious referent criterion in restoring the 
maritime transit system. The USCG relied on responders who had working 
relationships with HGOs. Other responding agencies identified the absence of 
these relationships as an impediment to restoring local control. Responders who 
were familiar with local systems, communications practices, and attitudes were 
not only able to communicate better, but could identify systems that were 
functional by local standards even if they did not necessarily conform to 
American standards. Most importantly to problem solving, they were able to help 
unfamiliar responders adapt their decisional frames and see these situations in 
appropriate context.
Participants describing the communicative actions they took in solving 
this problem, focused on information forwarding. The problem solving that 
response forces engaged in to restore HGOs to control following the immediate 
medical response appeared to conform to the STPS model. The three 
communicative actions were not viewed as equally important by responders, but 
some aspect of each was present. Daily briefs between the USCG and HGOs 
fostered a collaborative transfer process by pushing information. Cultural  
translators made sure that unfamiliar responders were presented with the local 
knowledge they needed to operate without upsetting HGOs. Our discussions 
revealed limited use of information forefending and criticisms of insufficient 
information seeking by the responders. All of the HGOs I spoke with reported 
that the response could have conducted a better needs assessment. If the cultural  
translators had not been present, this failure to consider local perspectives could 
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have subverted the authority of the HGOs, harming the relationship and 
threatening the restoration. 
Interesting to me were reports from the HGOs that the USCG followed a 
clearly defined plan throughout the response. I developed several possible 
explanations for this differing perspective. The Haitian agencies may have 
observed the USCG in action and assumed motive behind the motions. 
Alternately, the Haitian standards of a plan may be less stringent than the USCG 
standards. Finally, I acknowledge the possibility that the Haitian agencies I spoke 
with were reluctant to portray the USCG in a negative light, and thus consciously 
or unconsciously decided to credit responders with more organization than the 
responders themselves felt they had.
Reservations and Reassurance: Communicating the Mass Migration Response
This external problem changed over time. The first phase was proactively 
silent, the second phase was reactively vocal. The phase shift was primed by the 
USG granting TPS to Haitians who had been living in the US since before the 
earthquake. The JIC release of an out-of-context photograph of an overloaded 
Haitian ferry prompted fears of a mass migration, triggering the shift. In the first 
phase, USCG communicators had to prepare for a mass migration without 
detracting from the humanitarian image of the response. In the second phase, 
communicators needed to address perceptions in South Florida of an imminent 
mass migration. Communicators involved in solving this problem reported high 
levels of concurrence over the nature of the problem, the constraints they faced, 
and their level of involvement. The referent criterion was the history of 
interaction between the USCG and South Florida; the USCG had run public 
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awareness campaigns on mass migration for years prior to the earthquake, which 
contributed to the public fear. 
With full concurrence from the problem solvers on all of the situational 
antecedents, we could expect this problem solving experience to hew most closely 
to the STPS model (figure 3). While communicators reported that information 
transmission and acquisition played a strong role in the problem solving process, 
there was minimal evidence of information selection as an important action.  The 
closest example reported was one of forefending, when communicators ignored 
the JIC emphasis on the humanitarian image in order to promptly address public 
fear of a migration. 
Matching themes to theory
The themes of autonomy and cultural translators emerged often in 
discussions of these three problem solving processes. Cultural translators at the 
individual and organizational level were essential for accelerating and 
streamlining the process of integration and restoration, acting in a similar 
pattern to the biological concept of a catalyst (Tortora, Funke, & Case, 2007). 
Cultural translators were able to identify and respond to the growing public fear 
of mass migration before any other communicators, navigating the Scylla and 
Charybdis of public fear and image crisis. The concept I have identified as 
cultural translators is similar to the concept of the referent criterion, but the 
referent criterion is a cognitive shortcut resulting in less communicative action 
whereas cultural translators, though they likely possess those cognitive 
shortcuts, are able to see the absence of such shortcuts in culturally unfamiliar 
agents and help them bridge the gap. On an organizational level, the USCG's past 
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experiences: integrating with military and civilian agencies, interacting with 
HGOs, and communicating with South Florida news media; seems to have 
increased the obligation on the USCG to engage in the communicative behaviors 
to solve the emergent problems. This finding challenges the definition of the 
referent criterion in the full scope of the problem solving process: though 
previous experience may lead to shortcuts, those shortcuts do not always 
decrease the communicative demands if they are not held by all agents in the 
process. Autonomy, an identified characteristic of USCG organizational culture, 
helped to alleviate the need for communicative action, and was identified by 
participants as a critical component of the problem solving process.
While autonomy and integration seem to conflict, I found that when 
locally experienced agents were excepted from rigid centralized regulation they 
reported greater efficacy in achieving the organizational goals. Equally important 
were reports from experienced personnel of addressing needs before they were 
identified by the overall response structure, thereby streamlining the entire 
integration process. Autonomy as described by participants incorporated two of 
the communicative actions: information forwarding and information seeking. 
Autonomous agents sought out information based on their local contexts and 
forward information up their chain of command that they feel is important, 
whether solicited or not. In the crippled communication environment of post-
earthquake Haiti, these traits were essential in integrating the response effort. I  
also identified these themes at work in the other two problem scenarios. 
Autonomous agents ensured that HGOs were included throughout the 
restoration process, and the independent information seeking and forwarding of 
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communicators allowed the USCG to promptly address the public fears of mass 
migration. Only one example emerged of autonomous actions hindering any of 
the problem solving scenarios, but it could also be interpreted as a failure of 
information transmission. USCG medical responders failed to communicate with 
the HGO personnel on the ground when they were evacuating injured Haitian 
citizens to the USNS COMFORT. This failure of communication could have 
derailed the restoration process by excluding HGOs in the response, decreasing 
their involvement recognition. Despite the unrealized consequences of these 
scenarios, participant consensus was significant enough in many cases that I feel 
I can draw practical implications from both of the theories and from my study of 
the response.
Practical Implications
In four years of operational experience with the USCG, I have intercepted 
drug smugglers, searched for lost scuba divers, treated self-inflicted wounds on 
refugees, and responded to burning ships at sea. These are every day Coast Guard 
events, and all of those responses depended on organizational knowledge and 
checklists. In post-quake Haiti, responders and communicators quickly realized 
that there was no checklist for what they had to accomplish. From the moment 
the dust settled to the day the bulk of USCG responders left the country and the 
JIC went silent, the USCG and partner agencies were solving problems and 
communicating in a complex, uncertain environment. My research has 
demonstrated the descriptive efficacy of complexity theory and provided an 
important preliminary application of STPS. Additionally, I believe this study may 
also indicate normative possibilities for future response efforts and directions for 
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future research. None of my participants reported a specific theoretical 
framework that they employed, and I think that a real-world response would be 
under-informed if it was dependent on a single worldview. In this section I 
discuss overall practical applications rooted in the two theories.
The concepts of cultural translators, adaptability, flexibility, and 
autonomy combined and operationalized the concepts of the two theories. For 
future responders, the idea of the referent criterion might prove critical, 
especially knowing how to recognize which agents of a response structure possess 
it. The USCG did a capable job of this by drawing on its internal experience base, 
an action that any future international response will likely benefit from. For a 
crisis manager, simply calling in experience will likely prove insufficient, so I 
addressed managerial considerations for harnessing cultural translators in my 
analysis.
Local experience is a valuable tool for a response organization, as stated by 
director of the JTF General Keen (2010) in his post-response list of future 
priorities: “Protecting the people, understanding their culture, speaking their 
language, living among the populace, and developing a relationship with the 
community leaders,” but that does not mean that organizations should depend on 
its culturally aware personnel to run the response. A case study of two medical 
clinics established after the quake illustrated this tragically (Rosborough,  2010):  
A clinic composed of localized responders with less experience operating in 
disaster situations than a clinic of recently arrived foreigners yielded significantly 
lower survival rates in its patients. Cultural awareness is complementary to, not a 
replacement for crisis management experience. The three actions that most 
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successfully tapped the experience of the cultural translators were conducting 
needs assessment, fostering relationships, and assessing how actions will be 
interpreted by local agents. An additional action that I believe the cultural 
translators could have contributed to was conducting an effective security 
assessment – balancing the security and agency of the response organizations 
and avoiding the harmful consequences of unrealistic perceptions of violence. 
Finally, I feel it is important to reiterate that the title cultural translator is often 
a relative definition. An agent with more experience in a particular culture than 
the majority of other agents will be a useful source of knowledge and guidance, 
but would be best utilized as a facilitator of communication to promote 
understanding rather than a long-term voice of the target publics.
From a centralized crisis management perspective, autonomy may appear 
destabilizing, but can also be extremely beneficial. An experienced autonomous 
agent can address nascent needs, distributing and decentralizing both the 
influence and the awareness of the responding agency. On the other hand, a 
reckless or green agent left unmonitored can harm the overall mission, upset a 
delicate balance of international relations, and generally get little done.  
Hierarchy is inescapable in the federal response structure, and is advantageous 
for many reasons, so balance is key. I believe that an organizational culture of 
needs assessment, both internal and external, will address this. If autonomous 
agents are treated as internal publics by response hierarchies, they will be able to 
provide important feedback, voice needs, and be tracked. 
The STPS provides a useful framework for managers to evaluate an agent's 
potential to operate autonomously. Evaluating the motivational and referent 
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criteria of an asset can help determine its capability to engage in communicative 
action and solve problems. This suggestion may carry a higher level of risk than 
the federal culture of bureaucracy and centralization is comfortable with, but it is  
made in the context of an earthquake that was orders of magnitude more 
devastating than any response plan was prepared for.
Adaptability and flexibility are similarly troublesome concepts for a 
response organization to strive for. My study of this case revealed an unexpected 
duality of purpose: the USCG embraced a complex set of goals and strategies, but 
all were in pursuit of a singular end result. When participants reported that they 
showed up “without a plan” or “without goals,” what they actually meant was that  
they showed up knowing that they needed to work themselves out of a job, but 
unsure how they would get there. This overarching goal served as a guideline for 
the response, allowing divergent actions, sub goals, and an overall objective to 
evaluate against. There were occasions where sub-goals came into conflict:  
continued USCG administration of the port may have been more efficient than 
HGO management, because of USCG experience high-volume vessel traffic, but 
that decision would delayed HGO resumption of control and extend the 
requirement of USCG presence.
The metrics set forth by complexity scholars for assessing a successful 
response might be the closest thing to a checklist that future crisis managers 
need. If viewed as a series of prompts, perhaps adapted to organizational 
specifics, the categories of permeable boundaries, requisite variety, double loop 
learning, enacted realities and complexity absorption serve as a useful cognitive 
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guide for assessing the development and execution of a response. A rough 
example of what this prompt-list might look like is included in Appendix F.
A final practical consideration is how to foster a problem solving setting 
among responders and communicators. From the perspective of a crisis manager, 
this can be useful in prompting autonomy and taking advantage of a 
decentralized system. My findings supported the STPS model, so I used it as my 
basis. In general, any actions that increase the situational motivation to 
communicate should increase communicative action. Managers could increase 
problem recognition by seeking organizational concurrence on the nature and 
scope of the problems and by polling response agents to determine their 
perceptions of the problem. Increasing involvement recognition is more 
complicated than saying: “We're all in this together.” A manager must ensure that 
all participants recognize one another as partners, both inside and outside of the 
organizational boundaries, and that participants acknowledged and accepted 
their role in the response organization. Decreasing constraint recognition could 
be as simple as ensuring responders that their decisions would be supported in 
after action review, or could be a more complicated process of freeing operational 
resources to address responder needs. 
To fully integrate STPS into practice, we must also consider how to 
facilitate the second half of the model. Communicative action requires 
infrastructure, which Haiti lacked. My research did not directly address the 
technical aspects of the USCG response, but revealed strategic complexity in 
USCG approaches to communications. Social media, satellite phones, VHF 
radios, hand held radios, courier services, and word-of-mouth transmission were 
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all harnessed to pass operational and informational messages and conduct needs 
assessment. I consider this a noteworthy practice of the USCG response, and a 
flexible approach to organizational communications to be emulated in future 
responses.
Limitations
A single case study of an organization does not offer a comprehensive view 
of a response, but the pool of USCG crisis managers involved in this response was 
small enough that I felt I was able to gather the majority of perspectives. I was 
only able to gain access to one of the primary USCG publics to seek a more 
holistic understanding of the response process, which limited my ability to 
answer RQ #2. Interviewing more members of the USCG's publics would have 
enabled a stronger assessment of how cultural translators' efforts to influence 
communication were successful or unsuccessful, and whether the absence of 
cultural translators affected the response negatively. I conducted my research 18 
months after the earthquake struck, which may have distorted recollections of the 
response or may have enabled participants to find deeper meaning in what they 
experienced. Conducting additional studies of other organizations involved in the 
response would have provided valuable triangulation and would have allowed me 
to compare and contrast the effects of varied levels of experience.
The month I spent working and researching in Haiti yielded marginal 
gains in my cultural understanding. Throughout this thesis I have framed any 
commentary on Haiti as the perspectives of my participants, but my lack of 
understanding has limited my ability to assess the impact of cultural awareness. I  
was only able to identify critical points based on comparisons of responses, not 
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on my own experience and knowledge. This was also a limitation because I had 
no set metric for evaluating the cultural awareness of my participants. Their self-
assessment of awareness, lacked a uniform definition and ranking system, 
complicating the validity of their evaluations. By contrast, I was able to assess 
practices that adhered to or deviated from USCG policy based on my nine years of 
military service. 
My USCG service also needs to be noted as a limitation. No matter how 
hard I have tried to remain objective and reflexive, my referent criterion of 
service is a difficult decision frame to circumvent. My experiences carry the 
potential to obstruct results, fill in gaps of knowledge, and frame my research 
findings. I have tried in this thesis to be critical when it was necessary, though I 
was lucky to not find many situations requiring criticism. My USCG background 
also provided me unrestricted access to a wealth of internal knowledge, including 
thousands of documents compiled by the USCG historian, a military liaison in the 
US Embassy in Haiti, and the trust and confidence of most of the military 
personnel I interacted with. Overall, I am confident that my history of USCG 
service was more a boon than a curse.
Directions for Future Research
In the course of my ongoing research I discovered several other theories 
that seemed like they could explain aspects of the response narrative I assembled. 
Naturalistic Decision-Making (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008) describes the process of 
contextually embedded decision making in terms very similar to those used by 
responders with experience working in Haiti. A further comparison between that 
theory and my identified concepts of cultural translators and autonomy would 
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be a valuable assessment of alternate explanations.  I was relieved to learn that I  
was not the first person to present the concept of a cultural translator. A 1995 
meta-analysis of international PR practices by Grunig, Grunig, Sriramesh, 
Huang, and Lyra found the concept used by Greek PR practitioners working for 
international corporations. The study speculated that the concept should exist in 
most organizations seeking to interact with culturally diverse publics, but also 
suggested that it may not be distinct from the other four models of interaction 
they had identified. Though my research clearly applied the cultural translator 
concept to complexity theory and STPS, further research or application could 
validate or challenge their findings. As the US continues its involvement in 
foreign disaster response and crisis management, more case study opportunities 
will present themselves. The UN was an additional subject for study in Haiti that 
I was only able to interact with briefly, but the different approaches espoused in 
UN doctrine would provide a valuable contrast to the methods I examined in the 
USCG response. 
Conclusion
My goal in this study was to reconstruct an international disaster response 
from a communication perspective and to identify whether cultural awareness or 
ignorance affected the response. My preliminary research created an expectation 
a severe conflict between the response and the Haitian culture it addressed, but I 
quickly learned otherwise. In speaking with USCG responders and 
communicators, members of HGOs, and other partner agencies, I discovered a 
more nuanced version of influence, experience, and judgement. The response was 
not simply a bunch of Americans arriving in the disaster ravaged third world, nor 
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was it the locally experienced Americans battling a horde of insensitive agents. 
Cultural understanding was important from a practical perspective; ensuring that 
responders interacted within locally acceptable standards likely facilitated the  
transfer of control back to HGOs. Without the awareness that cultural  
translators provided, the cultural dissonance may have delayed the restoration 
process. Autonomous agents expanded the awareness and influence of the central 
command, frequently fixing problems before they emerged on the organizational 
level or drawing attention to issues before they “grew legs.” Cultural translators 
and autonomy infused the USCG response with adaptability and flexibility. 
Recognizing that, my hope was that I could make suggestions for future 
responses to do the same.
There is no guarantee that a response agency will have personnel familiar 
with the environment in an international response, but future responses stand to 
benefit from an internal search for experience. If identified, this experience can 
be used for cultural translation, an important tool for crisis management. In this 
response, cultural translation helped the USCG realize their end-state of 
returning control to local agencies and shape the image of the USG response, but 
in future responses it could be used to identify needs not apparent to foreigners, 
cement relationships for collaborative partnerships, or for other still unidentified 
uses.  Cultural translators and other personnel with applicable experience may 
be treated as autonomous agents. Managers can evaluate their problem solving 
capabilities to determine how much trust and independence to assign them, and 
treat them as internal publics to ensure that their needs are met and also that 
they are operating in line with the overall goals of the response. Finally, I directly 
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applied the two theories to the response process, presenting a rough prompt-list 
for practitioners and discussing how to foster a problem-solving environment. 
Though all of my research has been from the perspective of the USCG, crisis 
management is an adopted responsibility of the US government, the UN, and 
dozens of international response agencies. It is my hope that the considerations I 
have highlighted here will better prepare our responders to serve and empower 
international communities in a complex world, because we will never be able to 
predict what lies around the corner.
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Appendix A: Interview Schedule
Opening Statement:
Thank you very much for agreeing to speak with me. Before we begin, do I 
have your permission to record this interview? My name is David Connor, I am a 
researcher at the University of Maryland, and I am studying responses to the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti. I hope to understand how the USCG shaped its 
response, and how it communicated with its various publics. Though I can not 
offer any reward for speaking with me, I hope that my research will contribute to 
disaster research in ways that will help save lives in the future. 
My study has been approved by the UMD institutional review board, 
which oversees research ethics. This confidentiality agreement will discusses 
some of the concerns that the board addresses. Please read through it and sign it, 
and I’ll be happy to answer any questions you have.
● Could you please tell me your age?
● What languages would you consider yourself functional in?
● What is your rank and position?
● What was your rank and position at the time of the earthquake?
● Prior to the earthquake of 2010, had you responded to any disasters or 
attended any disaster training?
● Prior to the earthquake, had you visited Haiti
● How would you self-rate your familiarity with Haitian culture, 
tradition, and customs?
RQ1: How did the US Coast Guard shape and implement crisis 
management with its publics?
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RQ2: How did the publics of the US Coast Guard receive and respond 
to USCG communicative actions?
RQ3:  How did culture/history influence communications between 
the USCG and its publics?
Interview Schedule
● Please walk me through your experience of the Coast Guard’s response 
taking shape. (RQ1, 2, 3)
● what did you perceive to be the driving forces of the response?
● what were your critical concerns during the response, specifically 
with regards to communication?
● in retrospect, do you feel that there were any signs or opportunities 
that you missed?
● do you feel that there was enough information available to make 
decisions with confidence?
● what changes did you observe in the Coast Guard’s response 
structure across the course of the response?
● did the plan consider Haitian culture and history or would it have 
been the same for other Caribbean countries?
● How well did the plan as you were familiar with it translate into practice? 
(RQ1)
● What stands out in your memory about the Coast Guard’s response 
performance? (RQ1, 2, 3)
● what did you feel was successful?
● what did you feel was unsuccessful?
 155
● what would you have done differently?
● How did the Coast Guard get its messages out? (RQ2)
● What was your perception of the message content sent to the Haitian 
people? (RQ2)
● Did you interact with the Haitian people during your course of the 
response? (RQ1, 2, 3)
● what was the nature of your interactions?
Closing
Thank you for sharing your time and experience with me. I deeply 
appreciate your willingness to revisit this hard time in your life, and I will do my 
best to make sure that the experience you have shared with me will be used to 
better respond to future disasters. If you have any questions, or would like 
further information, please contact me via phone/email/mail. Thanks again for 
your help!
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Appendix E: STPS Models of USCG Problems
Figure 1. Integration problems in the STPS model.
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Figure 2: Mass-migration problems in the STPS model. 
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Figure 3. Restoration Problems in the STPS Model
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Appendix F: Sample Prompt-list for Crisis Managers
Permeable Boundaries
 List who you are helping.
◦ What have they identified as their needs?
◦ What do you perceive to be their needs?
◦ Can you justify any difference between the previous two answers?
 Who are you communicating with (inside and outside the org)?
◦ Do they have a similar perspective on the situation as you?
◦ Do they have access to the same information? Do they need it?
 If you could have access to one additional perspective, whose would it be?
Enacted Reality
 What is your desired end state?
◦ What prevents you from getting there?
◦ What problems must you address?
▪ If you had full confidence in your capacity, what action would you take?
◦ What can you put off until later?





 List your current goals.
 List related goals/problems.
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◦ Who is addressing them?
 If a beneficiary or a member at the lowest level of your organization had a 
critical concern, how would it get to the level needed to prompt action.
 How is upper level messaging/intent reaching responders? Beneficiaries?
 How are response assets communicating?
 What can you do to accelerate your objectives?
Predicted Range of Outcomes
 Who are you trying to communicate with?
 Who is watching you?
 Who are you trying to help?
 The above three groups are your publics. Present each message/goal to a 
theoretical panel of your publics. 
◦ How will each interpret it?
◦ Do you feel each interpretation is important?
 If a US news outlet was covering an action you are considering, how would 
they report it?
Double-loop Learning
 What has exacerbated the crisis? What is currently making it worse?
◦ Aside from directly assessing the needs, how can you improve your 
response?
◦ What aspects of the organization are hindering the response?
▪ How can you remove obstructions?
▪ Will it happen again next time?
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 If this crisis happened in the US, would your response be different? What 
about the other side of the world?
Requisite Variety/Autonomous Agents
 List the members in your organization who are the most knowledge about the 
situation.
◦ Can you tap their experience?
◦ Do they have experience in disaster response?
◦ How can you deploy them and stay aware of their needs and discoveries?
 Do you have access to local perspectives? Can you get access?
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Appendix G: Additional Findings
Mass Migration
According to participants, government planners do not consider mass 
migration a likely result of a single event, as one USCG communicator observed, 
“history has told us that’s simply not true, and so the plan is predisposed to the 
notion that...mass migration’s going to build up over a period of time.” Despite 
that, the earthquake was seen as a potential trigger: 
At the time of the earthquake, someone said ‘y’know, I’m not sure that 
we’re going to have that kind of time. let’s get the smart minds of the task 
force together and have you figure out how could we, if we had to, light off 
the mass migration plan quickly. How do we achieve that?’
which forced responders and communicators to implement the plan in days 
instead of weeks. 
Florida, Operational Communication Response
The USCG Incident Management Team (IMT) was responsible for 
conducting needs assessment for USCG responders and re-establishing 
communication with USCG assets in Haiti prior to the earthquake. The response 
adhered to the terms of the Incident Command System (ICS), a flexible response 
framework that all USCG personnel receive training on. Though ICS was 
designed to enable California fire departments from different counties to 
integrate in battling forest fires, it is general enough to accommodate a broad 
spectrum of agency and disaster types. FEMA uses ICS, but the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) do not, nor did the effected local 
agencies that the Coast Guard was working with. The response in Florida at the 
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District level was well practiced due to frequent hurricanes, though earthquakes 
and scales of destruction present in Haiti were unfamiliar. As one of the Florida-
based responders admitted to me, “it opened our eyes to the possibility of having 
to respond to something other than a typical weather and mass migration 
scenarios that we play out routinely.” The responder also noted that the existing 
plan was adaptable to fit the crisis describing the Incident Management Team 
(IMT), a component of the ICS: 
We didn't really have to vary our IMT that much, we just expanded it quite 
a bit as we started tracking more supplies and response effort as well as 
personnel who went down range...like our normal IMT on steroids...IMTs 
are scalable. We added additional elements such as the logistics branch at  
[Guantanamo Bay, Cuba], but we also added additional personnel because 
we were running around the clock operations.
Rapid expansion was possible in part because of the Coast Guard’s extensive 
reserve personnel system, where USCG personnel in civilian jobs are activated 
either cyclically or in response to emergent needs. The IMT preceded a larger 
management effort by the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) of DOD, and was 
able to provide guidance to the larger response. 
The Vacuum Preceding The Joint Task Force
I accidentally omitted the word communication when asking one senior 
responder about overarching USCG concerns during the response and he 
suggested, “I think you’re pointing your questions, I think, in a vacuum.” His 
implication was not that the response lacked concerns, but that it was 
multifaceted and too diverse to be summarized in a single statement. The Coast 
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Guard response in Haiti coalesced in a piecemeal, disjointed fashion, eventually 
solidifying around the emergent structure of the Joint Task Force (JTF). A senior 
responder recounted the first days, when USCG personnel, “showed up at the 
embassy who just got on an airplane and came down there, they were ordered 
down there, it wasn’t on their own behalf, the question was ‘why are you here?’  
and none of them could answer that question,” which was of particular concern in 
Haiti because, “If you respond to a natural disaster in the US, you just draw range 
rings and say ‘OK, we can stay in this hotel here.’ If you’re responding to a third-
world country which has suffered that much damage, you’re sleeping under a 
desk.” By the eighth day after the quake, the Coast Guard daily briefings indicate 
that all living facilities for inbound responders were full, suggesting that the 
ground response had reached capacity.
That same responder later observed that, “after a while more of the 
Coasties were really working for the Joint Command, the JTF commander...It fell 
into where it was supposed to be.” Coast Guard integration into the JTF structure 
was attained via daily meetings and organizational negotiations. UN responders 
reported a similar process for integrating the new civilian response structure 
after the incumbent leadership was killed in the collapse of the Hotel Montana.
The effort to bring in appropriate personnel was hindered by a lack of 
“preparedness by Coast Guard communicators to be deployed downrange on 
short notice,” as one responder noted:
They weren’t prepared to go down and be camped out at the airport for a 
long time. We didn’t have our own [Meals Ready to Eat], we didn’t have 
our own water, we didn’t have our own shelter, we didn’t have our own 
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sleeping bags unless they went to REI and bought it or something like that, 
so we were very ill prepared for that type of situation where we were going 
to be down in a foreign country for a long period of time. At the very 
beginning, we didn’t have...the required immunizations before we could 
get even go into the country.
Responders also commented on a lack of required weapons training for personnel 
protection and the under-availability of diplomatic government passports as 
impediments to moving personnel from the US into the response structure. 
Restoration
The restoration process was orchestrated by a US team called the 
Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit (MTSRU), which the USCG 
contributed to. Additionally, a USCG Port Security Unit (PSU) landed two weeks 
after the earthquake to conduct port security and assist the local agencies in 
resuming control of daily operations. USCG Responders to the port noted that 
they acquired a number of infrastructural responsibilities simply because of the 
capabilities they provided, as one senior responder noted:
We came with all this equipment and forces, it’s almost by default that we 
just kind of took it because they weren’t doing anything. You had ships 
coming in, it’s like ‘somebody has to be in charge of these ships coming in 
and making sure it gets where it needs to.’ And they weren’t doing it.
He contrasted the scene they encountered with what an equivalent disaster 
response might look like in the United States, where federal agencies respond to 
state governments. In this case, he observed,  “we were responding to nothing. 
So, we’re not going to sit around and wait, so we just kinda started reacting.”
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Participants perceived the assumption of control necessary due to the pressing 
needs of the population, even if it took control away from the local agencies.
Autonomy
A USCG responder described the day-to-day formation of the response 
and how the ability to autonomously choose objectives became a necessity to 
keeping responders engaged with the response effort:
They gave you tasking but it wasn’t anything that was really, ‘wow, this is  
bogging me down,’ ... That’s why I had to constantly be thinking about ‘ok, 
what else can we do, what else can we do?’ Because you can just look into 
that young guy’s eyes and say, ‘OK, we can’t have idle hands here,’ because 
you know what happens then.
A UN responder highlighted the value of delegating responsibility to the forces on 
the ground:
[We] came down with no plan, but were authorized for open action. This is 
important because, like any bureaucracy, UN actions are typically 
constrained by budget and must wait for votes of approval from the 
security council...we still had to account for everything...but we had our 
asses covered.
This enabled the UN to respond to emergent needs without the delay of higher-
level review and approval. Open approval also provided assurance to responders 
that their decisions would be supported after the fact, decreasing one aspect of 
uncertainty in the decision making process.
Autonomy is a strong example of structural complexity absorption.  The 
USCG  as an organization encourages absorption of structural complexity. Many 
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USCG responder criticisms addressed instances of structural complexity 
reduction; centralized command structure hindering the response's ability to 
adapt to emergent circumstances.
Cultural Awareness
Other responding USG agencies also drew from their internal experience bases 
with successful outcomes. A department of USAID granted most of its grants for 
reconstruction aid to NGOs with experience working in Haiti and reported that 
method as a generally successful strategy. One of the NGO participants I spoke 
with, a senior Haitian national consultant for a major international NGO, 
recounted his organization's process of drawing on responders with local 
experience, an action he highlighted as critical for an effective response. 
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Glossary
Acronyms are cold and impersonal, but a case study of a military organization 
that neglected to use them would stretch on to verbose infinity. Below is a list of 
the acronyms I have used in my thesis.
DOD: Department of Defense
DOS: Department of State, occasionally used synonymously with the US 
Embassy
HCG: Haitian Coast Guard (a division of the Haitian National Police)
HGO: Haitian Governmental Organizations (used in this thesis specifically to 
denote maritime agencies)
HSTF-SE: Homeland Security Task Force – Southeast. 
ICS: Incident Command System
IMT: Incident Management Team
JIC: Joint Information Center
JTF: Joint Task Force
MTSRU: Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit.
PaP: Port au Prince, capitol city of Haiti.
PSU: Port Security Unit (a Coast Guard team)
SOUTHCOM: The Southern Command of the Department of Defense
STPS: The Situational Theory of Problem Solving
TPS: Temporary Protected Status
USAID: United Sates Agency for International Development
USCG: United States Coast Guard
USCGC: United States Coast Guard Cutter
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USG: United States Government (used in this thesis specifically to denote 
government agencies involved in the Haitian earthquake response).
USNS: United States Naval Ship
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